(a) If any licensed person is convicted of violating any of the provisions of this title,
or of chapters 6, 10, 34, or 45 of title 11, or §§ 11-2-1, 11-9-13, 11-9-15, 11-11-5, 11-18-2 — 11-18-4, 11-20-1, 11-20-2, 11-23-4, 11-30-1 — 11-30-11, 11-31-1 or 11-37-2 — 11-37-4, or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to any complaint or indictment under any of
these provisions, or if his or her license is revoked, his or her bond shall be put
in suit by the town or city treasurer of the city or town where the bond is given,
and by due process of law, the penal sum of the bond shall be recovered for the use
of the town or city.
(b) If any licensed person permits the house or place where he or she is licensed to sell
beverages under the provisions of this title to become disorderly as to annoy and
disturb the persons inhabiting or residing in the neighborhood, or permits any gambling
or unlawful gaming to be carried on in the neighborhood, or permits any of the laws
of this state to be violated in the neighborhood, in addition to any punishment or
penalties that may be prescribed by statute for that offense, he or she may be summoned
before the board, body, or official that issued his or her license and before the
department, when he or she and the witnesses for and against him or her may be heard.
If it appears to the satisfaction of the board, body, or official hearing the charges
that the licensee has violated any of the provisions of this title or has permitted
any of the things listed in this section, then the board, body, or official may suspend
or revoke the license or enter another order.
(c) In case the license is revoked, the licensed person after the revocation shall cease
to have any authority under the license and shall be disqualified from holding any
of the licenses provided for in this title for a period of five (5) years following
the revocation.
(d) The revocation of a license shall not interfere with, or prejudice the right of, recovery
upon the licensee’s bond for the full amount of the bond.
Notes of Decisions
Manuel J. Furtado, Inc. v. Sarkas, 373 A.2d 169 (R.I. 1977).
· cites it 6× “the town council’s denial of the renewal of petitioner’s license under §3-5-23. 2 The petitioner appealed the decision of the administrator to the Superior Court pursuant to §42-35-15 of the Administrative Procedures Act.”
Cesaroni v. Smith, 202 A.2d 292 (R.I. 1964).
· cites it 11× “The suspension order is based on the administrator's finding that petitioner violated G.L. 1956, § 3-5-23, which in pertinent part provides that a license may be suspended if the licensee permits his place of business "to become disorderly so as to annoy and disturb the persons…”
Hallene v. Smith, 201 A.2d 921 (R.I. 1964).
· cites it 8× “of any licensee whose license shall be revoked or suspended by any local board or authority, the liquor control administrator shall have the right to review the decision of any local board, and after hearing, to confirm or reverse the same in whole or in part, and to make such…”
A.J.C. Enter., Inc. v. Pastore, 473 A.2d 269 (R.I. 1984).
· cites it 3× “1956 (1976 Reenactment) § 3-7-6 and refused to examine § 3-5-23 for identical infirmities. We shall dispose of § 3-5-23 first.”
Mathieu v. Bd. of License Commissioners, 343 A.2d 1 (R.I. 1975).
· cites it 5× “She first argues, as she did in Superior Court, that §3-5-23, 1 which is concerned with the suspension or revocation of liquor licenses but not with their renewal, is both vague and overbroad and therefore unconstitutional.”
Bd. of License Commissioners of Tiverton v. Pastore, 463 A.2d 161 (R.I. 1983).
· cites it 2× “1956 (1976 Reenactment) § 3-5-23. The board voted to revoke the establishment’s liquor license, thereby prompting an appeal to the State Liquor Control Administrator (the administrator).”
Mathieu v. Bd. of Lic. Comm'rs, Town of Jamestown, 343 A.2d 1 (R.I. 1975).
· cites it 5× “She first argues, as she did in Superior Court, that § 3-5-23 [1] , which is concerned with the suspension or revocation of liquor licenses but not with their renewal, is both vague and overbroad and therefore unconstitutional.”
Santos v. Smith, 208 A.2d 524 (R.I. 1965).
“Under §3-5-23 the determination of the penalty to be imposed was, in this instance, vested exclusively in the administrator.”
Lyons v. Liquor Control Adm'r, 218 A.2d 1 (R.I. 1966).
“1956, §3-5-23, which in pertinent part provides: “* * * or shall permit any of the laws of this state to be violated therein, in addition to any punishment, penalty or penalties which may be prescribed by stat *575 ute for such offense, he may be summoned before the board, body…”
Scialo v. Smith, 210 A.2d 595 (R.I. 1965).
· cites it 3× “These disclose that at the hearing before the bureau, petitioner pleaded nolo to the police charge that he had permitted gambling-on the premises in violation of §3-5-23 and had pleaded guilty to two charges in the district court of the .”
Vitali v. Smith, 254 A.2d 766 (R.I. 1969).
“1956, §3-5-23, may be imposed upon a licensed person who permits any of the laws of this state to be violated at the house or place where he is licensed to sell beverages.”
Therault v. O'DOWD, 223 A.2d 841 (R.I. 1966).
· cites it 2× “1956, §3-5-23. We issued the writ October 20, 1961, which was prior in time to the enactment of P.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.