Rhode Island General Laws

R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-19 (2026)

Restraining orders — Treatment for harmed or menaced spouse — Custody of children — Allowances — Alimony and counsel fees

✓ current as of July 2026

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(a) Whenever either party to a marriage is insane, or whenever a cause is in existence which is, or if continued, will be a cause for divorce, the family court, upon the original petition of one of the parties, or upon the filing of a complaint for divorce, may restrain either party from interfering with the personal liberty of the other, and may restrain either party from maliciously causing or attempting to cause bodily harm to the other, with or without a dangerous weapon, and may restrain either party from placing, by physical menace or threat of physical menace, the other in fear of imminent bodily injury; and upon a finding by the court that any party has been so harmed, menaced, or threatened the court may prescribe treatment including, but not limited to, out-patient counseling, and may regulate the custody and provide for the education, maintenance, and support of the children, if any, and may, in its discretion, order one of the parties to pay alimony and/or counsel fees to the other pursuant to § 15-5-16, which allowance shall not be regarded as a judgment for debt until the court, which made the order for maintenance and support of the children, alimony for one or the other of the parties, and counsel fees, has adjudicated in appropriate proceedings what, if anything, is due under the order. Suits may be brought or executions may issue for amounts due and unpaid, the executions to run against the goods and chattels of the husband or wife, as the case may be; the court may make all necessary orders and decrees concerning the suits or executions and at any time may alter, amend, or annul for sufficient cause, after notice to the interested parties.

(b)(1) Any violation of the protective orders mentioned in subsection (a) of this section shall subject the defendant to being found in contempt of court.

(2) The contempt order shall not be exclusive and shall not preclude any other available civil or criminal remedies.

(c) Any violation of a restraining order under this chapter protecting a person against bodily harm and/or against threat of imminent bodily injury shall be a misdemeanor which shall be punished by a fine of no more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. The penalties for violation of this section shall also include the penalties provided in § 12-29-5. The district court has criminal jurisdiction over violations of restraining orders protecting the person of the complainant against bodily harm and/or against the threat of imminent bodily injury.

(d) In regulating the custody of the children, the court shall provide for the reasonable right of visitation by the natural parent not having custody of the children except upon the showing of cause as to why the right should not be granted. The court shall mandate compliance with its orders by both the custodial parent and the children. In the event of noncompliance, the non-custodial parent may file a motion for contempt in family court. Upon a finding by the court that its order for visitation has not been complied with, the court shall exercise its discretion in providing a remedy, and define the non-custodial parent’s visitation in detail. However, if a second finding of noncompliance by the court is made, the court shall consider this to be grounds for a change of custody to the non-custodial parent.

(e) In all hearings regarding denial of visitation, the court shall make findings of fact.

(f) This chapter does not affect the right of the family court to award alimony or support pendente lite.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 13 cases, 1961–2003 · leading case: State v. Carter, 827 A.2d 636 (R.I. 2003).

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State v. Carter, 827 A.2d 636 (R.I. 2003). · cites it 3× “The definition of "Domestic Violence” also included violations of protective orders issued pursuant to G.L.1956 § 15-5-19 (domestic relations restraining orders) and protective orders issued by the District Court pursuant to G.”

Petition of Loudin, 219 A.2d 915 (R.I. 1966). · cites it 3× “” This language was expressly designed to include within the jurisdiction of the family court those proceedings previously authorized as within the jurisdiction of the superior court when sitting as a court of domestic relations and set forth in §15-5-19.”

Pate v. Pate, 196 A.2d 723 (R.I. 1964). · cites it 3× “1956, §15-5-19, wherein the petitioning wife seeks an allowance for support.”

Smith v. Smith, 382 A.2d 182 (R.I. 1978). “1956 (1969 Reenactment) §15-5-19 against her husband on the ground of extreme cruelty.”

Engelhardt v. Bergeron, 317 A.2d 877 (R.I. 1974). “This court has earlier determined that the provisions of §8-10-3 were designed to include within the jurisdiction of the Family Court those proceedings authorized as within the jurisdiction of the Superior Court when sitting as a court of domestic relations and as set forth in…”

Mendes v. Mendes, 241 A.2d 297 (R.I. 1968). “1956, §15-5-19. She then moved in each case to consolidate the two petitions for trial, and in addition, in the absolute divorce case, moved for an order authorizing the taking of depositions of essential witnesses in the Cape Verde Islands as well as for an allowance to cover…”

Burns v. Burns, 168 A.2d 141 (R.I. 1961). “1956, §15-5-19. On August 6, 1956 a consent decree granting such relief was duly entered by the superior court.”

Mendes v. Mendes, 305 A.2d 97 (R.I. 1973). “*577 II The petitioner contends that the trial justice committed prejudicial error when on April 7, 1967, he denied petitioner’s motion to consolidate for hearing her petition for absolute divorce and her miscellaneous petition for relief under §15-5-19 and argues that by reason…”

Phelan v. Phelan, 443 A.2d 1259 (R.I. 1982). · cites it 6× “1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 15-5-19 whereby either party to a marriage can be ordered to pay a separate maintenance to the other “whenever a cause is in existence which is, or if continued will be a cause for divorce * * *.”

Gomes v. Gomes, 171 A.2d 446 (R.I. 1961). “1956, §15-5-19, hereinafter referred to as the statute.”

Lynch v. Lynch, 172 A.2d 335 (R.I. 1961). · cites it 6× “1956, §15-5-19, authorizing the filing of such petitions for relief in the superior court without commencement of divorce proceedings.”

Thayer v. Thayer, 265 A.2d 436 (R.I. 1970). · cites it 5× “1956, §15-5-19, alleges (1) that a cause, willful desertion, was in existence which if continued would be a cause for divorce, and (2) that petitioner had no property of her own available for the purpose of enabling her to prosecute her petition.”

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