R.I. Gen. Laws
Rhode Island General Laws

R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-6-4 (2026)

Payment as prerequisite — Limitation of actions

✓ current as of July 2026
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Except as otherwise provided in § 10-6-7, a joint tortfeasor is not entitled to a final money judgment for contribution until he or she has by payment discharged the common liability or has paid more than his or her pro rata share of the final money judgment. Actions for contribution shall be commenced not later than one year next after the first payment made by a joint tortfeasor which has discharged the common liability or is more than his or her pro rata share thereof.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10 cases, 1967–2011 · leading case: Calise v. Hidden Valley Condo. Ass'n, 773 A.2d 834 (R.I. 2001).
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Calise v. Hidden Valley Condo. Ass'n, 773 A.2d 834 (R.I. 2001). · cites it 6× “See § 10-6-4. Thus, the mere fact that the Calises chose to settle with two of the other joint tortfeasor defendants [24] — instead of allowing those claims to be decided on the merits — should not affect the ultimate damages to be assessed against the defaulted defendants.”
Bailey v. Algonquin Gas Transmission Co., 788 A.2d 478 (R.I. 2002). · cites it 4× “See G.L. 1956 § 10-6-4 ("[a] joint tortfeasor is not entitled to a final money judgment for contribution until he or she has by payment discharged the common liability or has paid more than *489 his or her pro rata share of the final money judgment.”
Hawkins v. Gadoury, 713 A.2d 799 (R.I. 1998). · cites it 5× “1956 § 9-1-14(b)’s three-year limitations period applicable to actions for personal injuries.”
United States v. Davis, 20 F. Supp. 2d 326 (D.R.I. 1998). · cites it 2× “, a party who himself is liable) only to seek recoupment of that portion of his expenditures which exceeds his pro rata share of the overall liability”); see also R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-6-4 (“A joint tortfeasor is not entitled to a final money judgment for contribution until he or…”
Nelson v. Ptaszek, 505 A.2d 1141 (R.I. 1986). “The plaintiff also argues that at the time she signed the release her right to contribution had not yet matured and therefore was not releasable.”
Air-lite Prods., Inc. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 347 A.2d 623 (R.I. 1975). · cites it 2× “Because this release was given before plaintiffs secured the right to a money judgment for contribution, as provided in §10-6-4, 4 the trial justice held that the first two conditions of §10-6-8 were satisfied.”
Bowen v. Evanuk, 423 F. Supp. 1341 (D.R.I. 1976). · cites it 2× “G.L. § 10-6-4 (1969) would appear to operate to bar third-party plaintiff from seeking contribution from the State of Rhode Island in any other forum.”
Reyes v. Stand. Parking Corp., 461 B.R. 153 (D.R.I. 2011). · cites it 2× “73 (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-6-4).) Standard also asserts that its Rhode Island common-law indemnification claim did not exist prepet-ition because “[a]t the time of Rouse’s bankruptcy filing, there was no allegation that the prospective indemnitor, Rouse, was liable to the…”
Marcus v. Marcoux, 41 F.R.D. 332 (D.R.I. 1967). “At that time, Rhode Island General Laws 1956, § 10-6-4 provided, “A joint tortfeasor is not entitled to a .”
Mortimer v. Santos, 623 A.2d 38 (R.I. 1993). · cites it 3× “(1985 Reenactment) § 10-6-4. After hearing oral arguments and reviewing the memoranda filed by the parties, we find the claims of the third-party defendants to be without merit.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.