659A.030
Discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation,
gender identity, national origin, marital status, age or expunged juvenile
record prohibited.
(1) It is an unlawful employment practice:
(a) For an
employer, because of an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, sexual
orientation, gender identity, national origin, marital status or age if the
individual is 18 years of age or older, or because of the race, color,
religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, marital
status or age of any other person with whom the individual associates, or
because of an individual’s juvenile record that has been expunged pursuant to
ORS 419A.260 to 419A.271, to refuse to hire or employ the individual or to bar
or discharge the individual from employment. However, discrimination is not an
unlawful employment practice if the discrimination results from a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
employer’s business.
(b) For an
employer, because of an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, sexual
orientation, gender identity, national origin, marital status or age if the
individual is 18 years of age or older, or because of the race, color,
religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, marital
status or age of any other person with whom the individual associates, or
because of an individual’s juvenile record that has been expunged pursuant to
ORS 419A.260 to 419A.271, to discriminate against the individual in
compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.
(c) For a labor
organization, because of an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, sexual
orientation, gender identity, national origin, marital status or age if the
individual is 18 years of age or older, or because of an individual’s juvenile
record that has been expunged pursuant to ORS 419A.260 to 419A.271, to exclude
or to expel from its membership the individual or to discriminate in any way
against the individual or any other person.
(d) For any
employer or employment agency to print or circulate or cause to be printed or
circulated any statement, advertisement or publication, or to use any form of
application for employment or to make any inquiry in connection with
prospective employment that expresses directly or indirectly any limitation,
specification or discrimination as to an individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, marital status or
age if the individual is 18 years of age or older, or on the basis of an
expunged juvenile record, or any intent to make any such limitation, specification
or discrimination, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification.
Identification of prospective employees according to race, color, religion,
sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, marital status or
age does not violate this section unless the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Labor and Industries, after a hearing conducted pursuant to ORS 659A.805,
determines that the designation expresses an intent to limit, specify or
discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation,
gender identity, national origin, marital status or age.
(e) For an
employment agency, because of an individual’s race, color, religion, sex,
sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, marital status or age if
the individual is 18 years of age or older, or because of the race, color,
religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, marital
status or age of any other person with whom the individual associates, or
because of an individual’s juvenile record that has been expunged pursuant to
ORS 419A.260 to 419A.271, to classify or refer for employment, or to fail or
refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against the
individual. However, it is not an unlawful employment practice for an
employment agency to classify or refer for employment an individual when the
classification or referral results from a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the employer’s business.
(f) For an
employer, prospective employer or employment agency, prior to completing an
initial interview, or if there is no initial interview, prior to making a
conditional offer of employment, to request or require disclosure of the
applicant’s age or date of birth or when the applicant attended or graduated
from any educational institution, except when such information is required to:
(A) Affirm that
the applicant meets bona fide occupational qualifications; or
(B) Comply with
any provision of federal, state or local law, rule or regulation.
(g) For any
person to discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any other person
because that other person has opposed any unlawful practice, or because that
other person has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding
under this chapter or has attempted to do so.
(h) For any
person, whether an employer or an employee, to aid, abet, incite, compel or
coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this chapter or to attempt
to do so.
(2) The
provisions of this section apply to an apprentice under ORS 660.002 to 660.210.
The commissioner shall administer this section with respect to apprentices
under ORS 660.002 to 660.210 equally with regard to all employees and labor
organizations.
(3) The
compulsory retirement of employees required by law at any age is not an
unlawful employment practice if lawful under federal law.
(4)(a) It is not
an unlawful employment practice for an employer or labor organization to
provide or make financial provision for child care services of a custodial or
other nature to its employees or members who are responsible for a minor child.
(b) As used in
this subsection, “responsible for a minor child” means having custody or legal
guardianship of a minor child or acting in loco parentis to the child.
(5) This section
does not prohibit an employer from enforcing an otherwise valid dress code or
policy, as long as the employer provides, on a case-by-case basis, for
reasonable accommodation of an individual based on the health and safety needs
of the individual and the dress code or policy does not have a disproportionate
adverse impact on members of a protected class to a greater extent than the
policy impacts persons generally. [Formerly 659.030; 2007 c.100 §4; 2021 c.239 §4;
2021 c.367 §35; 2021 c.585 §10; 2025 c.125 §1]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
291
cases (
180 in the last 5 years), 2002–2026 · leading case:
McLaughlin v. Wilson, 449 P.3d 492 (Or. 2019).
McLaughlin v. Wilson, 449 P.3d 492 (Or. 2019).
· cites it 47× “Held: (1) As used in ORS 659A.030 (1)(f), “any person” includes individuals who are not employers; (2) “otherwise dis- criminate” in ORS 659A.”
Hernandez v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 490 P.3d 166 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).
· cites it 38× “They contended that ORS 659A.030 (1)(g) applies exclusively to conduct by employers and employees and does not extend to conduct by third par- ties to the employment relationship, even if that conduct, in fact, aids and abets an unlawful employment practice.”
Meyer v. State, 426 P.3d 89 (Or. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 10× “In it, they alleged that the Lottery subjected Meyer to retaliation in violation of ORS 659A.030 because she reported Niswender's sexual harassment of Meyer and others.”
Lindsey v. Clatskanie People's Util. Dist., 140 F. Supp. 3d 1077 (D. Or. 2015).
· cites it 21× “Retaliation Claims under Title VII and ORS § 659A.030 The substantive analysis for retaliation under Title VII and ORS § 659A.”
Summerfield v. OLCC, 472 P.3d 231 (Or. 2020).
· cites it 13× “046 must prove that there was an available and suitable position in which the plaintiff could have been reemployed and, in this case, plaintiff conceded that he had failed to do so; (2) the trial court erred in failing to give plaintiff’s requested jury instruction defining…”
Ekeya v. Shriners Hosp. for Child., Portland, 258 F. Supp. 3d 1192 (D. Or. 2017).
· cites it 25× “As her first claim, Ekeya alleges that Shri-ners Portland retaliated against her, in violation of Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(l)(f) and Or. Rev.”
Just. v. Rockwell Collins, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (D. Or. 2015).
· cites it 13× “060; (3) sexual harassment in violation of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”) and Or.Rev.Stat. § 659A.030; (4) retaliation for reporting sexual harassment in violation of Title VII and Or.”
Janell Howard v. City of Coos Bay, 871 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2017).
· cites it 4× “030(l)(f), Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(l)(a) makes it unlawful for an employer “to refuse to hire or employ [an] individual or to bar or discharge [an] individual from employment” on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, marital status or…”
Frehoo, Inc. v. BOLI, 510 P.3d 888 (Or. Ct. App. 2022).
· cites it 22× “805(1)(e) (authorizing issuance of reason- able rules for those purposes).”
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
· cites it 2× “); Ore. Rev. Stat. §659A.030(1) (2019) (prohibiting discrimi- nation because of “sex, sexual orientation,” etc.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(1) — 14 cases
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
“); Ore. Rev. Stat. §659A.030(1) (2019) (prohibiting discrimi- nation because of “sex, sexual orientation,” etc.”
McLaughlin v. Wilson, 449 P.3d 492 (Or. 2019).
“Held: (1) As used in ORS 659A.030 (1)(f), “any person” includes individuals who are not employers; (2) “otherwise dis- criminate” in ORS 659A.”
Hernandez v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 490 P.3d 166 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).
“They contended that ORS 659A.030 (1)(g) applies exclusively to conduct by employers and employees and does not extend to conduct by third par- ties to the employment relationship, even if that conduct, in fact, aids and abets an unlawful employment practice.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(1)(A) — 2 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(1)(a) — 54 cases
Hernandez v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 490 P.3d 166 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).
“They contended that ORS 659A.030 (1)(g) applies exclusively to conduct by employers and employees and does not extend to conduct by third par- ties to the employment relationship, even if that conduct, in fact, aids and abets an unlawful employment practice.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(1)(b) — 32 cases
Frehoo, Inc. v. BOLI, 510 P.3d 888 (Or. Ct. App. 2022).
“805(1)(e) (authorizing issuance of reason- able rules for those purposes).”
McLaughlin v. Wilson, 449 P.3d 492 (Or. 2019).
“Held: (1) As used in ORS 659A.030 (1)(f), “any person” includes individuals who are not employers; (2) “otherwise dis- criminate” in ORS 659A.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(1)(c) — 4 cases
Hernandez v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 490 P.3d 166 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).
“They contended that ORS 659A.030 (1)(g) applies exclusively to conduct by employers and employees and does not extend to conduct by third par- ties to the employment relationship, even if that conduct, in fact, aids and abets an unlawful employment practice.”
McLaughlin v. Wilson, 449 P.3d 492 (Or. 2019).
“Held: (1) As used in ORS 659A.030 (1)(f), “any person” includes individuals who are not employers; (2) “otherwise dis- criminate” in ORS 659A.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(1)(d) — 1 case
Hernandez v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 490 P.3d 166 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).
“They contended that ORS 659A.030 (1)(g) applies exclusively to conduct by employers and employees and does not extend to conduct by third par- ties to the employment relationship, even if that conduct, in fact, aids and abets an unlawful employment practice.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(1)(e) — 1 case
Hernandez v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 490 P.3d 166 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).
“They contended that ORS 659A.030 (1)(g) applies exclusively to conduct by employers and employees and does not extend to conduct by third par- ties to the employment relationship, even if that conduct, in fact, aids and abets an unlawful employment practice.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(1)(f) — 56 cases
McLaughlin v. Wilson, 449 P.3d 492 (Or. 2019).
“Held: (1) As used in ORS 659A.030 (1)(f), “any person” includes individuals who are not employers; (2) “otherwise dis- criminate” in ORS 659A.”
Meyer v. State, 426 P.3d 89 (Or. Ct. App. 2018).
“In it, they alleged that the Lottery subjected Meyer to retaliation in violation of ORS 659A.030 because she reported Niswender's sexual harassment of Meyer and others.”
Summerfield v. OLCC, 472 P.3d 231 (Or. 2020).
“046 must prove that there was an available and suitable position in which the plaintiff could have been reemployed and, in this case, plaintiff conceded that he had failed to do so; (2) the trial court erred in failing to give plaintiff’s requested jury instruction defining…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(1)(f)(2001) — 1 case
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(1)(g) — 40 cases
Hernandez v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 490 P.3d 166 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).
“They contended that ORS 659A.030 (1)(g) applies exclusively to conduct by employers and employees and does not extend to conduct by third par- ties to the employment relationship, even if that conduct, in fact, aids and abets an unlawful employment practice.”
Frehoo, Inc. v. BOLI, 510 P.3d 888 (Or. Ct. App. 2022).
“805(1)(e) (authorizing issuance of reason- able rules for those purposes).”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(1)(h) — 1 case
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(a) — 1 case
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(b) — 2 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(f) — 5 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(g) — 2 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(l) — 1 case
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(l)(a) — 10 cases
Janell Howard v. City of Coos Bay, 871 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2017).
“030(l)(f), Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(l)(a) makes it unlawful for an employer “to refuse to hire or employ [an] individual or to bar or discharge [an] individual from employment” on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, marital status or…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(l)(b) — 10 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(l)(e) — 1 case
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(l)(f) — 22 cases
Janell Howard v. City of Coos Bay, 871 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2017).
“030(l)(f), Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(l)(a) makes it unlawful for an employer “to refuse to hire or employ [an] individual or to bar or discharge [an] individual from employment” on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, marital status or…”
Ekeya v. Shriners Hosp. for Child., Portland, 258 F. Supp. 3d 1192 (D. Or. 2017).
“As her first claim, Ekeya alleges that Shri-ners Portland retaliated against her, in violation of Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(l)(f) and Or. Rev.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(l)(g) — 6 cases
Ekeya v. Shriners Hosp. for Child., Portland, 258 F. Supp. 3d 1192 (D. Or. 2017).
“As her first claim, Ekeya alleges that Shri-ners Portland retaliated against her, in violation of Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(l)(f) and Or. Rev.”
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