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Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.738 (2026)

Effect of citation; contents; hearing; court’s order; use of statements made at hearing

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1995–2026 49citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 49 opinions since 1995, 6 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (2)(a)(B) (28 cases).

      163.738 Effect of citation; contents; hearing; court’s order; use of statements made at hearing. (1)(a) A citation shall notify the respondent of a circuit court hearing where the respondent shall appear at the place and time set forth in the citation. The citation shall contain:

      (A) The name of the court at which the respondent is to appear;

      (B) The name of the respondent;

      (C) A copy of the stalking complaint;

      (D) The date, time and place at which the citation was issued;

      (E) The name of the law enforcement officer who issued the citation;

      (F) The time, date and place at which the respondent is to appear in court;

      (G) Notice to the respondent that failure to appear at the time, date and place set forth in the citation shall result in the respondent’s arrest and entry of a court’s stalking protective order; and

      (H) Notice to the respondent of potential liability under federal law for the possession or purchase of firearms or firearm ammunition and for other acts prohibited by 18 U.S.C. 2261 to 2262.

      (b) The officer shall notify the petitioner in writing of the place and time set for the hearing.

      (2)(a) The hearing shall be held as indicated in the citation. At the hearing, the petitioner may appear in person or by telephonic appearance. The respondent shall be given the opportunity to show cause why a court’s stalking protective order should not be entered. The hearing may be continued for up to 30 days. The court may enter:

      (A) A temporary stalking protective order pending further proceedings; or

      (B) A court’s stalking protective order if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that:

      (i) The person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly engages in repeated and unwanted contact with the other person or a member of that person’s immediate family or household thereby alarming or coercing the other person;

      (ii) It is objectively reasonable for a person in the victim’s situation to have been alarmed or coerced by the contact; and

      (iii) The repeated and unwanted contact causes the victim reasonable apprehension regarding the personal safety of the victim or a member of the victim’s immediate family or household.

      (b) In the order, the court shall specify the conduct from which the respondent is to refrain, which may include all contact listed in ORS 163.730 and any attempt to make contact listed in ORS 163.730. The order is of unlimited duration unless limited by law. If the respondent was provided notice and an opportunity to be heard, the court shall also include in the order, when appropriate, terms and findings sufficient under 18 U.S.C. 922 (d)(8) and (g)(8) to affect the respondent’s ability to possess firearms and ammunition or engage in activities involving firearms.

      (3) The circuit court may enter an order under this section against a minor respondent without appointment of a guardian ad litem.

      (4) If the respondent fails to appear at the time, date and place specified in the citation, the circuit court shall issue a warrant of arrest as provided in ORS 133.110 in order to ensure the appearance of the respondent at court and shall enter a court’s stalking protective order.

      (5) The circuit court may also order the respondent to undergo mental health evaluation and, if indicated by the evaluation, treatment. If the respondent is without sufficient resources to obtain the evaluation or treatment, or both, the court shall refer the respondent to the mental health agency designated by the community mental health director for evaluation or treatment, or both.

      (6) If the circuit court, the mental health evaluator or any other persons have probable cause to believe that the respondent is dangerous to self or others or is unable to provide for basic personal needs, the court shall initiate commitment procedures as provided in ORS 426.070 or 426.180.

      (7) A law enforcement officer shall report the results of any investigation arising from a complaint under ORS 163.744 to the district attorney within three days after presentation of the complaint.

      (8) Except for purposes of impeachment, a statement made by the respondent at a hearing under this section may not be used as evidence in a prosecution for stalking as defined in ORS 163.732 or for violating a court’s stalking protective order as defined in ORS 163.750. [1993 c.626 §4; 1995 c.353 §4; 1997 c.863 §6; 1999 c.1052 §2; 2003 c.292 §2]

 

      Note: See note under 163.730.

The 20 cases that cite Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.738 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENSchiffner v. Banks, 33 P.3d 701 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 163.738 28×subsections: (2)(a)(B) 9× (2)(a)(B)(ii) 8× (2)(a)(B)(i) 5× (2)(a)(B)(iii) 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 163.738
“The governing statute here is ORS 163.738, which provides, in part: "(2)(a) * * * The court may enter: "* * * * * "(B) A court's stalking protective order if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that: "(i) The person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly engages…”
Later courts cite it for
“that nomenclature can be confusing in an appeal like this, where the 'respondent' below is the appellant, and the 'petitioner' below is the respondent on appeal.” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENEdwards v. Biehler, 124 P.3d 1256 (Or. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 163.738 10×subsections: (2)(a)(A) 2× (2)(a)(B) 2× (2)(a)(B)(i) 2× (2)(b) 2×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 163.738
“741 to terminate “a stalking protective order as authorized by * * * ORS 163.738.” That statute, in turn, authorizes two kinds of SPOs.”
Later courts cite it for
“for entering the fapa in the first place” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENDelgado v. Souders, 46 P.3d 729 (Or. 2002).
cites § 163.738 3×subsections: (2)(a)(B) (2)(a)(B)(i)cited by 81 cases
Where it cites § 163.738
“866 is not part of the Oregon Criminal Code, it has a criminal counterpart, ORS 163.738, which, together with ORS 163.”
The case’s holding
A party may prove the elements of a civil stalking claim through circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from such evidence.
Later courts cite it for
“(i) the person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly engages in repeated and unwanted contact with the other person or a member of that person's immediate family or household thereby alarming or coercing the other person; "(ii) it is objectively reasonable for a person in the victim's situation to have been alarmed or coerced by the contact; and "(iii) the repeated and unwanted contact causes the victim reasonable apprehension regarding the personal safety of the victim or a member of the victim's immediate family or household.” · 7 citing courts
4
GREENM. D. O. v. Desantis, 461 P.3d 1066 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
cites § 163.738 6×subsections: (2)(a)(B)cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 163.738
“”1 During the year following the assault of respondent by petitioner’s children, the parties’ anger with each other grew and ultimately culminated in respondent following petitioner, stating that he would “get” petitioner, and petitioner seeking a stalking protective order (SPO)…”
Later courts cite it for
“if i don't get you now, i'll get you later” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Ryan, 261 P.3d 1189 (Or. 2011).
cites § 163.738 8×subsections: (2)(a)(A) 2× (2)(a)(B) 2× (2)(b) 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 163.738
“866(3)(a) (for civil stalking protective orders, trial court may "enter a court's stalking protective order and take other action as provided in ORS 163.738"); ORS 30.866(2) (temporary civil stalking protective order "may include, but is not limited to, all contact listed in ORS…”
Later courts cite it for
“because defendant's communications with the victim were already prohibited by the stalking protective order, the state was not required by article i, section 8, to prove under ors 163.750 that defendant had communicated an unequivocal threat to the victim.” · 1 citing court
6
GREENK. H. v. Mitchell, 27 P.3d 130 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 163.738 13×subsections: (2)(b) 4× (2) 2× (2)(a)(A) 2× (2)(a)(B)(i) 2×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 163.738
“732, ORS 163.738, ORS 163.750. However, because the stalking statutes expressly restrict communication, they had to be written in a way that complies with the proscription in Article I, section 8, against the enactment of certain laws that restrain or restrict expression.”
7
GREENState v. Norris-Romine, 894 P.2d 1221 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
cites § 163.738 6×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 163.738
“) ORS 163.738 provides, in part: “(3)(a) The circuit court may enter, after personal or telephonic appearance by the petitioner, a court’s stalking protective order if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that: *207 “(A) The person, without legitimate purpose,…”
8
GREENBryant v. Walker, 78 P.3d 148 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 163.738 4×subsections: (2)(a) 2× (2)(a)(B) 2×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 163.738
“" ORS 163.738(2)(a). The court is authorized by statute to enter a stalking protective order only if finds that the requirements for issuance are satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Later courts cite it for
“the contacts, cumulatively, caused her reasonably to fear for her personal safety.” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENHouse v. Hicks, 179 P.3d 730 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
cites § 163.738 2×subsections: (2)(a)(B) 2×cited by 49 cases
Where it cites § 163.738
“ORS 163.738(2)(a)(B) defines the conduct that can provoke a stalking protective order as intentional, knowing, or reckless repeated and unwanted contacts that creates alarm or coercion that is objectively reasonable and that causes reasonable apprehension about the victim's…”
The case’s holding
A trial court acts as a gatekeeper to determine if conduct is extreme and outrageous by assessing whether it exceeds the bounds of socially tolerable behavior.
Later courts cite it for
“a trial court plays a gatekeeper role in evaluating the viability of an iied claim by assessing the allegedly tortious conduct to determine whether it goes beyond the farthest reaches of socially tolerable behavior and creates a jury question on liability.” · 10 citing courts
10
GREENBlastic v. Holm, 273 P.3d 304 (Or. Ct. App. 2012).
cites § 163.738 4×subsections: (2)(a)(B) 3× (2)(a)(B)(iii)cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 163.738
“The trial court issued the SPO under ORS 163.738(2)(a)(B), which provides that the court may enter a permanent SPO if it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “(i) The [respondent] intentionally, knowingly or recklessly engages in repeated and unwanted contact with the…”
Later courts cite it for
“the contacts, cumulatively, also must give rise to subjective apprehension regarding the petitioner's personal safety or the personal safety of a member of the petitioner's immediate family or household, and that apprehension must be objectively reasonable.” · 4 citing courts
11
GREEND. O. v. Richey, 456 P.3d 348 (Or. Ct. App. 2019).
cites § 163.738 3×subsections: (2)(a)(B) 2× (2)cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 163.738
“CONCLUSION In the end, petitioner failed to meet her burden required of expressive and nonexpressive contacts under Cite as 301 Or App 18 (2019) 41 ORS 163.738(2) and ORS 163.730. The record contains insuf- ficient evidence to have permitted the trial court to issue an SPO.”
12
GREENHabrat v. Milligan, 145 P.3d 180 (Or. Ct. App. 2006).
cites § 163.738 2×subsections: (2)(a)(B)(i) (2)(a)(B)(iii)cited by 33 cases
Where it cites § 163.738
“A court may issue an SPO against someone who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly makes repeated and unwanted contact with another person, or a member of that person’s immediate family or household, causing that person to be alarmed or coerced.”
The case’s holding
Expressive sexual overtures provide relevant context for evaluating the impact of nonexpressive contacts in a stalking protective order proceeding.
Later courts cite it for
“nevertheless, are relevant context for respondent's nonexpressive contacts with petitioner” · 3 citing courts
13
GREENState v. Ryan, 239 P.3d 1016 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
cites § 163.738 4×subsections: (2)(b) 2×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 163.738
“732, ORS 163.738, and ORS 163.750, the Rangel analysis logically applies with equal force to prosecutions for violation of a stalking protective order.”
Later courts cite it for
“an unequivocal threat of the sort that makes it objectively reasonable for the victim to believe that he or she is being threatened with imminent and serious physical harm,” · 1 citing court
14
GREENAmarillas v. White, 292 P.3d 587 (Or. Ct. App. 2012).
cites § 163.738 4×subsections: (2)(a)(B) 3×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 163.738
“866, rather than ORS 163.738, as in this case. However, as the court noted in Delgado , the requirements for obtaining an SPO are identical under both statutes.”
15
GREENMiley v. Miley, 335 P.3d 853 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).
cites § 163.738 4×subsections: (2)(a)(B)(iii)cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 163.738
“The trial court entered the SPO under ORS 163.738. As we have recognized, the substantive standards for an SPO under ORS 163.”
16
GREENShook v. Ackert, 952 P.2d 1044 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
cites § 163.738 14×subsections: (2)(b) 7× (2) 3× (1) (2)(a)cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 163.738
“But the statutory scheme, and ORS 163.738 in particular, provides for a court ordered restraint upon respondent’s conduct short of any criminal conduct.”
17
GREENJennings v. Gifford, 154 P.3d 163 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 163.738 3×subsections: (2)(a)(B) 3×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 163.738
“Under ORS 163.738(2)(a)(B), a court may enter a stalking protective order if: “(i) The person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly engages in repeated and unwanted contact with the other person or a member of that person’s immediate family or household thereby alarming or…”
18
GREENM. K. F. v. Miramontes, 287 P.3d 1045 (Or. 2012).
cites § 163.738 1×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 163.738
“*** “(3)(a) At the hearing, whether or not the respondent appears, the court may continue the hearing for up to 30 days or may proceed to enter a court’s stalking protective order and take other action as provided in ORS 163.738. «* * * * * “(4) The plaintiff may recover: “(a)…”
The case’s holding
Courts determine the right to a civil jury trial by applying an issue-by-issue approach to evaluate the historical nature of the claim (adopting an issue-by-issue approach).
Later courts cite it for
“article i, section 17, and article vii (amended), section 3, of the oregon constitution do not guarantee a right to jury trial for claims or request s for relief that, standing alone, are equitable in nature and would have been tried to a court without a jury at common law.” · 4 citing courts
19
GREENWayt v. Goff, 956 P.2d 1063 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
cites § 163.738 5×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 163.738
“Pursuant to the complaint, Goff was served with a uniform stalking citation and ordered to appear in court and show cause why the court should not issue a permanent SPO under ORS 163.738. At the show-cause hearing, Goff testified and described three instances in which he had…”
20
NEUTRALJ. C. R. v. McNulty, 467 P.3d 48 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
cites § 163.738 7×subsections: (1)(a) (2)(a) (2)(a)(B)(ii)cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 163.738
“” Held: The correct standard for “alarm” in determining whether to issue an SPO based on nonexpressive conduct is whether the conduct gave rise to an objectively reasonable fear of a threat of physical injury.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
199520102026

One bar per year. Tallest: 5 cases in 2012. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Or. Ct. App.45Or.4
By subsection
(1)2 cases
Shook v. Ackert, 952 P.2d 1044 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).“But the statutory scheme, and ORS 163.738 in particular, provides for a court ordered restraint upon respondent’s conduct short of any criminal conduct.”
Johnson v. McGrew, 902 P.2d 1209 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
(1)(a)1 case
J. C. R. v. McNulty, 467 P.3d 48 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).“” Held: The correct standard for “alarm” in determining whether to issue an SPO based on nonexpressive conduct is whether the conduct gave rise to an objectively reasonable fear of a threat of physical injury.”
(2)6 cases
D. O. v. Richey, 456 P.3d 348 (Or. Ct. App. 2019).“CONCLUSION In the end, petitioner failed to meet her burden required of expressive and nonexpressive contacts under Cite as 301 Or App 18 (2019) 41 ORS 163.738(2) and ORS 163.730. The record contains insuf- ficient evidence to have permitted the trial court to issue an SPO.”
K. H. v. Mitchell, 27 P.3d 130 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).“732, ORS 163.738, ORS 163.750. However, because the stalking statutes expressly restrict communication, they had to be written in a way that complies with the proscription in Article I, section 8, against the enactment of certain laws that restrain or restrict expression.”
Carter v. Bowman, 277 P.3d 634 (Or. Ct. App. 2012).
Shook v. Ackert, 952 P.2d 1044 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
A. S. v. Rich, 332 Or. App. 810 (Or. Ct. App. 2024).
Showing the top 5 of 6. More in the list view →
(2)(a)6 cases
Bryant v. Walker, 78 P.3d 148 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).“" ORS 163.738(2)(a). The court is authorized by statute to enter a stalking protective order only if finds that the requirements for issuance are satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Miller v. Leighty, 973 P.2d 920 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).
J. C. R. v. McNulty, 467 P.3d 48 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
Shook v. Ackert, 952 P.2d 1044 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
Johnson v. McGrew, 902 P.2d 1209 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
Showing the top 5 of 6. More in the list view →
(2)(a)(A)3 cases
Edwards v. Biehler, 124 P.3d 1256 (Or. Ct. App. 2005).“741 to terminate “a stalking protective order as authorized by * * * ORS 163.738.” That statute, in turn, authorizes two kinds of SPOs.”
State v. Ryan, 261 P.3d 1189 (Or. 2011).“866(3)(a) (for civil stalking protective orders, trial court may "enter a court's stalking protective order and take other action as provided in ORS 163.738"); ORS 30.866(2) (temporary civil stalking protective order "may include, but is not limited to, all contact listed in ORS…”
K. H. v. Mitchell, 27 P.3d 130 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
(2)(a)(B)28 cases
Schiffner v. Banks, 33 P.3d 701 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).“The governing statute here is ORS 163.738, which provides, in part: "(2)(a) * * * The court may enter: "* * * * * "(B) A court's stalking protective order if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that: "(i) The person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly engages…”
House v. Hicks, 179 P.3d 730 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).“ORS 163.738(2)(a)(B) defines the conduct that can provoke a stalking protective order as intentional, knowing, or reckless repeated and unwanted contacts that creates alarm or coercion that is objectively reasonable and that causes reasonable apprehension about the victim's…”
Blastic v. Holm, 273 P.3d 304 (Or. Ct. App. 2012).“The trial court issued the SPO under ORS 163.738(2)(a)(B), which provides that the court may enter a permanent SPO if it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “(i) The [respondent] intentionally, knowingly or recklessly engages in repeated and unwanted contact with the…”
Delgado v. Souders, 46 P.3d 729 (Or. 2002).“866 is not part of the Oregon Criminal Code, it has a criminal counterpart, ORS 163.738, which, together with ORS 163.”
D. O. v. Richey, 456 P.3d 348 (Or. Ct. App. 2019).
Showing the top 5 of 28. More in the list view →
(2)(a)(B)(i)8 cases
Schiffner v. Banks, 33 P.3d 701 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
Delgado v. Souders, 46 P.3d 729 (Or. 2002).
Edwards v. Biehler, 124 P.3d 1256 (Or. Ct. App. 2005).
Habrat v. Milligan, 145 P.3d 180 (Or. Ct. App. 2006).“A court may issue an SPO against someone who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly makes repeated and unwanted contact with another person, or a member of that person’s immediate family or household, causing that person to be alarmed or coerced.”
K. H. v. Mitchell, 27 P.3d 130 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
Showing the top 5 of 8. More in the list view →
(2)(a)(B)(ii)4 cases
Schiffner v. Banks, 33 P.3d 701 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
K. H. v. Mitchell, 27 P.3d 130 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
C. P. v. Mittelbach, 468 P.3d 496 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
J. C. R. v. McNulty, 467 P.3d 48 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
(2)(a)(B)(iii)7 cases
Habrat v. Milligan, 145 P.3d 180 (Or. Ct. App. 2006).
Schiffner v. Banks, 33 P.3d 701 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
Blastic v. Holm, 273 P.3d 304 (Or. Ct. App. 2012).
Edwards v. Biehler, 124 P.3d 1256 (Or. Ct. App. 2005).
Miley v. Miley, 335 P.3d 853 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).“The trial court entered the SPO under ORS 163.738. As we have recognized, the substantive standards for an SPO under ORS 163.”
Showing the top 5 of 7. More in the list view →
(2)(b)9 cases
Edwards v. Biehler, 124 P.3d 1256 (Or. Ct. App. 2005).
Schiffner v. Banks, 33 P.3d 701 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
State v. Ryan, 261 P.3d 1189 (Or. 2011).
K. H. v. Mitchell, 27 P.3d 130 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
State v. Ryan, 239 P.3d 1016 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).“732, ORS 163.738, and ORS 163.750, the Rangel analysis logically applies with equal force to prosecutions for violation of a stalking protective order.”
Showing the top 5 of 9. More in the list view →
(3)1 case
State v. Orton, 904 P.2d 179 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
(3)(a)2 cases
Starr v. Eccles, 900 P.2d 1068 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
Johnson v. McGrew, 902 P.2d 1209 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
(3)(a)(A)2 cases
Starr v. Eccles, 900 P.2d 1068 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
State v. Orton, 904 P.2d 179 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
(3)(b)1 case
Johnson v. McGrew, 902 P.2d 1209 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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