215.130
Application of ordinances and comprehensive plan; alteration of nonconforming
use. (1) Any
legislative ordinance relating to land use planning or zoning shall be a local
law within the meaning of, and subject to, ORS 250.155 to 250.235.
(2) An ordinance
designed to carry out a county comprehensive plan and a county comprehensive
plan shall apply to:
(a) The area
within the county also within the boundaries of a city as a result of extending
the boundaries of the city or creating a new city unless, or until the city has
by ordinance or other provision provided otherwise; and
(b) The area
within the county also within the boundaries of a city if the governing body of
such city adopts an ordinance declaring the area within its boundaries subject
to the county’s land use planning and regulatory ordinances, officers and
procedures and the county governing body consents to the conferral of
jurisdiction.
(3) An area
within the jurisdiction of city land use planning and regulatory provisions
that is withdrawn from the city or an area within a city that disincorporates
shall remain subject to such plans and regulations which shall be administered
by the county until the county provides otherwise.
(4) County
ordinances designed to implement a county comprehensive plan shall apply to
publicly owned property.
(5) The lawful
use of any building, structure or land at the time of the enactment or
amendment of any zoning ordinance or regulation may be continued. Alteration of
any such use may be permitted subject to subsection (9) of this section.
Alteration of any such use shall be permitted when necessary to comply with any
lawful requirement for alteration in the use. Except as provided in ORS
215.215, a county shall not place conditions upon the continuation or
alteration of a use described under this subsection when necessary to comply
with state or local health or safety requirements, or to maintain in good
repair the existing structures associated with the use. A change of ownership
or occupancy shall be permitted.
(6) Restoration
or replacement of any use described in subsection (5) of this section may be
permitted when the restoration or replacement is made necessary by fire, other
casualty or natural disaster. Restoration or replacement must be commenced
within one year from the occurrence of the fire, casualty or natural disaster.
If restoration or replacement is necessary under this subsection, restoration
or replacement must be done in compliance with ORS 195.260 (1)(c).
(7)(a) Any use
described in subsection (5) of this section may not be resumed after a period
of interruption or abandonment unless the resumed use conforms with the
requirements of zoning ordinances or regulations applicable at the time of the
proposed resumption.
(b)
Notwithstanding any local ordinance, a surface mining use continued under
subsection (5) of this section is not considered interrupted or abandoned for
any period after July 1, 1972, provided:
(A) The owner or
operator was issued and continuously renewed a state or local surface mining
permit, or received and maintained a state or local exemption from surface
mining regulation; and
(B) The surface
mining use was not inactive for a period of 12 consecutive years or more.
(c) For purposes
of paragraph (b) of this subsection, “inactive” means no aggregate materials
were excavated, crushed, removed, stockpiled or sold by the owner or operator
of the surface mine.
(d) A use
continued under subsection (5) of this section is not considered interrupted or
abandoned for any period while a federal, state or local emergency order
temporarily limits or prohibits the use or the restoration or replacement of
the use.
(8) Any proposal
for the verification or alteration of a use under subsection (5) of this
section, except an alteration necessary to comply with a lawful requirement,
for the restoration or replacement of a use under subsection (6) of this
section or for the resumption of a use under subsection (7) of this section
shall be subject to the provisions of ORS 215.416. An initial decision by the
county or its designate on a proposal for the alteration of a use described in
subsection (5) of this section shall be made as an administrative decision
without public hearing in the manner provided in ORS 215.416 (11).
(9) As used in
this section, “alteration” of a nonconforming use includes:
(a) A change in
the use of no greater adverse impact to the neighborhood; and
(b) A change in
the structure or physical improvements of no greater adverse impact to the
neighborhood.
(10) A local
government may adopt standards and procedures to implement the provisions of
this section. The standards and procedures may include but are not limited to
the following:
(a) For purposes
of verifying a use under subsection (5) of this section, a county may adopt
procedures that allow an applicant for verification to prove the existence,
continuity, nature and extent of the use only for the 10-year period
immediately preceding the date of application. Evidence proving the existence,
continuity, nature and extent of the use for the 10-year period preceding
application creates a rebuttable presumption that the use, as proven, lawfully
existed at the time the applicable zoning ordinance or regulation was adopted
and has continued uninterrupted until the date of application.
(b) Establishing
criteria to determine when a use has been interrupted or abandoned under
subsection (7) of this section.
(c) Conditioning
approval of the alteration of a use in a manner calculated to ensure mitigation
of adverse impacts as described in subsection (9) of this section.
(11) For purposes
of verifying a use under subsection (5) of this section, a county may not
require an applicant for verification to prove the existence, continuity,
nature and extent of the use for a period exceeding 20 years immediately
preceding the date of application. [Amended by 1961 c.607 §2; 1963 c.577 §4;
1963 c.619 §9; 1969 c.460 §1; 1973 c.503 §2; 1977 c.766 §5; 1979 c.190 §406;
1979 c.610 §1; 1993 c.792 §52; 1997 c.394 §1; 1999 c.353 §1; 1999 c.458 §1;
1999 c.1103 §10; 2021 c.25 §3]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
67
cases (
7 in the last 5 years), 1968–2024 · leading case:
Polk Cnty. v. Martin, 636 P.2d 952 (Or. 1981).
Polk Cnty. v. Martin, 636 P.2d 952 (Or. 1981).
· cites it 54× “Neither ORS 215.130 nor Clackamas Co. v. Holmes, supra , require that anything beyond the requirements of present ORS 215.”
Allison v. Washington Cnty., 548 P.2d 188 (Or. Ct. App. 1976).
· cites it 20× “Stated differently, we hold that if ORS 215.130, upon which Tatum and today's specially concurring opinion are based, were repealed it would make no difference in the result.”
Morgan v. Jackson Cnty., 414 P.3d 917 (Or. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 22× “In June 2016, the Perketts filed an application asking the county to verify the auto yard, as well as three storage structures, as a permissible, nonconforming use under ORS 215.130 and the Jackson County Land Development Ordinance (LDO) chapter 11.”
Aguilar v. Washington Cnty., 120 P.3d 514 (Or. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 14× “Petitioners appealed to LUBA, arguing that, under ORS 215.130, once they proved 20 years of continuous use before their application for verification of a nonconforming use, the county was prohibited from requiring them to prove more, that is, that the use was lawful.”
Fountain Vill. Dev. Co. v. Multnomah Cnty., 31 P.3d 458 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 16× “In sum, petitioner argues that “the legislature recognizes two related but distinct set of rights — the vested right of a property owner to build a development under a certain set of regulations [quoting statutes], versus the right of a property owner to use of the property (ORS…”
Lawrence v. Clackamas Cnty., 43 P.3d 1192 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
· cites it 20× “ORS 215.130 provides, in part: “(5) The lawful use of any building, structure or land at the time of the enactment or amendment of any zoning ordinance or regulation may be continued.”
VanSpeybroeck v. Tillamook Cnty., 191 P.3d 712 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 7× “The Tillamook County Land Use Ordinance (“TCLUO”) requires one parking space for each 150 square feet of floor area for an eating and drinking establishment, two parking spaces for a dwelling unit, and one parking space for each motel or hotel unit.”
Grabhorn v. Washington Cnty., 379 P.3d 796 (Or. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 9× “In addition, “[f]or purposes of verifying a use under subsection (5) of [ORS 215.130], a county may not require an applicant for verification to prove the existence, continuity, nature and extent of the use for a period exceeding 20 years immediately preceding the date of…”
Lane Cnty. v. Bessett, 612 P.2d 297 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
· cites it 11× “) The county argues: "ORS 215.130 did not say that Counties could not zone Federal properties.”
Kleikamp v. Bd. of Commissioners of Yamhill Cnty., 455 P.3d 546 (Or. Ct. App. 2019).
· cites it 5× “The circuit court erred in determining that ORS 215.130 and a county ordinance implementing that statute applied to, and extinguished, the claims under section 5(3) of Measure 49.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.130(1) — 2 cases
Allison v. Washington Cnty., 548 P.2d 188 (Or. Ct. App. 1976).
“Stated differently, we hold that if ORS 215.130, upon which Tatum and today's specially concurring opinion are based, were repealed it would make no difference in the result.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.130(10) — 4 cases
Grabhorn v. Washington Cnty., 379 P.3d 796 (Or. Ct. App. 2016).
“In addition, “[f]or purposes of verifying a use under subsection (5) of [ORS 215.130], a county may not require an applicant for verification to prove the existence, continuity, nature and extent of the use for a period exceeding 20 years immediately preceding the date of…”
Fountain Vill. Dev. Co. v. Multnomah Cnty., 31 P.3d 458 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
“In sum, petitioner argues that “the legislature recognizes two related but distinct set of rights — the vested right of a property owner to build a development under a certain set of regulations [quoting statutes], versus the right of a property owner to use of the property (ORS…”
Lawrence v. Clackamas Cnty., 43 P.3d 1192 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
“ORS 215.130 provides, in part: “(5) The lawful use of any building, structure or land at the time of the enactment or amendment of any zoning ordinance or regulation may be continued.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.130(10)(a) — 2 cases
Lawrence v. Clackamas Cnty., 43 P.3d 1192 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
“ORS 215.130 provides, in part: “(5) The lawful use of any building, structure or land at the time of the enactment or amendment of any zoning ordinance or regulation may be continued.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.130(10)(b) — 4 cases
Fountain Vill. Dev. Co. v. Multnomah Cnty., 31 P.3d 458 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
“In sum, petitioner argues that “the legislature recognizes two related but distinct set of rights — the vested right of a property owner to build a development under a certain set of regulations [quoting statutes], versus the right of a property owner to use of the property (ORS…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.130(10)(c) — 2 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.130(11) — 5 cases
Lawrence v. Clackamas Cnty., 43 P.3d 1192 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
“ORS 215.130 provides, in part: “(5) The lawful use of any building, structure or land at the time of the enactment or amendment of any zoning ordinance or regulation may be continued.”
Aguilar v. Washington Cnty., 120 P.3d 514 (Or. Ct. App. 2005).
“Petitioners appealed to LUBA, arguing that, under ORS 215.130, once they proved 20 years of continuous use before their application for verification of a nonconforming use, the county was prohibited from requiring them to prove more, that is, that the use was lawful.”
Grabhorn v. Washington Cnty., 379 P.3d 796 (Or. Ct. App. 2016).
“In addition, “[f]or purposes of verifying a use under subsection (5) of [ORS 215.130], a county may not require an applicant for verification to prove the existence, continuity, nature and extent of the use for a period exceeding 20 years immediately preceding the date of…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.130(2) — 6 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.130(2)(a) — 3 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.130(2)(b) — 1 case
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.130(3) — 1 case
Lane Cnty. v. Bessett, 612 P.2d 297 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
“) The county argues: "ORS 215.130 did not say that Counties could not zone Federal properties.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.130(4) — 12 cases
Lane Cnty. v. Bessett, 612 P.2d 297 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
“) The county argues: "ORS 215.130 did not say that Counties could not zone Federal properties.”
Polk Cnty. v. Martin, 636 P.2d 952 (Or. 1981).
“Neither ORS 215.130 nor Clackamas Co. v. Holmes, supra , require that anything beyond the requirements of present ORS 215.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.130(5) — 36 cases
Polk Cnty. v. Martin, 636 P.2d 952 (Or. 1981).
“Neither ORS 215.130 nor Clackamas Co. v. Holmes, supra , require that anything beyond the requirements of present ORS 215.”
Morgan v. Jackson Cnty., 414 P.3d 917 (Or. Ct. App. 2018).
“In June 2016, the Perketts filed an application asking the county to verify the auto yard, as well as three storage structures, as a permissible, nonconforming use under ORS 215.130 and the Jackson County Land Development Ordinance (LDO) chapter 11.”
VanSpeybroeck v. Tillamook Cnty., 191 P.3d 712 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
“The Tillamook County Land Use Ordinance (“TCLUO”) requires one parking space for each 150 square feet of floor area for an eating and drinking establishment, two parking spaces for a dwelling unit, and one parking space for each motel or hotel unit.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.130(6) — 4 cases
Polk Cnty. v. Martin, 636 P.2d 952 (Or. 1981).
“Neither ORS 215.130 nor Clackamas Co. v. Holmes, supra , require that anything beyond the requirements of present ORS 215.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.130(7) — 8 cases
Polk Cnty. v. Martin, 636 P.2d 952 (Or. 1981).
“Neither ORS 215.130 nor Clackamas Co. v. Holmes, supra , require that anything beyond the requirements of present ORS 215.”
VanSpeybroeck v. Tillamook Cnty., 191 P.3d 712 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
“The Tillamook County Land Use Ordinance (“TCLUO”) requires one parking space for each 150 square feet of floor area for an eating and drinking establishment, two parking spaces for a dwelling unit, and one parking space for each motel or hotel unit.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.130(7)(a) — 5 cases
Fountain Vill. Dev. Co. v. Multnomah Cnty., 31 P.3d 458 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
“In sum, petitioner argues that “the legislature recognizes two related but distinct set of rights — the vested right of a property owner to build a development under a certain set of regulations [quoting statutes], versus the right of a property owner to use of the property (ORS…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.130(7)(b) — 1 case
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.130(8) — 3 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.130(9) — 7 cases
Polk Cnty. v. Martin, 636 P.2d 952 (Or. 1981).
“Neither ORS 215.130 nor Clackamas Co. v. Holmes, supra , require that anything beyond the requirements of present ORS 215.”
Fountain Vill. Dev. Co. v. Multnomah Cnty., 31 P.3d 458 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
“In sum, petitioner argues that “the legislature recognizes two related but distinct set of rights — the vested right of a property owner to build a development under a certain set of regulations [quoting statutes], versus the right of a property owner to use of the property (ORS…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.