§ 110. When prosecution barred by former prosecution for different offense.
Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision of the statutes
than a former prosecution or is based on different facts, it is barred by such former
prosecution under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction as defined in section
109 of this title (relating to when prosecution barred by former prosecution for the
same offense) and the subsequent prosecution is for:
(i) any offense of which the defendant could have been convicted on the first prosecution;
(ii) any offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, if
such offense was known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement
of the first trial and occurred within the same judicial district as the former prosecution
unless the court ordered a separate trial of the charge of such offense or the offense
of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted was a summary offense or
a summary traffic offense; or
(iii) the same conduct, unless:
(A) the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted and the offense
for which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not required
by the other and the law defining each of such offenses is intended to prevent a substantially
different harm or evil; or
(B) the second offense was not consummated when the former trial began.
(2) The former prosecution was terminated, after the indictment was found, by an acquittal
or by a final order or judgment for the defendant which has not been set aside, reversed
or vacated and which acquittal, final order or judgment necessarily required a determination
inconsistent with a fact which must be established for conviction of the second offense.
(3) The former prosecution was improperly terminated, as improper termination is defined
in section 109 of this title (relating to when prosecution barred by former prosecution
for the same offense) and the subsequent prosecution is for an offense of which the
defendant could have been convicted had the former prosecution not been improperly
terminated.
(June 28, 2002, P.L.481, No.82, eff. 60 days; July 11, 2022, P.L.1571, No.85, eff.
imd.)
2022 Amendment. Act 85 amended par. (1).
Cross References. Section 110 is referred to in section 112 of this title.
Notes of Decisions
Commonwealth v. Perfetto, M., Aplt., 207 A.3d 812 (Pa. 2019).
· cites it 13× “The Legislature subsequently codified this rule in the Crimes Code at 18 Pa.C.S. § 110. Prior to 2002, Subsection 110(1)(ii) of the compulsory joinder statute barred the Commonwealth from prosecuting a defendant when: (1) a former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or…”
Commonwealth v. Bracalielly, 658 A.2d 755 (Pa. 1995).
· cites it 22× “Appellants contend that because these prosecutions arise from conduct which forms part of the same criminal episode on which previous prosecutions were based, 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 requires their dismissal.”
Commonwealth v. Bethea, 828 A.2d 1066 (Pa. 2003).
· cites it 12× “[4] *1071 The Superior Court majority distinguished McPhail as that case involved the consolidation of criminal charges that occurred in multiple counties but were part of a single criminal transaction, pursuant to 18 Pa. C.S. § 110. Looking at the circumstances in the present…”
Commonwealth v. Perfetto, 169 A.3d 1114 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).
· cites it 11× “In June 2015, Appellee filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that subsection (1)(ii) of 18 Pa.C.S. § 110, known as the compulsory joinder rule, barred his prosecution for DUI.”
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244 (Pa. 2011).
· cites it 6× “Appellant asserts that he "was `harassed' by four separate prosecutions in quick succession" in four counties, for offenses that arose out of the same criminal episode and thus should have been consolidated for trial.”
Commonwealth v. McPhail, 692 A.2d 139 (Pa. 1997).
· cites it 14× “This case involves the question whether four drug transactions constituting a single criminal episode, committed in two counties, were within the jurisdiction of a single court; if they were, then 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 mandates that the charges be tried in a single proceeding.”
Commonwealth v. Caufman, 662 A.2d 1050 (Pa. 1995).
· cites it 12× “At issue is the Superior Court's reversal of the trial court's ruling that appellee's plea of guilt to the charge of driving at an unsafe speed did not bar prosecution of the homicide by vehicle charge.”
Freundt v. Com. Dept. of Transp., 883 A.2d 503 (Pa. 2005).
· cites it 6× “The compulsory joinder rule and 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 protect these interests by requiring that all crimes arising from the same criminal episode be charged and tried together.”
Commonwealth v. Bradley, 834 A.2d 1127 (Pa. 2003).
· cites it 4× “Before turning to that consideration, however, we note that the Sentencing Guidelines are not the only other instance in Pennsylvania criminal law where issues arise concerning whether multiple crimes should be treated as single or multiple episodes or transactions.”
Commonwealth v. Rosario, 652 A.2d 354 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
· cites it 8× “ROWLEY, President Judge: In this appeal by Agustin Rosario, we consider, inter alia, whether 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 barred appellant's prosecution on murder and conspiracy charges where, pursuant to a plea bargain, the Commonwealth agreed to nol pros those charges in exchange for…”
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 896 A.2d 1191 (Pa. 2006).
· cites it 2× “18 Pa.C.S. § 110(1)(ii). Spotz maintained that the York and Cumberland County murders were based on the same conduct or arose from the same criminal episode as the killings in Schuylkill and Clearfield Counties.”
Commonwealth v. Lesko, 15 A.3d 345 (Pa. 2011).
· cites it 2× “First, he contends that the prosecution for the murder of Officer Miller should have been barred by 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 because of his guilty plea to the murder of Nicholls.”
— 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 110(1) — 16 cases
— 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 110(1)(i) — 4 cases
— 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 110(1)(ii) — 65 cases
Commonwealth v. Perfetto, M., Aplt., 207 A.3d 812 (Pa. 2019).
“The Legislature subsequently codified this rule in the Crimes Code at 18 Pa.C.S. § 110. Prior to 2002, Subsection 110(1)(ii) of the compulsory joinder statute barred the Commonwealth from prosecuting a defendant when: (1) a former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or…”
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 896 A.2d 1191 (Pa. 2006).
“18 Pa.C.S. § 110(1)(ii). Spotz maintained that the York and Cumberland County murders were based on the same conduct or arose from the same criminal episode as the killings in Schuylkill and Clearfield Counties.”
Commonwealth v. Bracalielly, 658 A.2d 755 (Pa. 1995).
“Appellants contend that because these prosecutions arise from conduct which forms part of the same criminal episode on which previous prosecutions were based, 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 requires their dismissal.”
Freundt v. Com. Dept. of Transp., 883 A.2d 503 (Pa. 2005).
“The compulsory joinder rule and 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 protect these interests by requiring that all crimes arising from the same criminal episode be charged and tried together.”
— 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 110(1)(iii) — 1 case
— 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 110(1)(iii)(A) — 6 cases
— 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 110(2) — 5 cases
— 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 110(3) — 1 case
— 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 110(a)(1)(ii) — 5 cases
— 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 110(ii) — 1 case
— 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 110(l)(i) — 1 case
— 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 110(l)(ii) — 28 cases
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 896 A.2d 1191 (Pa. 2006).
“18 Pa.C.S. § 110(1)(ii). Spotz maintained that the York and Cumberland County murders were based on the same conduct or arose from the same criminal episode as the killings in Schuylkill and Clearfield Counties.”
Commonwealth v. Bracalielly, 658 A.2d 755 (Pa. 1995).
“Appellants contend that because these prosecutions arise from conduct which forms part of the same criminal episode on which previous prosecutions were based, 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 requires their dismissal.”
Freundt v. Com. Dept. of Transp., 883 A.2d 503 (Pa. 2005).
“The compulsory joinder rule and 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 protect these interests by requiring that all crimes arising from the same criminal episode be charged and tried together.”
Commonwealth v. Perfetto, 169 A.3d 1114 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).
“In June 2015, Appellee filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that subsection (1)(ii) of 18 Pa.C.S. § 110, known as the compulsory joinder rule, barred his prosecution for DUI.”
— 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 110(l)(ii)(1983) — 1 case
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