Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 307 (2026)

 Liability of organizations and certain related persons.

✓ current as of May 2026
Coverage note: this corpus holds the consolidated Pa.C.S. titles only. Unconsolidated P.S. statutes (UTPCPL 73 P.S. § 201-1, Liquor Code, wage payment laws) are not included; a miss here does not mean the statute does not exist. Check palegis.us.
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section PA-LEGpalegis.us JustiaTitle on Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

§ 307.  Liability of organizations and certain related persons.

(a)  Corporations generally.--A corporation may be convicted of the commission of an offense if:

(1)  the offense is a summary offense or the offense is defined by a statute other than this title in which a legislative purpose to impose liability on corporations plainly appears and the conduct is performed by an agent of the corporation acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or employment, except that if the law defining the offense designates the agents for whose conduct the corporation is accountable or the circumstances under which it is accountable, such provisions shall apply;

(2)  the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corporations by law; or

(3)  the commission of the offense was authorized, requested, commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or employment.

(b)  Corporations, absolute liability.--When absolute liability is imposed for the commission of an offense, a legislative purpose to impose liability on a corporation shall be assumed, unless the contrary plainly appears.

(c)  Unincorporated associations.--An unincorporated association may be convicted of the commission of an offense if:

(1)  the offense is defined by a statute other than this title which expressly provides for the liability of such an association and the conduct is performed by an agent of the association acting in behalf of the association within the scope of his office or employment, except that if the law defining the offense designates the agents for whose conduct the association is accountable or the circumstances under which it is accountable, such provisions shall apply; or

(2)  the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on associations by law.

(d)  Defenses.--In any prosecution of a corporation or an unincorporated association for the commission of an offense included within the terms of paragraph (a)(1) or paragraph (c)(1) of this section, other than an offense for which absolute liability has been imposed, it shall be a defense if the defendant proves by a preponderance of evidence that the high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense employed due diligence to prevent its commission. This subsection shall not apply if it is plainly inconsistent with the legislative purpose in defining the particular offense.

(e)  Persons acting or under a duty to act for organizations.--

(1)  A person is legally accountable for any conduct he performs or causes to be performed in the name of a corporation or an unincorporated association or in its behalf to the same extent as if it were performed in his own name or behalf.

(2)  Whenever a duty to act is imposed by law upon a corporation or an unincorporated association, any agent of the corporation or association having primary responsibility for the discharge of the duty is legally accountable for a reckless omission to perform the required act to the same extent as if the duty were imposed by law directly upon himself.

(3)  When a person is convicted of an offense by reason of his legal accountability for the conduct of a corporation or an unincorporated association, he is subject to the sentence authorized by law when a natural person is convicted of an offense of the grade and the degree involved.

(f)  Definitions.--As used in this section the following words and phrases shall have the meanings given to them in this subsection:

"Agent."  Any director, officer, servant, employee or other person authorized to act in behalf of the corporation or association and, in the case of an unincorporated association, a member of such association.

"Corporation."  Does not include an entity organized as or by a governmental agency for the execution of a governmental program.

"High managerial agent."  An officer of a corporation or an unincorporated association, or, in the case of a partnership, a partner, or any other agent of a corporation or association having duties of such responsibility that his conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation or association.

 

Cross References.  Section 307 is referred to in section 6305 of this title; sections 3345.1, 8510.1, 9002 of Title 75 (Vehicles).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10 cases, 1979–2005 · leading case: Commonwealth v. Pestinikas, 617 A.2d 1339 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
Commonwealth v. Pestinikas, 617 A.2d 1339 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). · cites it 10× “§ 303(d); 18 Pa.C.S. § 307(1)(2); 18 Pa.C.S. § 307(c)(2).”
Commonwealth v. Miller, 606 A.2d 495 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). · cites it 4× “The trial court, relying to a large extent on 18 Pa.C.S. § 307, found that the Commonwealth had met its burden of establishing that appellant was primarily responsible for the *60 corporation’s tax payments.”
Commonwealth v. Snyder, 483 A.2d 933 (Pa. 1984). · cites it 3× “was held for trial on four counts of each offense under the corporate liability provisions of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 307(a); appellee Vic Snyder, owner and president of the corporation, was held on two counts of each offense; appel-lee Michael Marino on one count of each;…”
Commonwealth v. Klinger, 535 A.2d 1060 (Pa. 1987). · cites it 2× “Importantly, the testimony at trial demonstrates that it was appellant who made the decision not to pay the taxes at issue in this case. [9] Additionally, although we do not decide, it is arguable that appellant is criminally responsible for non-payment of the oil company…”
Commonwealth v. J.F. Lomma, Inc., 590 A.2d 342 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). · cites it 4× “In general, the criminal liability of corporations is defined at 18 Pa.C.S. § 307(a) and (b) as follows: *192 § 307.”
Brownsburg Cmty. Sch. Corp. v. Natare Corp., 824 N.E.2d 336 (Ind. 2005). “23(D) (2004); 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 307(F) (2004). 7 . Unlike the federal antitrust laws and those of most states, the Indiana Antitrust Act does not explicitly provide an injunctive remedy.”
Commonwealth v. Sanico, Inc., 830 A.2d 621 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003). “18 Pa.C.S. § 307(d) (emphasis added). 9 .”
King Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 475 A.2d 939 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984). · cites it 2× “The appellants allege that: (1) the Crimes Code, 18 Pa. C. S. §307, prohibits the bringing of criminal charges against the partnership, King Coal Company; (2) the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Robert Woods operated a surface coal- mine without a…”
Commonwealth v. J. P. Mascaro & Sons, Inc., 402 A.2d 1050 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979). “*10 The circumstances under which corporations may be criminally liable are set forth in 18 Pa.C.S. § 307(a). It is there provided in pertinent part as follows: “A corporation may be convicted .”
Commonwealth v. Mazzatosta, 28 Pa. D. & C.4th 177 (1993). “1963), 18 Pa.C.S. §307(a)(3); Commonwealth v. Penn Valley Resorts Inc.”
— 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 307(1)(2) — 1 case
Commonwealth v. Pestinikas, 617 A.2d 1339 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). “§ 303(d); 18 Pa.C.S. § 307(1)(2); 18 Pa.C.S. § 307(c)(2).”
— 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 307(B)(2) — 1 case
Commonwealth v. Pestinikas, 617 A.2d 1339 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). “§ 303(d); 18 Pa.C.S. § 307(1)(2); 18 Pa.C.S. § 307(c)(2).”
— 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 307(F) — 1 case
Brownsburg Cmty. Sch. Corp. v. Natare Corp., 824 N.E.2d 336 (Ind. 2005). “23(D) (2004); 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 307(F) (2004). 7 . Unlike the federal antitrust laws and those of most states, the Indiana Antitrust Act does not explicitly provide an injunctive remedy.”
— 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 307(a) — 3 cases
Commonwealth v. Snyder, 483 A.2d 933 (Pa. 1984). “was held for trial on four counts of each offense under the corporate liability provisions of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 307(a); appellee Vic Snyder, owner and president of the corporation, was held on two counts of each offense; appel-lee Michael Marino on one count of each;…”
Commonwealth v. J.F. Lomma, Inc., 590 A.2d 342 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). “In general, the criminal liability of corporations is defined at 18 Pa.C.S. § 307(a) and (b) as follows: *192 § 307.”
Commonwealth v. J. P. Mascaro & Sons, Inc., 402 A.2d 1050 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979). “*10 The circumstances under which corporations may be criminally liable are set forth in 18 Pa.C.S. § 307(a). It is there provided in pertinent part as follows: “A corporation may be convicted .”
— 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 307(a)(2) — 1 case
Commonwealth v. Pestinikas, 617 A.2d 1339 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). “§ 303(d); 18 Pa.C.S. § 307(1)(2); 18 Pa.C.S. § 307(c)(2).”
— 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 307(a)(3) — 3 cases
Commonwealth v. Snyder, 483 A.2d 933 (Pa. 1984). “was held for trial on four counts of each offense under the corporate liability provisions of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 307(a); appellee Vic Snyder, owner and president of the corporation, was held on two counts of each offense; appel-lee Michael Marino on one count of each;…”
Commonwealth v. J.F. Lomma, Inc., 590 A.2d 342 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). “In general, the criminal liability of corporations is defined at 18 Pa.C.S. § 307(a) and (b) as follows: *192 § 307.”
Commonwealth v. Mazzatosta, 28 Pa. D. & C.4th 177 (1993). “1963), 18 Pa.C.S. §307(a)(3); Commonwealth v. Penn Valley Resorts Inc.”
— 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 307(c) — 1 case
King Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 475 A.2d 939 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984). “The appellants allege that: (1) the Crimes Code, 18 Pa. C. S. §307, prohibits the bringing of criminal charges against the partnership, King Coal Company; (2) the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Robert Woods operated a surface coal- mine without a…”
— 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 307(c)(2) — 1 case
Commonwealth v. Pestinikas, 617 A.2d 1339 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). “§ 303(d); 18 Pa.C.S. § 307(1)(2); 18 Pa.C.S. § 307(c)(2).”
— 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 307(d) — 1 case
Commonwealth v. Sanico, Inc., 830 A.2d 621 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003). “18 Pa.C.S. § 307(d) (emphasis added). 9 .”
— 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 307(e) — 2 cases
Commonwealth v. Klinger, 535 A.2d 1060 (Pa. 1987). “Importantly, the testimony at trial demonstrates that it was appellant who made the decision not to pay the taxes at issue in this case. [9] Additionally, although we do not decide, it is arguable that appellant is criminally responsible for non-payment of the oil company…”
Commonwealth v. Miller, 606 A.2d 495 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). “The trial court, relying to a large extent on 18 Pa.C.S. § 307, found that the Commonwealth had met its burden of establishing that appellant was primarily responsible for the *60 corporation’s tax payments.”
— 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 307(e)(1) — 1 case
Commonwealth v. Miller, 606 A.2d 495 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). “The trial court, relying to a large extent on 18 Pa.C.S. § 307, found that the Commonwealth had met its burden of establishing that appellant was primarily responsible for the *60 corporation’s tax payments.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.