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Oregon Revised Statutes

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.738 (2026)

Effect of citation; contents; hearing; court’s order; use of statements made at hearing

✓ current as of May 2026
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      163.738 Effect of citation; contents; hearing; court’s order; use of statements made at hearing. (1)(a) A citation shall notify the respondent of a circuit court hearing where the respondent shall appear at the place and time set forth in the citation. The citation shall contain:

      (A) The name of the court at which the respondent is to appear;

      (B) The name of the respondent;

      (C) A copy of the stalking complaint;

      (D) The date, time and place at which the citation was issued;

      (E) The name of the law enforcement officer who issued the citation;

      (F) The time, date and place at which the respondent is to appear in court;

      (G) Notice to the respondent that failure to appear at the time, date and place set forth in the citation shall result in the respondent’s arrest and entry of a court’s stalking protective order; and

      (H) Notice to the respondent of potential liability under federal law for the possession or purchase of firearms or firearm ammunition and for other acts prohibited by 18 U.S.C. 2261 to 2262.

      (b) The officer shall notify the petitioner in writing of the place and time set for the hearing.

      (2)(a) The hearing shall be held as indicated in the citation. At the hearing, the petitioner may appear in person or by telephonic appearance. The respondent shall be given the opportunity to show cause why a court’s stalking protective order should not be entered. The hearing may be continued for up to 30 days. The court may enter:

      (A) A temporary stalking protective order pending further proceedings; or

      (B) A court’s stalking protective order if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that:

      (i) The person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly engages in repeated and unwanted contact with the other person or a member of that person’s immediate family or household thereby alarming or coercing the other person;

      (ii) It is objectively reasonable for a person in the victim’s situation to have been alarmed or coerced by the contact; and

      (iii) The repeated and unwanted contact causes the victim reasonable apprehension regarding the personal safety of the victim or a member of the victim’s immediate family or household.

      (b) In the order, the court shall specify the conduct from which the respondent is to refrain, which may include all contact listed in ORS 163.730 and any attempt to make contact listed in ORS 163.730. The order is of unlimited duration unless limited by law. If the respondent was provided notice and an opportunity to be heard, the court shall also include in the order, when appropriate, terms and findings sufficient under 18 U.S.C. 922 (d)(8) and (g)(8) to affect the respondent’s ability to possess firearms and ammunition or engage in activities involving firearms.

      (3) The circuit court may enter an order under this section against a minor respondent without appointment of a guardian ad litem.

      (4) If the respondent fails to appear at the time, date and place specified in the citation, the circuit court shall issue a warrant of arrest as provided in ORS 133.110 in order to ensure the appearance of the respondent at court and shall enter a court’s stalking protective order.

      (5) The circuit court may also order the respondent to undergo mental health evaluation and, if indicated by the evaluation, treatment. If the respondent is without sufficient resources to obtain the evaluation or treatment, or both, the court shall refer the respondent to the mental health agency designated by the community mental health director for evaluation or treatment, or both.

      (6) If the circuit court, the mental health evaluator or any other persons have probable cause to believe that the respondent is dangerous to self or others or is unable to provide for basic personal needs, the court shall initiate commitment procedures as provided in ORS 426.070 or 426.180.

      (7) A law enforcement officer shall report the results of any investigation arising from a complaint under ORS 163.744 to the district attorney within three days after presentation of the complaint.

      (8) Except for purposes of impeachment, a statement made by the respondent at a hearing under this section may not be used as evidence in a prosecution for stalking as defined in ORS 163.732 or for violating a court’s stalking protective order as defined in ORS 163.750. [1993 c.626 §4; 1995 c.353 §4; 1997 c.863 §6; 1999 c.1052 §2; 2003 c.292 §2]

 

      Note: See note under 163.730.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 49 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1995–2026 · leading case: Schiffner v. Banks, 33 P.3d 701 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
Schiffner v. Banks, 33 P.3d 701 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 28× “The governing statute here is ORS 163.738, which provides, in part: "(2)(a) * * * The court may enter: "* * * * * "(B) A court's stalking protective order if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that: "(i) The person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly engages…”
Edwards v. Biehler, 124 P.3d 1256 (Or. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 10× “741 to terminate “a stalking protective order as authorized by * * * ORS 163.738.” That statute, in turn, authorizes two kinds of SPOs.”
Delgado v. Souders, 46 P.3d 729 (Or. 2002). · cites it 3× “866 is not part of the Oregon Criminal Code, it has a criminal counterpart, ORS 163.738, which, together with ORS 163.”
M. D. O. v. Desantis, 461 P.3d 1066 (Or. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 6× “”1 During the year following the assault of respondent by petitioner’s children, the parties’ anger with each other grew and ultimately culminated in respondent following petitioner, stating that he would “get” petitioner, and petitioner seeking a stalking protective order (SPO)…”
State v. Ryan, 261 P.3d 1189 (Or. 2011). · cites it 8× “866(3)(a) (for civil stalking protective orders, trial court may "enter a court's stalking protective order and take other action as provided in ORS 163.738"); ORS 30.866(2) (temporary civil stalking protective order "may include, but is not limited to, all contact listed in ORS…”
K. H. v. Mitchell, 27 P.3d 130 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 13× “732, ORS 163.738, ORS 163.750. However, because the stalking statutes expressly restrict communication, they had to be written in a way that complies with the proscription in Article I, section 8, against the enactment of certain laws that restrain or restrict expression.”
State v. Norris-Romine, 894 P.2d 1221 (Or. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 6× “) ORS 163.738 provides, in part: “(3)(a) The circuit court may enter, after personal or telephonic appearance by the petitioner, a court’s stalking protective order if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that: *207 “(A) The person, without legitimate purpose,…”
Bryant v. Walker, 78 P.3d 148 (Or. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 4× “" ORS 163.738(2)(a). The court is authorized by statute to enter a stalking protective order only if finds that the requirements for issuance are satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence.”
House v. Hicks, 179 P.3d 730 (Or. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 2× “ORS 163.738(2)(a)(B) defines the conduct that can provoke a stalking protective order as intentional, knowing, or reckless repeated and unwanted contacts that creates alarm or coercion that is objectively reasonable and that causes reasonable apprehension about the victim's…”
Blastic v. Holm, 273 P.3d 304 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 4× “The trial court issued the SPO under ORS 163.738(2)(a)(B), which provides that the court may enter a permanent SPO if it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “(i) The [respondent] intentionally, knowingly or recklessly engages in repeated and unwanted contact with the…”
D. O. v. Richey, 456 P.3d 348 (Or. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 3× “CONCLUSION In the end, petitioner failed to meet her burden required of expressive and nonexpressive contacts under Cite as 301 Or App 18 (2019) 41 ORS 163.738(2) and ORS 163.730. The record contains insuf- ficient evidence to have permitted the trial court to issue an SPO.”
Habrat v. Milligan, 145 P.3d 180 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 2× “A court may issue an SPO against someone who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly makes repeated and unwanted contact with another person, or a member of that person’s immediate family or household, causing that person to be alarmed or coerced.”
Show all 49 citing cases →
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.738(1) — 2 cases
Shook v. Ackert, 952 P.2d 1044 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
Johnson v. McGrew, 902 P.2d 1209 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.738(1)(a)(ii) — 1 case
J. C. R. v. McNulty, 467 P.3d 48 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.738(2) — 4 cases
D. O. v. Richey, 456 P.3d 348 (Or. Ct. App. 2019). “CONCLUSION In the end, petitioner failed to meet her burden required of expressive and nonexpressive contacts under Cite as 301 Or App 18 (2019) 41 ORS 163.738(2) and ORS 163.730. The record contains insuf- ficient evidence to have permitted the trial court to issue an SPO.”
Carter v. Bowman, 277 P.3d 634 (Or. Ct. App. 2012).
Shook v. Ackert, 952 P.2d 1044 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
A. S. v. Rich, 332 Or. App. 810 (Or. Ct. App. 2024).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.738(2)(B) — 1 case
Provost v. Atchley, 132 P.3d 30 (Or. Ct. App. 2006).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.738(2)(B)(iii) — 1 case
K. H. v. Mitchell, 27 P.3d 130 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). “732, ORS 163.738, ORS 163.750. However, because the stalking statutes expressly restrict communication, they had to be written in a way that complies with the proscription in Article I, section 8, against the enactment of certain laws that restrain or restrict expression.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.738(2)(a) — 5 cases
Bryant v. Walker, 78 P.3d 148 (Or. Ct. App. 2003). “" ORS 163.738(2)(a). The court is authorized by statute to enter a stalking protective order only if finds that the requirements for issuance are satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Miller v. Leighty, 973 P.2d 920 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).
J. C. R. v. McNulty, 467 P.3d 48 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
Shook v. Ackert, 952 P.2d 1044 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
Johnson v. McGrew, 902 P.2d 1209 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.738(2)(a)(A) — 3 cases
Edwards v. Biehler, 124 P.3d 1256 (Or. Ct. App. 2005). “741 to terminate “a stalking protective order as authorized by * * * ORS 163.738.” That statute, in turn, authorizes two kinds of SPOs.”
State v. Ryan, 261 P.3d 1189 (Or. 2011). “866(3)(a) (for civil stalking protective orders, trial court may "enter a court's stalking protective order and take other action as provided in ORS 163.738"); ORS 30.866(2) (temporary civil stalking protective order "may include, but is not limited to, all contact listed in ORS…”
K. H. v. Mitchell, 27 P.3d 130 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). “732, ORS 163.738, ORS 163.750. However, because the stalking statutes expressly restrict communication, they had to be written in a way that complies with the proscription in Article I, section 8, against the enactment of certain laws that restrain or restrict expression.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.738(2)(a)(B) — 28 cases
Schiffner v. Banks, 33 P.3d 701 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). “The governing statute here is ORS 163.738, which provides, in part: "(2)(a) * * * The court may enter: "* * * * * "(B) A court's stalking protective order if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that: "(i) The person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly engages…”
House v. Hicks, 179 P.3d 730 (Or. Ct. App. 2008). “ORS 163.738(2)(a)(B) defines the conduct that can provoke a stalking protective order as intentional, knowing, or reckless repeated and unwanted contacts that creates alarm or coercion that is objectively reasonable and that causes reasonable apprehension about the victim's…”
Blastic v. Holm, 273 P.3d 304 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). “The trial court issued the SPO under ORS 163.738(2)(a)(B), which provides that the court may enter a permanent SPO if it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “(i) The [respondent] intentionally, knowingly or recklessly engages in repeated and unwanted contact with the…”
Delgado v. Souders, 46 P.3d 729 (Or. 2002). “866 is not part of the Oregon Criminal Code, it has a criminal counterpart, ORS 163.738, which, together with ORS 163.”
D. O. v. Richey, 456 P.3d 348 (Or. Ct. App. 2019). “CONCLUSION In the end, petitioner failed to meet her burden required of expressive and nonexpressive contacts under Cite as 301 Or App 18 (2019) 41 ORS 163.738(2) and ORS 163.730. The record contains insuf- ficient evidence to have permitted the trial court to issue an SPO.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.738(2)(a)(B)(i) — 8 cases
Schiffner v. Banks, 33 P.3d 701 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). “The governing statute here is ORS 163.738, which provides, in part: "(2)(a) * * * The court may enter: "* * * * * "(B) A court's stalking protective order if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that: "(i) The person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly engages…”
Delgado v. Souders, 46 P.3d 729 (Or. 2002). “866 is not part of the Oregon Criminal Code, it has a criminal counterpart, ORS 163.738, which, together with ORS 163.”
Edwards v. Biehler, 124 P.3d 1256 (Or. Ct. App. 2005). “741 to terminate “a stalking protective order as authorized by * * * ORS 163.738.” That statute, in turn, authorizes two kinds of SPOs.”
Habrat v. Milligan, 145 P.3d 180 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). “A court may issue an SPO against someone who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly makes repeated and unwanted contact with another person, or a member of that person’s immediate family or household, causing that person to be alarmed or coerced.”
K. H. v. Mitchell, 27 P.3d 130 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). “732, ORS 163.738, ORS 163.750. However, because the stalking statutes expressly restrict communication, they had to be written in a way that complies with the proscription in Article I, section 8, against the enactment of certain laws that restrain or restrict expression.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.738(2)(a)(B)(ii) — 4 cases
Schiffner v. Banks, 33 P.3d 701 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). “The governing statute here is ORS 163.738, which provides, in part: "(2)(a) * * * The court may enter: "* * * * * "(B) A court's stalking protective order if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that: "(i) The person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly engages…”
K. H. v. Mitchell, 27 P.3d 130 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). “732, ORS 163.738, ORS 163.750. However, because the stalking statutes expressly restrict communication, they had to be written in a way that complies with the proscription in Article I, section 8, against the enactment of certain laws that restrain or restrict expression.”
C. P. v. Mittelbach, 468 P.3d 496 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
J. C. R. v. McNulty, 467 P.3d 48 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.738(2)(a)(B)(iii) — 7 cases
Habrat v. Milligan, 145 P.3d 180 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). “A court may issue an SPO against someone who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly makes repeated and unwanted contact with another person, or a member of that person’s immediate family or household, causing that person to be alarmed or coerced.”
Schiffner v. Banks, 33 P.3d 701 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). “The governing statute here is ORS 163.738, which provides, in part: "(2)(a) * * * The court may enter: "* * * * * "(B) A court's stalking protective order if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that: "(i) The person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly engages…”
Blastic v. Holm, 273 P.3d 304 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). “The trial court issued the SPO under ORS 163.738(2)(a)(B), which provides that the court may enter a permanent SPO if it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “(i) The [respondent] intentionally, knowingly or recklessly engages in repeated and unwanted contact with the…”
Edwards v. Biehler, 124 P.3d 1256 (Or. Ct. App. 2005). “741 to terminate “a stalking protective order as authorized by * * * ORS 163.738.” That statute, in turn, authorizes two kinds of SPOs.”
Miley v. Miley, 335 P.3d 853 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.738(2)(a)(b) — 1 case
J. S. E. v. Cubic, 473 P.3d 117 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.738(2)(b) — 9 cases
Edwards v. Biehler, 124 P.3d 1256 (Or. Ct. App. 2005). “741 to terminate “a stalking protective order as authorized by * * * ORS 163.738.” That statute, in turn, authorizes two kinds of SPOs.”
Schiffner v. Banks, 33 P.3d 701 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). “The governing statute here is ORS 163.738, which provides, in part: "(2)(a) * * * The court may enter: "* * * * * "(B) A court's stalking protective order if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that: "(i) The person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly engages…”
State v. Ryan, 261 P.3d 1189 (Or. 2011). “866(3)(a) (for civil stalking protective orders, trial court may "enter a court's stalking protective order and take other action as provided in ORS 163.738"); ORS 30.866(2) (temporary civil stalking protective order "may include, but is not limited to, all contact listed in ORS…”
K. H. v. Mitchell, 27 P.3d 130 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). “732, ORS 163.738, ORS 163.750. However, because the stalking statutes expressly restrict communication, they had to be written in a way that complies with the proscription in Article I, section 8, against the enactment of certain laws that restrain or restrict expression.”
State v. Ryan, 239 P.3d 1016 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.738(3) — 1 case
State v. Orton, 904 P.2d 179 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.738(3)(a) — 2 cases
Starr v. Eccles, 900 P.2d 1068 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
Johnson v. McGrew, 902 P.2d 1209 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.738(3)(a)(A) — 2 cases
Starr v. Eccles, 900 P.2d 1068 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
State v. Orton, 904 P.2d 179 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.738(3)(b) — 1 case
Johnson v. McGrew, 902 P.2d 1209 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.