The following words and phrases, when used in this chapter, have the following meanings:
(1) “Accused” means a person accused of a sexual assault.
(2) “Force or coercion” means when the accused does any of the following:
(i) Uses or threatens to use a weapon, or any article used or fashioned in a manner to
lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a weapon.
(ii) Overcomes the victim through the application of physical force or physical violence.
(iii) Coerces the victim to submit by threatening to use force or violence on the victim
and the victim reasonably believes that the accused has the present ability to execute
these threats.
(iv) Coerces the victim to submit by threatening to at some time in the future murder,
inflict serious bodily injury upon or kidnap the victim or any other person and the
victim reasonably believes that the accused has the ability to execute this threat.
(3) “Intimate parts” means the genital or anal areas, groin, inner thigh, or buttock of
any person or the breast of a female.
(4) “Mentally disabled” means a person who has a mental impairment which renders that
person incapable of appraising the nature of the act.
(5) “Mentally incapacitated” means a person who is rendered temporarily incapable of appraising
or controlling his or her conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic,
or other substance administered to that person without his or her consent, or who
is mentally unable to communicate unwillingness to engage in the act.
(6) “Physically helpless” means a person who is unconscious, asleep, or for any other
reason is physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act.
(7) “Sexual contact” means the intentional touching of the victim’s or accused’s intimate
parts, clothed or unclothed, if that intentional touching can be reasonably construed
as intended by the accused to be for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification,
or assault.
(8) “Sexual penetration” means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, and anal intercourse,
or any other intrusion, however slight, by any part of a person’s body or by any object
into the genital or anal openings of another person’s body, or the victim’s own body
upon the accused’s instruction, but emission of semen is not required.
(9) “Spouse” means a person married to the accused at the time of the alleged sexual assault,
except that such persons shall not be considered the spouse if the couple are living
apart and a decision for divorce has been granted, whether or not a final decree has
been entered.
(10) “Victim” means the person alleging to have been subjected to sexual assault.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
81
cases (
3 in the last 5 years), 1975–2025 · leading case:
State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776 (R.I. 1996).
State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776 (R.I. 1996).
· cites it 40× “1 as defined in § 11-37-1. In that definition "sexual penetration" is clearly and unambiguously defined as "intrusion, however slight, by any part of a person's body or by any object into the genital or anal openings of another person's body * * *.”
State v. DiPetrillo, 922 A.2d 124 (R.I. 2007).
· cites it 21× “This Court in Burke held that an implied threat can be as effective as a declared threat under § 11-37-1 and that "[a] threat may consist of the imposition of psychological pressure on one who, under the circumstances, is vulnerable and susceptible to such pressure.”
In re B.H., 138 A.3d 774 (R.I. 2016).
· cites it 14× “The terms “sexual intercourse” and “anal intercourse” are not defined in § 11-37-1. Dictionaries typically provide a primary definition of “sexual intercourse” that involves the penetration of the vagina by the penis.”
State v. Pignolet, 465 A.2d 176 (R.I. 1983).
· cites it 8× “1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 11-37-1, as enacted by P.L. 1979, ch. 302, § 2, is such a statute.”
State v. Mohapatra, 880 A.2d 802 (R.I. 2005).
· cites it 4× “" Section 11-37-1(7); see also State v. Tobin, 602 A.”
State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759 (R.I. 1998).
· cites it 7× “) Section 11-37-1(7) defines "sexual contact" as: "the intentional touching of the victim's or accused's intimate parts, clothed or unclothed, if that intentional touching can be reasonably construed as intended by the accused to be for the purpose of sexual arousal,…”
State v. John Rainey, 175 A.3d 1169 (R.I. 2018).
· cites it 4× “” Section 11-37-1(8) (emphasis added). In light of this definition, we analyze defendant’s argument as to each count.”
State v. Tobin, 602 A.2d 528 (R.I. 1992).
· cites it 6× “Additionally the defense filed motions attacking the constitutionality of the second-degree sexual-assault statutes, § 11-37-1 and § 11-37-4 including, inter alia, an argument that the statutes, if literally applied, would allow conviction without a criminal mens rea.”
State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725 (R.I. 1987).
· cites it 3× “” General Laws 1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 11-37-1 provides as follows: “ ‘Force or coercion’ — shall mean when the accused does any of the following: (A) uses or threatens to use a weapon, or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to…”
State v. Higham, 865 A.2d 1040 (R.I. 2004).
· cites it 4× “The term “sexual penetration” is defined in § 11-37-1(8) as: “sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, and anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, by any part of a person’s body or by any object into the genital or anal openings of another person’s body, or…”
State v. Silvia, 798 A.2d 419 (R.I. 2002).
· cites it 4× “” G.L. 1956 § 11-37-1. The trial justice also found defendant guilty of the original second-degree child-molestation charge, involving defendant’s sexual contact in the bathroom with the victim’s breasts.”
State v. Dubois, 36 A.3d 191 (R.I. 2012).
· cites it 3× “2006) (quoting G.L.1956 §§ 11-37-1(7) and 11-37-8.3); Mohapatra, 880 A.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-1(0) — 1 case
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-1(2) — 3 cases
State v. DiPetrillo, 922 A.2d 124 (R.I. 2007).
“This Court in Burke held that an implied threat can be as effective as a declared threat under § 11-37-1 and that "[a] threat may consist of the imposition of psychological pressure on one who, under the circumstances, is vulnerable and susceptible to such pressure.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-1(2)(B) — 1 case
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-1(2)(ii) — 2 cases
State v. DiPetrillo, 922 A.2d 124 (R.I. 2007).
“This Court in Burke held that an implied threat can be as effective as a declared threat under § 11-37-1 and that "[a] threat may consist of the imposition of psychological pressure on one who, under the circumstances, is vulnerable and susceptible to such pressure.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-1(2)(iii) — 1 case
State v. DiPetrillo, 922 A.2d 124 (R.I. 2007).
“This Court in Burke held that an implied threat can be as effective as a declared threat under § 11-37-1 and that "[a] threat may consist of the imposition of psychological pressure on one who, under the circumstances, is vulnerable and susceptible to such pressure.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-1(3) — 3 cases
In re B.H., 138 A.3d 774 (R.I. 2016).
“The terms “sexual intercourse” and “anal intercourse” are not defined in § 11-37-1. Dictionaries typically provide a primary definition of “sexual intercourse” that involves the penetration of the vagina by the penis.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-1(4) — 2 cases
Keeley, 27 I. & N. Dec. 146 (2017).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-1(5) — 1 case
Keeley, 27 I. & N. Dec. 146 (2017).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-1(6) — 3 cases
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-1(7) — 21 cases
State v. Mohapatra, 880 A.2d 802 (R.I. 2005).
“" Section 11-37-1(7); see also State v. Tobin, 602 A.”
In re B.H., 138 A.3d 774 (R.I. 2016).
“The terms “sexual intercourse” and “anal intercourse” are not defined in § 11-37-1. Dictionaries typically provide a primary definition of “sexual intercourse” that involves the penetration of the vagina by the penis.”
State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759 (R.I. 1998).
“) Section 11-37-1(7) defines "sexual contact" as: "the intentional touching of the victim's or accused's intimate parts, clothed or unclothed, if that intentional touching can be reasonably construed as intended by the accused to be for the purpose of sexual arousal,…”
State v. Dubois, 36 A.3d 191 (R.I. 2012).
“2006) (quoting G.L.1956 §§ 11-37-1(7) and 11-37-8.3); Mohapatra, 880 A.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-1(8) — 19 cases
State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776 (R.I. 1996).
“1 as defined in § 11-37-1. In that definition "sexual penetration" is clearly and unambiguously defined as "intrusion, however slight, by any part of a person's body or by any object into the genital or anal openings of another person's body * * *.”
State v. John Rainey, 175 A.3d 1169 (R.I. 2018).
“” Section 11-37-1(8) (emphasis added). In light of this definition, we analyze defendant’s argument as to each count.”
In re B.H., 138 A.3d 774 (R.I. 2016).
“The terms “sexual intercourse” and “anal intercourse” are not defined in § 11-37-1. Dictionaries typically provide a primary definition of “sexual intercourse” that involves the penetration of the vagina by the penis.”
State v. Higham, 865 A.2d 1040 (R.I. 2004).
“The term “sexual penetration” is defined in § 11-37-1(8) as: “sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, and anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, by any part of a person’s body or by any object into the genital or anal openings of another person’s body, or…”
State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759 (R.I. 1998).
“) Section 11-37-1(7) defines "sexual contact" as: "the intentional touching of the victim's or accused's intimate parts, clothed or unclothed, if that intentional touching can be reasonably construed as intended by the accused to be for the purpose of sexual arousal,…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-1(C) — 4 cases
State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725 (R.I. 1987).
“” General Laws 1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 11-37-1 provides as follows: “ ‘Force or coercion’ — shall mean when the accused does any of the following: (A) uses or threatens to use a weapon, or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to…”
State v. DiPetrillo, 922 A.2d 124 (R.I. 2007).
“This Court in Burke held that an implied threat can be as effective as a declared threat under § 11-37-1 and that "[a] threat may consist of the imposition of psychological pressure on one who, under the circumstances, is vulnerable and susceptible to such pressure.”
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