R.I. Gen. Laws
Rhode Island General Laws

R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-2 (2026)

First degree sexual assault

✓ current as of July 2026
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A person is guilty of first degree sexual assault if he or she engages in sexual penetration with another person, and if any of the following circumstances exist:

(1) The accused knows or has reason to know that the victim is mentally incapacitated, mentally disabled, or physically helpless.

(2) The accused uses force or coercion.

(3) The accused, through concealment or by the element of surprise, is able to overcome the victim.

(4) The accused engages in the medical treatment or examination of the victim for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or stimulation.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 109 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1980–2026 · leading case: State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022 (R.I. 2004).
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State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022 (R.I. 2004). · cites it 14× “Further, the sexual activities to which he admitted in the hearsay statements, even if consensual, would arguably subject him to liability for sexual penetration with a mentally-disabled individual under G.L.1956 § 11-37-2, as well as for sodomy, under the then-existing version…”
State v. Gardiner, 895 A.2d 703 (R.I. 2006). · cites it 21× “Third, Gardiner maintains that the state failed to provide expert testimony with respect to Jane's mental condition, thus warranting acquittal on the charge that he sexually assaulted a mentally disabled person in violation of G.L.1956 § 11-37-2. Fourth, Gardiner argues that it…”
State v. DiPetrillo, 922 A.2d 124 (R.I. 2007). · cites it 14× “Specifically, DiPetrillo argues that the trial justice "conflated the `force or coercion' standard" adopted by the General Assembly with other theories, such as: "the non-consent standard; the psychological-coercion-of-susceptible-victim standard; and the disagreeable sexual…”
State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759 (R.I. 1998). · cites it 13× “[18] The approximate precursor to today's law, G.L.1956 § 11-37-2, was passed in 1889 and, as originally phrased, essentially restated the early colonial statutes (which had in turn echoed the English common-law prohibition of carnal knowledge of a girl) but raised the threshold…”
State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776 (R.I. 1996). · cites it 8× “1 defining first-degree child molestation sexual assault that there is absolutely no requirement that the sexual penetration prohibited therein must be for the sexual arousal or gratification of the perpetrator, except for the specific occasion during which the accused engages…”
State v. Helberth Perez, 161 A.3d 487 (R.I. 2017). · cites it 11× “The indictment charged defendant with: count 1, engaging in sexual penetration, fellatio, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-37-2, first-degree sexual assault; count 2, engaging in sexual contact, penis to buttocks contact, in violation of § 11-37-4, second-degree sexual assault;…”
State v. Jordan, 528 A.2d 731 (R.I. 1987). · cites it 10× “At that time, the Legislature made no other changes in the statute and did not amend the third-degree sexual-assault statute.”
State v. Saluter., 715 A.2d 1250 (R.I. 1998). · cites it 5× “Facts and Procedural History On March 8, 1994, defendant was charged by indictment with two counts of first-degree sexual assault in violation of G.L.1956 §§ 11-37-2 and 11-37-3, four counts of first-degree child molestation in violation of §§ 11-37-8.”
State v. Ware, 418 A.2d 1 (R.I. 1980). · cites it 10× “1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 11-37-2. The grand jury further indicted him in three counts with violations of § 11-26-1 (kidnapping), § 11-37-1 (rape), and § 11-37-3 (attempted carnal knowledge of a girl under the age of sixteen).”
Brown v. State, 841 A.2d 1116 (R.I. 2004). · cites it 4× “Specifically, the indictment alleged in counts 1 through 3 that between July 1, 1979 and May 3, 1984, Brown engaged in sexual penetration with a person thirteen years old or under in violation of G.L. 1956 §§ 11-37-2, as amended by P.L. 1981, ch.”
State v. John J. Eddy, 68 A.3d 1089 (R.I. 2013). · cites it 3× “1, 1 and two counts of first-degree sexual assault in violation of § 11-37-2. 2 I Facts and Travel A The Appointment and Discharge of Defendant’s Attorneys On April 21, 2004, defendant John J.”
State v. Adefusika, 989 A.2d 467 (R.I. 2010). · cites it 3× “Adefusika on one count of first-degree sexual assault (sexual penetration), in violation of G.L.1956 §§ 11-37-2 and 11-37-3, and one count of second-degree sexual assault (hand to breast contact), in violation of §§ 11-37-4 and 11-37-5.”
Show all 109 citing cases →
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-2(1) — 6 cases
State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022 (R.I. 2004). “Further, the sexual activities to which he admitted in the hearsay statements, even if consensual, would arguably subject him to liability for sexual penetration with a mentally-disabled individual under G.L.1956 § 11-37-2, as well as for sodomy, under the then-existing version…”
State v. Gardiner, 895 A.2d 703 (R.I. 2006). “Third, Gardiner maintains that the state failed to provide expert testimony with respect to Jane's mental condition, thus warranting acquittal on the charge that he sexually assaulted a mentally disabled person in violation of G.L.1956 § 11-37-2. Fourth, Gardiner argues that it…”
State v. Contreras-Cruz, 765 A.2d 849 (R.I. 2001).
State v. Cook, 45 A.3d 1272 (R.I. 2012).
State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759 (R.I. 1998). “[18] The approximate precursor to today's law, G.L.1956 § 11-37-2, was passed in 1889 and, as originally phrased, essentially restated the early colonial statutes (which had in turn echoed the English common-law prohibition of carnal knowledge of a girl) but raised the threshold…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-2(2) — 4 cases
State v. Roger Watkins, 92 A.3d 172 (R.I. 2014).
State v. Gardiner, 895 A.2d 703 (R.I. 2006). “Third, Gardiner maintains that the state failed to provide expert testimony with respect to Jane's mental condition, thus warranting acquittal on the charge that he sexually assaulted a mentally disabled person in violation of G.L.1956 § 11-37-2. Fourth, Gardiner argues that it…”
State v. Jeffrey Martin, 68 A.3d 467 (R.I. 2013).
State v. Larry Threadgill (R.I. 2025).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-2(4) — 1 case
State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776 (R.I. 1996). “1 defining first-degree child molestation sexual assault that there is absolutely no requirement that the sexual penetration prohibited therein must be for the sexual arousal or gratification of the perpetrator, except for the specific occasion during which the accused engages…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-2(A) — 1 case
In Re Paul, 626 A.2d 694 (R.I. 1993).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-2(B) — 2 cases
State v. Mora, 618 A.2d 1275 (R.I. 1993).
State v. Dinagen, 639 A.2d 1353 (R.I. 1994).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-2(C) — 1 case
In Re Paul, 626 A.2d 694 (R.I. 1993).
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