(a) “Domestic violence” includes, but is not limited to, any of the following crimes when
committed by one family or household member against another:
(1) Simple assault (§ 11-5-3);
(2) Felony assaults (chapter 5 of title 11);
(3) Vandalism (§ 11-44-1);
(4) Disorderly conduct (§ 11-45-1);
(5) Trespass (§ 11-44-26);
(6) Kidnapping (§ 11-26-1);
(7) Child-snatching (§ 11-26-1.1);
(8) Sexual assault (§§ 11-37-2, 11-37-4);
(9) Homicide (§§ 11-23-1 and 11-23-3);
(10) Violation of the provisions of a protective order entered pursuant to § 15-5-19, chapter 15 of title 15, or chapter 8.1 of title 8 where the respondent has knowledge of the order and the penalty for its violation,
or a violation of a no contact order issued pursuant to § 12-29-4;
(11) Stalking (chapter 59 of title 11);
(12) Refusal to relinquish or to damage or to obstruct a telephone (§ 11-35-14);
(13) Burglary and Unlawful Entry (chapter 8 of title 11);
(14) Arson (chapter 4 of title 11);
(15) Cyberstalking and cyberharassment (§ 11-52-4.2);
(16) Domestic assault by strangulation § 11-5-2.3; and
(17) Electronic tracking of motor vehicles (§ 11-69-1).
(b) “Family or household member” means spouses, former spouses, adult persons related
by blood or marriage, adult persons who are presently residing together or who have
resided together in the past three (3) years, and persons who have a child in common
regardless of whether they have been married or have lived together, or persons who
are, or have been, in a substantive dating or engagement relationship within the past
one year which shall be determined by the court’s consideration of the following factors:
(1) The length of time of the relationship;
(2) The type of the relationship;
(3) The frequency of the interaction between the parties.
(c) “Protective order” means an order issued pursuant to § 15-5-19, chapter 15 of title 15, or chapter 8.1 of title 8.
(d) “Victim” means a family or household member who has been subjected to domestic violence.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
21
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1998–2025 · leading case:
State v. Martini, 860 A.2d 689 (R.I. 2004).
State v. Martini, 860 A.2d 689 (R.I. 2004).
· cites it 36× “This Court vacated the conviction because the defendant's second offense, violating a District Court no-contact order, was not an enumerated domestic violence crime qualifying as a second offense, pursuant to the provisions of G.L.1956 § 12-29-2. Carter, 827 A.2d at 644-45 .”
State v. Enos, 21 A.3d 326 (R.I. 2011).
· cites it 32× “I cannot concur with the majority's conclusion that the substantive dating relationship as set forth in G.L.1956 § 12-29-2, which is an essential element of the domestic violence offense, "is, by its very nature, a somewhat flexible concept.”
State v. Carter, 827 A.2d 636 (R.I. 2003).
· cites it 19× “Additionally, defendant raised for the first time, a defect in the state’s proof; that is, that his second conviction for violating a no-contact order was not a qualifying offense pursuant to the provisions of §§ 12-29-2 and 12-29-5. Specifically, Carter contended that his…”
State v. Paul Fleck, 81 A.3d 1129 (R.I. 2014).
· cites it 9× “Significantly, the definition of family or household member under G.L.1956 § 12-29-2 also includes "adult persons who are presently residing together or who have resided together in the past three (3) years.”
State v. Erwin Grantley, 149 A.3d 124 (R.I. 2016).
· cites it 5× “See G.L. 1956 § 12-29-2. 2 . To avoid confusion with Crystal Brace, we will refer to Christopher Brace and Jonathan Bruce by their first names.”
State v. Russell, 890 A.2d 453 (R.I. 2006).
· cites it 5× “The defendant was charged with one count of disorderly conduct in violation of § ll-45-l(a)(l) 2 and G.L.1956 § 12-29-2. 3 In Superior Court, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint and alleged that the police lacked probable cause to charge him with disorderly conduct for…”
State v. Brown, 900 A.2d 1155 (R.I. 2006).
· cites it 5× “1956 § 11-5-2 and G.L.1956 § 12-29-2 and two counts of simple assault in violation of § 11-5-3 and § 12-29-2.”
State v. Cardona, 969 A.2d 667 (R.I. 2009).
· cites it 3× “General Laws 1956 § 12-29-5 provides in pertinent part: "(c)(1) Every person convicted of an offense punishable as a misdemeanor involving domestic violence as defined in § 12-29-2 shall: [[Image here]] "(ii) For a third and subsequent violation be deemed guilty of a felony and…”
State v. Hesford, 900 A.2d 1194 (R.I. 2006).
· cites it 3× “1956 § 12 — 29—5(c)(1)(ii), which provides: "(c)(1) Every person convicted of an offense punishable as a misdemeanor involving domestic violence as defined in § 12-29-2 shall: "(ii) For a third and subsequent violation be deemed guilty of a felony and be imprisoned for a term of…”
State v. DelBonis, 862 A.2d 760 (R.I. 2004).
· cites it 2× “The Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated the conviction because the defendant’s second offense, violating a District Court no-contact order, was not an enumerated crime qualifying as a second offense, pursuant to the provisions of G.L.1956 § 12-29-2, and therefore, the offense on…”
State v. Furtado, 774 A.2d 38 (R.I. 2001).
· cites it 2× “1956 § 11-45-1 are crimes enumerated in the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, in accordance with G.L. 1956 § 12-29-2. 2 . Although the full transcript of the trial testimony has not been provided to us on appeal, the record suggests that, despite testimony to the contrary,…”
State v. John, 881 A.2d 920 (R.I. 2005).
“General Laws 1956 § 12-29-5(c)(1) reads in pertinent part: "Every person convicted of an offense punishable as a misdemeanor involving domestic violence as defined in § 12-29-2 shall: (ii) For a third and subsequent violation be deemed guilty of a felony and be imprisoned for a…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-2(4) — 1 case
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-2(a) — 4 cases
State v. Martini, 860 A.2d 689 (R.I. 2004).
“This Court vacated the conviction because the defendant's second offense, violating a District Court no-contact order, was not an enumerated domestic violence crime qualifying as a second offense, pursuant to the provisions of G.L.1956 § 12-29-2. Carter, 827 A.2d at 644-45 .”
State v. Cardona, 969 A.2d 667 (R.I. 2009).
“General Laws 1956 § 12-29-5 provides in pertinent part: "(c)(1) Every person convicted of an offense punishable as a misdemeanor involving domestic violence as defined in § 12-29-2 shall: [[Image here]] "(ii) For a third and subsequent violation be deemed guilty of a felony and…”
State v. Enos, 21 A.3d 326 (R.I. 2011).
“I cannot concur with the majority's conclusion that the substantive dating relationship as set forth in G.L.1956 § 12-29-2, which is an essential element of the domestic violence offense, "is, by its very nature, a somewhat flexible concept.”
State v. Erwin Grantley, 149 A.3d 124 (R.I. 2016).
“See G.L. 1956 § 12-29-2. 2 . To avoid confusion with Crystal Brace, we will refer to Christopher Brace and Jonathan Bruce by their first names.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-2(a)(10) — 1 case
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-2(a)(13) — 1 case
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-2(a)(2) — 1 case
State v. Erwin Grantley, 149 A.3d 124 (R.I. 2016).
“See G.L. 1956 § 12-29-2. 2 . To avoid confusion with Crystal Brace, we will refer to Christopher Brace and Jonathan Bruce by their first names.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-2(a)(4) — 1 case
State v. Hesford, 900 A.2d 1194 (R.I. 2006).
“1956 § 12 — 29—5(c)(1)(ii), which provides: "(c)(1) Every person convicted of an offense punishable as a misdemeanor involving domestic violence as defined in § 12-29-2 shall: "(ii) For a third and subsequent violation be deemed guilty of a felony and be imprisoned for a term of…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-2(b) — 3 cases
State v. Enos, 21 A.3d 326 (R.I. 2011).
“I cannot concur with the majority's conclusion that the substantive dating relationship as set forth in G.L.1956 § 12-29-2, which is an essential element of the domestic violence offense, "is, by its very nature, a somewhat flexible concept.”
State v. Paul Fleck, 81 A.3d 1129 (R.I. 2014).
“Significantly, the definition of family or household member under G.L.1956 § 12-29-2 also includes "adult persons who are presently residing together or who have resided together in the past three (3) years.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-2(b)(3) — 1 case
State v. Enos, 21 A.3d 326 (R.I. 2011).
“I cannot concur with the majority's conclusion that the substantive dating relationship as set forth in G.L.1956 § 12-29-2, which is an essential element of the domestic violence offense, "is, by its very nature, a somewhat flexible concept.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-2(c) — 1 case
State v. Martini, 860 A.2d 689 (R.I. 2004).
“This Court vacated the conviction because the defendant's second offense, violating a District Court no-contact order, was not an enumerated domestic violence crime qualifying as a second offense, pursuant to the provisions of G.L.1956 § 12-29-2. Carter, 827 A.2d at 644-45 .”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-2(e) — 1 case
State v. Martini, 860 A.2d 689 (R.I. 2004).
“This Court vacated the conviction because the defendant's second offense, violating a District Court no-contact order, was not an enumerated domestic violence crime qualifying as a second offense, pursuant to the provisions of G.L.1956 § 12-29-2. Carter, 827 A.2d at 644-45 .”
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