163.700
Invasion of personal privacy in the second degree. (1) Except as provided in ORS
163.702, a person commits the crime of invasion of personal privacy in the
second degree if:
(a)(A) For the
purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of the person, the person
is in a location to observe another person in a state of nudity without the
consent of the other person; and
(B) The other
person is in a place and circumstances where the person has a reasonable
expectation of personal privacy; or
(b)(A) The person
knowingly makes or records a photograph, motion picture, videotape or other
visual recording of another person’s intimate area without the consent of the
other person; and
(B) The person
being recorded has a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning the intimate
area.
(2) As used in
this section and ORS 163.701:
(a) “Intimate
area” means nudity, or undergarments that are being worn by a person and are
covered by clothing.
(b) “Makes or
records a photograph, motion picture, videotape or other visual recording”
includes, but is not limited to:
(A) Making or
recording or employing, authorizing, permitting, compelling or inducing another
person to make or record a photograph, motion picture, videotape or other
visual recording.
(B) Making or
recording a photograph, motion picture, videotape or other visual recording
through the use of an unmanned aircraft system as defined in ORS 837.300, even
if the unmanned aircraft system is operated for commercial purposes in
compliance with authorization granted by the Federal Aviation Administration.
(c) “Nudity”
means any part of the uncovered or less than opaquely covered:
(A) Genitals;
(B) Pubic area;
or
(C) Female breast
below a point immediately above the top of the areola.
(d) “Places and
circumstances where the person has a reasonable expectation of personal privacy”
includes, but is not limited to, a bathroom, dressing room, locker room that
includes an enclosed area for dressing or showering, tanning booth and any area
where a person undresses in an enclosed space that is not open to public view.
(e) “Public view”
means that an area can be readily seen and that a person within the area can be
distinguished by normal unaided vision when viewed from a public place as
defined in ORS 161.015.
(f) “Reasonable
expectation of privacy concerning the intimate area” means that the person
intended to protect the intimate area from being seen and has not exposed the
intimate area to public view.
(3) Invasion of
personal privacy in the second degree is a Class A misdemeanor. [1997 c.697 §1;
2001 c.330 §1; 2009 c.877 §1; 2013 c.1 §11; 2015 c.321 §§1,4; 2016 c.72 §11]
Note: 163.700, 163.701 and 163.702 were
enacted into law by the Legislative Assembly but were not added to or made a
part of ORS chapter 163 or any series therein by legislative action. See
Preface to Oregon Revised Statutes for further explanation.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
17
cases (
2 in the last 5 years), 2000–2023 · leading case:
State v. Parra-Sanchez, 527 P.3d 1008 (Or. Ct. App. 2023).
State v. Parra-Sanchez, 527 P.3d 1008 (Or. Ct. App. 2023).
· cites it 23× “As a preliminary matter, it is worth stating out loud that defendant’s efforts to see his daughter’s naked body were wrong, and likely a criminal invasion of her privacy under ORS 163.700. To the extent that our case law regard- ing the crime of display has strayed at times from…”
State v. Mayes, 186 P.3d 293 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 23× “*388 The state charged defendant with multiple counts of violating ORS 163.700 as to the adult women and the girls.”
State v. McQueen, 478 P.3d 581 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
· cites it 41× “No rational trier of fact could have found that the person defendant recorded had a “reasonable expectation of privacy concerning” her “intimate area,” as that phrase is used in ORS 163.700 (1)(b)(B), because no rational trier of fact could determine that she intended to protect…”
State v. Rodriguez-Ganegar, 63 P.3d 1225 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 10× “For example, if someone (or the officers, for that matter) heard sounds emanating from the room that suggested that people were making love in it, the person would violate ORS 163.700(1)(b) by looking into the room in the manner that the officers did if the person did so to…”
State v. Luman, 223 P.3d 1041 (Or. 2009).
· cites it 4× “Defendant was charged with 48 counts of invasion of personal privacy, in violation of ORS 163.700. [1] Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the videotapes and all evidence derived from them, on the ground that the deputy viewed the videotapes without first securing a…”
State v. Stevenson, 2000 WI 71 (Wis. 2000).
· cites it 2× “Oregon's privacy statute, Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.700 (1997) reads in pertinent part: (1) Except as provided in ORS 163.”
State v. Daniels, 228 P.3d 695 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
“686; two counts of invasion of privacy, ORS 163.700; and one count of sexual abuse in the third degree, ORS 163.”
State v. Cazee, 482 P.3d 140 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).
“701; three counts of second-degree invasion of personal privacy, ORS 163.700; five counts of stalking, ORS 163.”
State v. Luman, 188 P.3d 372 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 2× “Defendant was convicted on 11 counts of invasion of personal privacy, ORS 163.700, 1 and argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying in part his motion to suppress evidence found on a videotape.”
State v. Dunlap, 168 P.3d 295 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
“At the time that defendant committed the crimes at issue, he was serving terms of probation imposed for a conviction in Yamhill County for invasion of personal privacy, ORS 163.700, and convictions in Washington County for invasion of personal privacy and encouraging child…”
State v. Smith, 372 P.3d 549 (Or. Ct. App. 2016).
“719(1) violates the Equal Protection Clause, as applied to his conviction for felony public indecency, because it is underinclusive, in that it does not apply to other crimes of the same or similar character including the felonies of first-degree custodial sexual misconduct, ORS…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.700(1) — 2 cases
State v. Mayes, 186 P.3d 293 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
“*388 The state charged defendant with multiple counts of violating ORS 163.700 as to the adult women and the girls.”
State v. McQueen, 478 P.3d 581 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
“No rational trier of fact could have found that the person defendant recorded had a “reasonable expectation of privacy concerning” her “intimate area,” as that phrase is used in ORS 163.700 (1)(b)(B), because no rational trier of fact could determine that she intended to protect…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.700(1)(a) — 1 case
State v. Parra-Sanchez, 527 P.3d 1008 (Or. Ct. App. 2023).
“As a preliminary matter, it is worth stating out loud that defendant’s efforts to see his daughter’s naked body were wrong, and likely a criminal invasion of her privacy under ORS 163.700. To the extent that our case law regard- ing the crime of display has strayed at times from…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.700(1)(b) — 2 cases
State v. Rodriguez-Ganegar, 63 P.3d 1225 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
“For example, if someone (or the officers, for that matter) heard sounds emanating from the room that suggested that people were making love in it, the person would violate ORS 163.700(1)(b) by looking into the room in the manner that the officers did if the person did so to…”
State v. McQueen, 478 P.3d 581 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
“No rational trier of fact could have found that the person defendant recorded had a “reasonable expectation of privacy concerning” her “intimate area,” as that phrase is used in ORS 163.700 (1)(b)(B), because no rational trier of fact could determine that she intended to protect…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.700(1)(b)(B) — 1 case
State v. McQueen, 478 P.3d 581 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
“No rational trier of fact could have found that the person defendant recorded had a “reasonable expectation of privacy concerning” her “intimate area,” as that phrase is used in ORS 163.700 (1)(b)(B), because no rational trier of fact could determine that she intended to protect…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.700(2)(a) — 1 case
State v. McQueen, 478 P.3d 581 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
“No rational trier of fact could have found that the person defendant recorded had a “reasonable expectation of privacy concerning” her “intimate area,” as that phrase is used in ORS 163.700 (1)(b)(B), because no rational trier of fact could determine that she intended to protect…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.700(2)(b) — 2 cases
State v. Mayes, 186 P.3d 293 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
“*388 The state charged defendant with multiple counts of violating ORS 163.700 as to the adult women and the girls.”
State v. Parra-Sanchez, 527 P.3d 1008 (Or. Ct. App. 2023).
“As a preliminary matter, it is worth stating out loud that defendant’s efforts to see his daughter’s naked body were wrong, and likely a criminal invasion of her privacy under ORS 163.700. To the extent that our case law regard- ing the crime of display has strayed at times from…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.700(2)(c) — 2 cases
State v. Rodriguez-Ganegar, 63 P.3d 1225 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
“For example, if someone (or the officers, for that matter) heard sounds emanating from the room that suggested that people were making love in it, the person would violate ORS 163.700(1)(b) by looking into the room in the manner that the officers did if the person did so to…”
State v. McQueen, 478 P.3d 581 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
“No rational trier of fact could have found that the person defendant recorded had a “reasonable expectation of privacy concerning” her “intimate area,” as that phrase is used in ORS 163.700 (1)(b)(B), because no rational trier of fact could determine that she intended to protect…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.700(2)(d) — 1 case
State v. Rodriguez-Ganegar, 63 P.3d 1225 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
“For example, if someone (or the officers, for that matter) heard sounds emanating from the room that suggested that people were making love in it, the person would violate ORS 163.700(1)(b) by looking into the room in the manner that the officers did if the person did so to…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.700(2)(e) — 1 case
State v. McQueen, 478 P.3d 581 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
“No rational trier of fact could have found that the person defendant recorded had a “reasonable expectation of privacy concerning” her “intimate area,” as that phrase is used in ORS 163.700 (1)(b)(B), because no rational trier of fact could determine that she intended to protect…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.700(2)(f) — 1 case
State v. McQueen, 478 P.3d 581 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
“No rational trier of fact could have found that the person defendant recorded had a “reasonable expectation of privacy concerning” her “intimate area,” as that phrase is used in ORS 163.700 (1)(b)(B), because no rational trier of fact could determine that she intended to protect…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.700(3) — 1 case
State v. McQueen, 478 P.3d 581 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
“No rational trier of fact could have found that the person defendant recorded had a “reasonable expectation of privacy concerning” her “intimate area,” as that phrase is used in ORS 163.700 (1)(b)(B), because no rational trier of fact could determine that she intended to protect…”
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