Oregon Revised Statutes

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.730 (2026)

Definitions for ORS 30.866 and 163.730 to 163.750

✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section ORSoregonlegislature.gov JustiaChapter on Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

      163.730 Definitions for ORS 30.866 and 163.730 to 163.750. As used in ORS 30.866 and 163.730 to 163.750, unless the context requires otherwise:

      (1) “Alarm” means to cause apprehension or fear resulting from the perception of danger.

      (2) “Coerce” means to restrain, compel or dominate by force or threat.

      (3) “Contact” includes but is not limited to:

      (a) Coming into the visual or physical presence of the other person;

      (b) Following the other person;

      (c) Waiting outside the home, property, place of work or school of the other person or of a member of that person’s family or household;

      (d) Sending or making written or electronic communications in any form to the other person;

      (e) Speaking with the other person by any means;

      (f) Communicating with the other person through a third person;

      (g) Committing a crime against the other person;

      (h) Communicating with a third person who has some relationship to the other person with the intent of affecting the third person’s relationship with the other person;

      (i) Communicating with business entities with the intent of affecting some right or interest of the other person;

      (j) Damaging the other person’s home, property, place of work or school;

      (k) Delivering directly or through a third person any object to the home, property, place of work or school of the other person;

      (L) Service of process or other legal documents unless the other person is served as provided in ORCP 7 or 9;

      (m) Obtaining, possessing, transferring, creating, uttering or converting to the person’s own use the personal identification of the other person;

      (n) Disclosing an image of the other person, whose intimate parts are visible or who is engaged in sexual conduct, without the consent of the other person;

      (o) The use of an electronic service, application, device or other electronic means to obtain, monitor or interfere with the location, communication or activities of the other person, without the consent of the other person; or

      (p) Causing a third person to harass, humiliate or injure the other person by disclosing the other person’s name, image or personal information, as that term is defined in ORS 30.835, without the consent of the other person.

      (4) “Disclose” has the meaning given that term in ORS 163.472.

      (5) “Household member” means any person residing in the same residence as the victim.

      (6) “Immediate family” means father, mother, child, sibling, spouse, grandparent, stepparent and stepchild.

      (7) “Law enforcement officer” means:

      (a) A person employed in this state as a police officer by:

      (A) A county sheriff, constable or marshal;

      (B) A police department established by a university under ORS 352.121 or 353.125; or

      (C) A municipal or state police agency; or

      (b) An authorized tribal police officer as defined in ORS 181A.940.

      (8) “Personal identification” has the meaning given that term in ORS 165.800.

      (9) “Repeated” means two or more times.

      (10) “School” means a public or private institution of learning or a child care facility. [1993 c.626 §1; 1995 c.278 §27; 1995 c.353 §1; 2001 c.870 §1; 2007 c.71 §46; 2009 c.359 §2; 2011 c.644 §§24,66,73; 2013 c.180 §§25,26; 2015 c.174 §12; 2024 c.90 §1]

 

      Note: 163.730 to 163.753 were enacted into law by the Legislative Assembly but were not added to or made a part of ORS chapter 163 or any series therein by legislative action. See Preface to Oregon Revised Statutes for further explanation.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 145 cases (48 in the last 5 years), 1995–2026 · leading case: Delgado v. Souders, 46 P.3d 729 (Or. 2002).
Delgado v. Souders, 46 P.3d 729 (Or. 2002). · cites it 28× ““(2) At the time the petition is filed, the court, upon a finding of probable cause based on the allegations in the petition, shall enter a temporary court’s stalking protective order that may include, but is not limited to, all contact fisted in ORS 163.730. The petition and…”
Hanzo v. dePARRIE, 953 P.2d 1130 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 38× “[10] See ORS 163.730 (definitions in ORS 163.730 apply to ORS 30.”
Schiffner v. Banks, 33 P.3d 701 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 50× “738(2)(b), a court may include in the list of types of contact from which a respondent must refrain "all contact listed in ORS 163.730 * * *." Communicating with a business entity is currently a form of contact listed in ORS 163.”
Boyd v. Essin, 12 P.3d 1003 (Or. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 24× “" ORS 163.730(1) (defining "alarm"). [13] The closest that petitioner comes to asserting that she experienced subjective alarm is at the end of her testimony when she indicated that her life has been more peaceful since the issuance of the temporary stalking protective order.”
State v. Rangel, 977 P.2d 379 (Or. 1999). · cites it 12× “732 does not expressly require that a “threat” be made to the victim, the terms of ORS 163.730 and ORS 163.732 demonstrate that “a threat or its equivalent must have been made in order for the crime of stalking to be found.”
State v. Ryan, 261 P.3d 1189 (Or. 2011). · cites it 28× “866(2) (temporary stalking protective order "may include, but is not limited to, all contact listed in ORS 163.730"); ORS 163.730(3)(f) (defining "contact" to include "[c]ommunicating with the other person through a third person").”
H. L. P. v. Jones, 481 P.3d 415 (Or. Ct. App. 2021). · cites it 7× “She did not testify that he possessed any weapons, that he looked threatening, or that he said anything to her at all.”
A. A. C. v. Miller-Pomlee, 440 P.3d 106 (Or. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 17× “" ORS 163.730(1). And, finally, the contacts, " 'cumulatively, [also] must give rise to subjective apprehension regarding the petitioner's personal safety or the personal safety of a member of the petitioner's immediate family or household, and that apprehension must be…”
State v. Ryan, 239 P.3d 1016 (Or. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 22× “738(2)(b), an SPO may prohibit "all contact listed in ORS 163.730." The definition of "contact" found in ORS 163.”
Goodness v. Beckham, 198 P.3d 980 (Or. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 11× “Additionally, the police did not go to petitioner’s house in order to communicate with petitioner on respondent’s behalf.”
Brown v. Roach, 277 P.3d 628 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 8× “” ORS 163.730(1). “ ‘Coerce’ means to restrain, compel or dominate by force or threat.”
State v. Meek, 338 P.3d 767 (Or. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 14× “ORS 163.730(3) sets out 11 categories of “contact” that may violate an SPO.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.730(1) — 60 cases
Delgado v. Souders, 46 P.3d 729 (Or. 2002). ““(2) At the time the petition is filed, the court, upon a finding of probable cause based on the allegations in the petition, shall enter a temporary court’s stalking protective order that may include, but is not limited to, all contact fisted in ORS 163.730. The petition and…”
Schiffner v. Banks, 33 P.3d 701 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). “738(2)(b), a court may include in the list of types of contact from which a respondent must refrain "all contact listed in ORS 163.730 * * *." Communicating with a business entity is currently a form of contact listed in ORS 163.”
Brown v. Roach, 277 P.3d 628 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). “” ORS 163.730(1). “ ‘Coerce’ means to restrain, compel or dominate by force or threat.”
State v. Rangel, 977 P.2d 379 (Or. 1999). “732 does not expressly require that a “threat” be made to the victim, the terms of ORS 163.730 and ORS 163.732 demonstrate that “a threat or its equivalent must have been made in order for the crime of stalking to be found.”
Reitz v. Erazo, 274 P.3d 214 (Or. Ct. App. 2012).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.730(2) — 22 cases
H. L. P. v. Jones, 481 P.3d 415 (Or. Ct. App. 2021). “She did not testify that he possessed any weapons, that he looked threatening, or that he said anything to her at all.”
Brown v. Roach, 277 P.3d 628 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). “” ORS 163.730(1). “ ‘Coerce’ means to restrain, compel or dominate by force or threat.”
Hanzo v. dePARRIE, 953 P.2d 1130 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). “[10] See ORS 163.730 (definitions in ORS 163.730 apply to ORS 30.”
Delgado v. Souders, 46 P.3d 729 (Or. 2002). ““(2) At the time the petition is filed, the court, upon a finding of probable cause based on the allegations in the petition, shall enter a temporary court’s stalking protective order that may include, but is not limited to, all contact fisted in ORS 163.730. The petition and…”
State v. Rangel, 977 P.2d 379 (Or. 1999). “732 does not expressly require that a “threat” be made to the victim, the terms of ORS 163.730 and ORS 163.732 demonstrate that “a threat or its equivalent must have been made in order for the crime of stalking to be found.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.730(2)(b) — 1 case
Shook v. Ackert, 952 P.2d 1044 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.730(3) — 64 cases
Delgado v. Souders, 46 P.3d 729 (Or. 2002). ““(2) At the time the petition is filed, the court, upon a finding of probable cause based on the allegations in the petition, shall enter a temporary court’s stalking protective order that may include, but is not limited to, all contact fisted in ORS 163.730. The petition and…”
Schiffner v. Banks, 33 P.3d 701 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). “738(2)(b), a court may include in the list of types of contact from which a respondent must refrain "all contact listed in ORS 163.730 * * *." Communicating with a business entity is currently a form of contact listed in ORS 163.”
Boyd v. Essin, 12 P.3d 1003 (Or. Ct. App. 2000). “" ORS 163.730(1) (defining "alarm"). [13] The closest that petitioner comes to asserting that she experienced subjective alarm is at the end of her testimony when she indicated that her life has been more peaceful since the issuance of the temporary stalking protective order.”
A. A. C. v. Miller-Pomlee, 440 P.3d 106 (Or. Ct. App. 2019). “" ORS 163.730(1). And, finally, the contacts, " 'cumulatively, [also] must give rise to subjective apprehension regarding the petitioner's personal safety or the personal safety of a member of the petitioner's immediate family or household, and that apprehension must be…”
State v. Rangel, 977 P.2d 379 (Or. 1999). “732 does not expressly require that a “threat” be made to the victim, the terms of ORS 163.730 and ORS 163.732 demonstrate that “a threat or its equivalent must have been made in order for the crime of stalking to be found.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.730(3)(L) — 1 case
State v. Buchalski, 331 P.3d 1049 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.730(3)(a) — 21 cases
Delgado v. Souders, 46 P.3d 729 (Or. 2002). ““(2) At the time the petition is filed, the court, upon a finding of probable cause based on the allegations in the petition, shall enter a temporary court’s stalking protective order that may include, but is not limited to, all contact fisted in ORS 163.730. The petition and…”
Boyd v. Essin, 12 P.3d 1003 (Or. Ct. App. 2000). “" ORS 163.730(1) (defining "alarm"). [13] The closest that petitioner comes to asserting that she experienced subjective alarm is at the end of her testimony when she indicated that her life has been more peaceful since the issuance of the temporary stalking protective order.”
Hanzo v. dePARRIE, 953 P.2d 1130 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). “[10] See ORS 163.730 (definitions in ORS 163.730 apply to ORS 30.”
Bryant v. Walker, 78 P.3d 148 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
State v. Maxwell, 998 P.2d 680 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.730(3)(b) — 7 cases
Hanzo v. dePARRIE, 953 P.2d 1130 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). “[10] See ORS 163.730 (definitions in ORS 163.730 apply to ORS 30.”
A. A. C. v. Miller-Pomlee, 440 P.3d 106 (Or. Ct. App. 2019). “" ORS 163.730(1). And, finally, the contacts, " 'cumulatively, [also] must give rise to subjective apprehension regarding the petitioner's personal safety or the personal safety of a member of the petitioner's immediate family or household, and that apprehension must be…”
Schiffner v. Banks, 33 P.3d 701 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). “738(2)(b), a court may include in the list of types of contact from which a respondent must refrain "all contact listed in ORS 163.730 * * *." Communicating with a business entity is currently a form of contact listed in ORS 163.”
J. P. v. Holmes, 339 Or. App. 503 (Or. Ct. App. 2025).
J. P. v. Holmes, 339 Or. App. 502 (Or. Ct. App. 2025).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.730(3)(c) — 7 cases
Schiffner v. Banks, 33 P.3d 701 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). “738(2)(b), a court may include in the list of types of contact from which a respondent must refrain "all contact listed in ORS 163.730 * * *." Communicating with a business entity is currently a form of contact listed in ORS 163.”
Boyd v. Essin, 12 P.3d 1003 (Or. Ct. App. 2000). “" ORS 163.730(1) (defining "alarm"). [13] The closest that petitioner comes to asserting that she experienced subjective alarm is at the end of her testimony when she indicated that her life has been more peaceful since the issuance of the temporary stalking protective order.”
Hanzo v. dePARRIE, 953 P.2d 1130 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). “[10] See ORS 163.730 (definitions in ORS 163.730 apply to ORS 30.”
Falkenstein v. Falkenstein, 236 P.3d 798 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
State v. Berkey, 344 Or. App. 313 (Or. Ct. App. 2025).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.730(3)(d) — 21 cases
State v. Ryan, 261 P.3d 1189 (Or. 2011). “866(2) (temporary stalking protective order "may include, but is not limited to, all contact listed in ORS 163.730"); ORS 163.730(3)(f) (defining "contact" to include "[c]ommunicating with the other person through a third person").”
State v. Meek, 338 P.3d 767 (Or. Ct. App. 2014). “ORS 163.730(3) sets out 11 categories of “contact” that may violate an SPO.”
Hanzo v. dePARRIE, 953 P.2d 1130 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). “[10] See ORS 163.730 (definitions in ORS 163.730 apply to ORS 30.”
Delgado v. Souders, 46 P.3d 729 (Or. 2002). ““(2) At the time the petition is filed, the court, upon a finding of probable cause based on the allegations in the petition, shall enter a temporary court’s stalking protective order that may include, but is not limited to, all contact fisted in ORS 163.730. The petition and…”
State v. Ryan, 239 P.3d 1016 (Or. Ct. App. 2010). “738(2)(b), an SPO may prohibit "all contact listed in ORS 163.730." The definition of "contact" found in ORS 163.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.730(3)(e) — 6 cases
Hanzo v. dePARRIE, 953 P.2d 1130 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). “[10] See ORS 163.730 (definitions in ORS 163.730 apply to ORS 30.”
Layne v. MacDonald, 340 P.3d 773 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).
J. P. v. Holmes, 339 Or. App. 503 (Or. Ct. App. 2025).
J. P. v. Holmes, 339 Or. App. 502 (Or. Ct. App. 2025).
P. O. B. v. Harny, 507 P.3d 800 (Or. Ct. App. 2022).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.730(3)(f) — 7 cases
State v. Ryan, 261 P.3d 1189 (Or. 2011). “866(2) (temporary stalking protective order "may include, but is not limited to, all contact listed in ORS 163.730"); ORS 163.730(3)(f) (defining "contact" to include "[c]ommunicating with the other person through a third person").”
State v. Ryan, 239 P.3d 1016 (Or. Ct. App. 2010). “738(2)(b), an SPO may prohibit "all contact listed in ORS 163.730." The definition of "contact" found in ORS 163.”
Schiffner v. Banks, 33 P.3d 701 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). “738(2)(b), a court may include in the list of types of contact from which a respondent must refrain "all contact listed in ORS 163.730 * * *." Communicating with a business entity is currently a form of contact listed in ORS 163.”
Goodness v. Beckham, 198 P.3d 980 (Or. Ct. App. 2008). “Additionally, the police did not go to petitioner’s house in order to communicate with petitioner on respondent’s behalf.”
State v. Johnson, 536 P.3d 1029 (Or. Ct. App. 2023).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.730(3)(g) — 6 cases
Hanzo v. dePARRIE, 953 P.2d 1130 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). “[10] See ORS 163.730 (definitions in ORS 163.730 apply to ORS 30.”
Goodness v. Beckham, 198 P.3d 980 (Or. Ct. App. 2008). “Additionally, the police did not go to petitioner’s house in order to communicate with petitioner on respondent’s behalf.”
Layne v. MacDonald, 340 P.3d 773 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).
A. A. C. v. Miller-Pomlee, 440 P.3d 106 (Or. Ct. App. 2019). “" ORS 163.730(1). And, finally, the contacts, " 'cumulatively, [also] must give rise to subjective apprehension regarding the petitioner's personal safety or the personal safety of a member of the petitioner's immediate family or household, and that apprehension must be…”
P. N. K. v. J. R., 344 Or. App. 298 (Or. Ct. App. 2025).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.730(3)(h) — 2 cases
Schiffner v. Banks, 33 P.3d 701 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). “738(2)(b), a court may include in the list of types of contact from which a respondent must refrain "all contact listed in ORS 163.730 * * *." Communicating with a business entity is currently a form of contact listed in ORS 163.”
Benaron v. Simic (D. Or. 2021).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.730(3)(i) — 2 cases
Schiffner v. Banks, 33 P.3d 701 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). “738(2)(b), a court may include in the list of types of contact from which a respondent must refrain "all contact listed in ORS 163.730 * * *." Communicating with a business entity is currently a form of contact listed in ORS 163.”
Hanzo v. dePARRIE, 953 P.2d 1130 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). “[10] See ORS 163.730 (definitions in ORS 163.730 apply to ORS 30.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.730(3)(j) — 3 cases
Pinkham v. Brubaker, 37 P.3d 186 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
Hanzo v. dePARRIE, 953 P.2d 1130 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). “[10] See ORS 163.730 (definitions in ORS 163.730 apply to ORS 30.”
A. S. v. Rich, 332 Or. App. 810 (Or. Ct. App. 2024).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.730(3)(k) — 2 cases
State v. Meek, 338 P.3d 767 (Or. Ct. App. 2014). “ORS 163.730(3) sets out 11 categories of “contact” that may violate an SPO.”
Hanzo v. dePARRIE, 953 P.2d 1130 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). “[10] See ORS 163.730 (definitions in ORS 163.730 apply to ORS 30.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.730(4) — 7 cases
Schiffner v. Banks, 33 P.3d 701 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). “738(2)(b), a court may include in the list of types of contact from which a respondent must refrain "all contact listed in ORS 163.730 * * *." Communicating with a business entity is currently a form of contact listed in ORS 163.”
Sparks v. Deveny, 189 P.3d 1268 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
State ex rel. Juv. Dep't v. C. M. C., 259 P.3d 938 (Or. Ct. App. 2011).
T. D. T. v. Lane, 343 Or. App. 295 (Or. Ct. App. 2025).
T. D. T. v. Lane, 343 Or. App. 295 (Or. Ct. App. 2025).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.730(5) — 3 cases
Pinkham v. Brubaker, 37 P.3d 186 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
Osborne v. Williams, 201 P.3d 278 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
Sparks v. Deveny, 189 P.3d 1268 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.730(7) — 58 cases
Hanzo v. dePARRIE, 953 P.2d 1130 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). “[10] See ORS 163.730 (definitions in ORS 163.730 apply to ORS 30.”
H. L. P. v. Jones, 481 P.3d 415 (Or. Ct. App. 2021). “She did not testify that he possessed any weapons, that he looked threatening, or that he said anything to her at all.”
Boyd v. Essin, 12 P.3d 1003 (Or. Ct. App. 2000). “" ORS 163.730(1) (defining "alarm"). [13] The closest that petitioner comes to asserting that she experienced subjective alarm is at the end of her testimony when she indicated that her life has been more peaceful since the issuance of the temporary stalking protective order.”
State v. Norris-Romine, 894 P.2d 1221 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
State v. Hejazi, 524 P.3d 534 (Or. Ct. App. 2023).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.730(9) — 4 cases
J. W. v. Devaney, 340 Or. App. 547 (Or. Ct. App. 2025).
State v. Holbrook, 348 Or. App. 93 (Or. Ct. App. 2026).
J. W. v. Devaney, 340 Or. App. 547 (Or. Ct. App. 2025).
R. C. v. Sanchez, 346 Or. App. 754 (Or. Ct. App. 2026).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.730(l)(c) — 1 case
Delgado v. Souders, 934 P.2d 1132 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.