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Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.732 (2026)

Stalking

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session (checked Sept. 2026) ACTIVE · 31 IN 5Y cited 1995–2026 76citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 76 opinions since 1995, 31 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (1) (15 cases).

      163.732 Stalking. (1) A person commits the crime of stalking if:

      (a) The person knowingly alarms or coerces another person or a member of that person’s immediate family or household by engaging in repeated and unwanted contact with the other person;

      (b) It is objectively reasonable for a person in the victim’s situation to have been alarmed or coerced by the contact; and

      (c) The repeated and unwanted contact causes the victim reasonable apprehension regarding the personal safety of the victim or a member of the victim’s immediate family or household.

      (2)(a) Stalking is a Class A misdemeanor.

      (b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this subsection, stalking is a Class C felony if:

      (A) The person has a prior conviction for:

      (i) Stalking, or an equivalent crime in another jurisdiction; or

      (ii) Violating a court’s stalking protective order, or an equivalent crime in another jurisdiction;

      (B) The person is the respondent for an active protection order in any jurisdiction that restrains the person from stalking, intimidating, molesting or menacing another person, and the person protected by the order is not the victim of the current offense; or

      (C) At least one instance of unwanted contact is the commission of the following against the victim:

      (i) A felony;

      (ii) Unlawful dissemination of an intimate image under ORS 163.472; or

      (iii) Unlawful use of a global positioning system device under ORS 163.715.

      (c) When stalking is a Class C felony pursuant to paragraph (b) of this subsection, stalking shall be classified as a person felony and as crime category 8 of the sentencing guidelines grid of the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission. [1993 c.626 §2; 1995 c.353 §2; 2024 c.90 §2]

 

      Note: See note under 163.730.

The 20 cases that cite Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.732 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Rangel, 977 P.2d 379 (Or. 1999).
cites § 163.732 32×subsections: (1) 6× (1)(a) 3× (1)(b) 2×cited by 179 cases
Where it cites § 163.732
“The issue in this criminal case is whether Oregon’s stalking statute, ORS 163.732, is overbroad in violation of Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution, 1 or the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.”
The case’s holding
Communication-based stalking requires an unequivocal threat that instills fear of imminent and serious personal violence from the speaker and is objectively likely to be followed by unlawful acts.
Later courts cite it for
“instills in the addressee a fear of imminent and serious personal violence from the speaker, is unequivocal, and is objectively likely to be followed by unlawful acts.” · 65 citing courts
2
GREENHanzo v. dePARRIE, 953 P.2d 1130 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
cites § 163.732 25×subsections: (1) 7× (1)(b) (1)(c)cited by 50 cases
Where it cites § 163.732
“730, which applies equally to civil and criminal stalking proceedings, provides, in part: "As used in ORS 30.”
The case’s holding
A civil stalking protective order requires proof that expression unambiguously and unequivocally communicates a determination to cause harm rather than mere peaceful protest or abstract advocacy.
Later courts cite it for
“in civil stalking proceedings, the party applying for relief is denominated the 'petitioner' and the party against whom the relief is sought is the 'respondent.' obviously that nomenclature can be confusing in an appeal like this, where the 'respondent' below is the appellant and the 'petitioner' is the respondent.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENState v. Shields, 56 P.3d 937 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
cites § 163.732 17×subsections: (1)(a) (1)(b) (1)(c)cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 163.732
“ORS 163.732. He assigns as error the trial court’s denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal and the court’s refusal to give one of his requested jury instructions.”
The case’s holding
Nonexpressive contacts, such as silent telephone calls that create an unwanted relationship with a victim who has said to stop, can support a stalking conviction.
4
GREENDelgado v. Souders, 46 P.3d 729 (Or. 2002).
cites § 163.732 7×subsections: (1) 3× (1)(a)cited by 81 cases
Where it cites § 163.732
“Rangel, 328 Or 294 , 977 P2d 379 (1999), which upheld ORS 163.732, the criminal anti-stalking statute, against a similar challenge, disposed of his overbreadth claim here.”
The case’s holding
A party may prove the elements of a civil stalking claim through circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from such evidence.
Later courts cite it for
“(i) the person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly engages in repeated and unwanted contact with the other person or a member of that person's immediate family or household thereby alarming or coercing the other person; "(ii) it is objectively reasonable for a person in the victim's situation to have been alarmed or coerced by the contact; and "(iii) the repeated and unwanted contact causes the victim reasonable apprehension regarding the personal safety of the victim or a member of the victim's immediate family or household.” · 7 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Ryan, 261 P.3d 1189 (Or. 2011).
cites § 163.732 14×subsections: (1) 2× (1)(c) 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 163.732
“2d 379 (1999) (imposing a similar limitation on the crime of stalking under ORS 163.732, when communications formed the factual basis for that crime).”
Later courts cite it for
“because defendant's communications with the victim were already prohibited by the stalking protective order, the state was not required by article i, section 8, to prove under ors 163.750 that defendant had communicated an unequivocal threat to the victim.” · 1 citing court
6
GREENState v. Hejazi, 524 P.3d 534 (Or. Ct. App. 2023).
cites § 163.732 5×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 163.732
“190, and stalking, ORS 163.732, assigning error to the trial court’s denial of his motions for judgment of acquittal on both charges.”
The case’s holding
If expressive conduct causes the alarm in a contact involving both expressive and nonexpressive acts, that conduct must meet a heightened standard of a qualifying threat.
Later courts cite it for
“a 'contact' can include almost any interaction with a person and can be categorized as either nonexpressive (physical or visual) contacts or expressive (spoken or written) contacts.” · 8 citing courts
7
GREENState v. Ryan, 239 P.3d 1016 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
cites § 163.732 16×subsections: (1) 4×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 163.732
“866 as well as to ORS 163.732 and ORS 163.750, provides, in part: "(3) `Contact' includes but is not limited to: "* * * * * "(d) Sending or making written or electronic communications in any form to the other person; "(e) Speaking with the other person by any means; "(f)…”
Later courts cite it for
“an unequivocal threat of the sort that makes it objectively reasonable for the victim to believe that he or she is being threatened with imminent and serious physical harm,” · 1 citing court
8
GREENHouse v. Hicks, 179 P.3d 730 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
cites § 163.732 4×cited by 49 cases
Where it cites § 163.732
“" We do not decide whether that statute applies here, whether criminal stalking conduct occurred under ORS 163.732, or whether ORS 163.732 is a "law * * * pertaining to safety * * * in the place of employment.”
The case’s holding
A trial court acts as a gatekeeper to determine if conduct is extreme and outrageous by assessing whether it exceeds the bounds of socially tolerable behavior.
Later courts cite it for
“a trial court plays a gatekeeper role in evaluating the viability of an iied claim by assessing the allegedly tortious conduct to determine whether it goes beyond the farthest reaches of socially tolerable behavior and creates a jury question on liability.” · 10 citing courts
9
REDState v. Rangel, 934 P.2d 1128 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
cites § 163.732 11×subsections: (1) 2× (1)(c)cited by 14 cases
Reversed by State v. Rangel (1999): the Oregon Supreme Court's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 163.732
“Defendant was charged with stalking, ORS 163.732, by “unlawfully and knowingly alarm [ing] [the victim] by coming to her place of employment and threatening her” on repeated occasions.”
The case’s holding
A stalking statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad if it requires a communication that is intended by the speaker and reasonably perceivable as a threat.
Later courts cite it for
“a threat or something that does not differ meaningfully from one.” · 1 citing court
10
GREENState v. Martin, 501 P.3d 554 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).
cites § 163.732 5×subsections: (1)(a) (1)(b) (1)(c) (2)(a)cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 163.732
“866—the civil analog to ORS 163.732— “[t]he victim’s situation includes all of the circumstances of the parties’ relationship.”
Later courts cite it for
“the details of the relationship between two parties can shed light on whether a defendant knew that particular conduct would alarm the victim, on what the victim's situation was, and on whether apprehension by the victim is reasonable under the circumstances.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENState v. Barrett, 255 P.3d 472 (Or. 2011).
cites § 163.732 2×subsections: (2)(a)cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 163.732
“In this case, defendant was charged with misdemeanor stalking under ORS 163.732, which is classified as a “person Class A misdemeanor.”
The case’s holding
Vacating a sentence and conducting a new sentencing hearing is a proper remedy for a violation of a victim's constitutional right to be heard at sentencing.
Later courts cite it for
“article i, section 42, makes it clear that only federal constitutional rights are preserved invio- late.” · 1 citing court
12
GREENState v. Maxwell, 998 P.2d 680 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 163.732 3×subsections: (2)cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 163.732
“750, 1 and one felony count of stalking, ORS 163.732. 2 Defendant assigns seven errors to various trial court rulings, but only five assignments of error merit discussion.”
The case’s holding
The term visual presence means being capable of being seen (visual presence).
Later courts cite it for
“a person is within another's 'visual or physical presence' when the person is capable of being seen - whether or not the person is in fact seen - or when the person is within physical calling distance.” · 1 citing court
13
GREENDeHart v. Tofte, 533 P.3d 829 (Or. Ct. App. 2023).
cites § 163.732 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 163.732
““(e) ‘Stalk’ means conduct constituting the crime of stalking under ORS 163.732 or conduct that would give rise to an action for issuance or violation of a stalking protec- tive order under ORS 30.”
Later courts cite it for
“we 'liberally' construe the statute 'in favor of the exercise of the rights of expression' it protects.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENState v. Johnson, 536 P.3d 1029 (Or. Ct. App. 2023).
cites § 163.732 3×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 163.732
“Yamhill County Circuit Court 18CR80923, 18CR02723; A175405 (Control), A175406 536 P3d 1029 Defendant challenges his convictions for stalking, ORS 163.732, and tele- phonic harassment, ORS 166.”
15
GREENState v. Jackson, 313 P.3d 383 (Or. Ct. App. 2013).
cites § 163.732 5×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 163.732
“Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction on one count of stalking, ORS 163.732, contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal (MJOA) at the close of the state’s case-in-chief.”
16
GREENUnited States v. Saunders, 59 M.J. 1 (C.A.A.F. 2003).
cites § 163.732 1×cited by 46 cases
Where it cites § 163.732
“); Or.Rev.Stat. § 163.732 (LEXIS through 2001 Reg.”
The case’s holding
A specification under Article 134 of the UCMJ is valid for an unenumerated offense if the accused had fair notice that the conduct was criminal.
Later courts cite it for
“article 134, ucmj, the 'general article,' criminalizes service-discrediting conduct by military service members.” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENState v. Glaspey, 100 P.3d 730 (Or. 2004).
cites § 163.732 1×cited by 43 cases
Where it cites § 163.732
“…163.405, first-degree unlawful sexual penetration, ORS 163.411, first-degree sexual abuse, ORS 163.427, and stalking, ORS 163.732.”
The case’s holding
The term victims in a sentencing statute refers to the category of persons who are victims within the meaning of the specific substantive offense.
Later courts cite it for
“when the same conduct or criminal episode, though violating only one statutory provision involves two or more victims, there are as many separately punishable offenses as there are victims.” · 9 citing courts
18
GREENState v. Thorp, 2 P.3d 903 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 163.732 2×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 163.732
“ORS 163.732. • Dismembering, mutilating, or engaging in sexual activity with a corpse (a presumptive sentence of probation to 16 months' imprisonment).”
The case’s holding
A mandatory minimum sentence violates the state constitution only if it is so disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable persons.
Later courts cite it for
“the test for determining whether a sentence violates the proportionality provision in article i, section 16, is whether the sentence is so disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable persons as to what is right and proper.” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENState v. Cazee, 482 P.3d 140 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).
cites § 163.732 1×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 163.732
“700; five counts of stalking, ORS 163.732; four counts of second-degree criminal trespass, ORS 164.”
Later courts cite it for
“to establish probable cause, an affidavit must do more than allege facts that support a mere suspicion that evidence will be found; even a well-warranted suspicion does not suffice.” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENState v. Norris-Romine, 894 P.2d 1221 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
cites § 163.732 2×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 163.732
“They provide no guidance to the trier of fact and permit ad hoc judgments as to what is legitimate.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
199520102026

One bar per year. Tallest: 10 cases in 2025. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Or. Ct. App.66Or.6D. Or.2C.A.A.F.1
By subsection
(1)15 cases
State v. Rangel, 977 P.2d 379 (Or. 1999).“The issue in this criminal case is whether Oregon’s stalking statute, ORS 163.732, is overbroad in violation of Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution, 1 or the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.”
Hanzo v. dePARRIE, 953 P.2d 1130 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).“730, which applies equally to civil and criminal stalking proceedings, provides, in part: "As used in ORS 30.”
Delgado v. Souders, 46 P.3d 729 (Or. 2002).“Rangel, 328 Or 294 , 977 P2d 379 (1999), which upheld ORS 163.732, the criminal anti-stalking statute, against a similar challenge, disposed of his overbreadth claim here.”
State v. Ryan, 239 P.3d 1016 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).“866 as well as to ORS 163.732 and ORS 163.750, provides, in part: "(3) `Contact' includes but is not limited to: "* * * * * "(d) Sending or making written or electronic communications in any form to the other person; "(e) Speaking with the other person by any means; "(f)…”
State v. Ryan, 261 P.3d 1189 (Or. 2011).“2d 379 (1999) (imposing a similar limitation on the crime of stalking under ORS 163.732, when communications formed the factual basis for that crime).”
Showing the top 5 of 15. More in the list view →
(1)(a)6 cases
State v. Rangel, 977 P.2d 379 (Or. 1999).
Delgado v. Souders, 46 P.3d 729 (Or. 2002).
State v. Shields, 56 P.3d 937 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).“ORS 163.732. He assigns as error the trial court’s denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal and the court’s refusal to give one of his requested jury instructions.”
State v. Martin, 501 P.3d 554 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).“866—the civil analog to ORS 163.732— “[t]he victim’s situation includes all of the circumstances of the parties’ relationship.”
State v. Sierzega, 237 P.3d 234 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
Showing the top 5 of 6. More in the list view →
(1)(b)7 cases
State v. Rangel, 977 P.2d 379 (Or. 1999).
Hanzo v. dePARRIE, 953 P.2d 1130 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
State v. Shields, 56 P.3d 937 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
State v. Martin, 501 P.3d 554 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).
State v. Schoen, 211 P.3d 948 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
Showing the top 5 of 7. More in the list view →
(1)(c)5 cases
State v. Ryan, 261 P.3d 1189 (Or. 2011).
Hanzo v. dePARRIE, 953 P.2d 1130 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
State v. Shields, 56 P.3d 937 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
State v. Martin, 501 P.3d 554 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).
State v. Rangel, 934 P.2d 1128 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).“Defendant was charged with stalking, ORS 163.732, by “unlawfully and knowingly alarm [ing] [the victim] by coming to her place of employment and threatening her” on repeated occasions.”
(2)3 cases
State v. Maxwell, 998 P.2d 680 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).“750, 1 and one felony count of stalking, ORS 163.732. 2 Defendant assigns seven errors to various trial court rulings, but only five assignments of error merit discussion.”
State v. Luster, 350 P.3d 575 (Or. Ct. App. 2015).
State v. Hurita, 366 P.3d 754 (Or. Ct. App. 2016).
(2)(a)5 cases
State v. Barrett, 255 P.3d 472 (Or. 2011).“In this case, defendant was charged with misdemeanor stalking under ORS 163.732, which is classified as a “person Class A misdemeanor.”
State v. Martin, 501 P.3d 554 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).
State v. Turner, 344 Or. App. 746 (Or. Ct. App. 2025).
State v. Turner, 344 Or. App. 746 (Or. Ct. App. 2025).
State v. Smith, 337 Or. App. 817 (Or. Ct. App. 2025).
(2)(b)5 cases
State v. Chesnut, 388 P.3d 1237 (Or. Ct. App. 2017).
State v. Capri, 273 P.3d 290 (Or. Ct. App. 2012).
State v. Turner, 344 Or. App. 746 (Or. Ct. App. 2025).
State v. Jordan, 136 P.3d 1198 (Or. Ct. App. 2006).
State v. Turner, 344 Or. App. 746 (Or. Ct. App. 2025).

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Enactment and amendments

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Edition shown: laws through the 2025 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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