(a) Whenever any person shall die leaving a husband or wife surviving, the real estate
owned by the decedent in fee simple at his or her death shall descend and pass to
the husband or wife for his or her natural life subject, however, to any encumbrances
existing at death; provided that the liability, if any, of the decedent to discharge
the encumbrance or encumbrances shall not be impaired. The provisions of §§ 33-1-1 and 33-1-2 shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter and of § 33-1-6.
(b) For purposes of this section, any real estate conveyed by the decedent prior to his
or her death, with or without monetary consideration, shall not be subject to the
life estate granted in subsection (a) if the instrument or instruments evidencing
such conveyance were recorded in the records of land evidence in the city or town
where the real estate is located prior to the death of the decedent. Nothing in this
section shall be construed to require that the instrument or instruments evidencing
the conveyance must be recorded prior to the death of the decedent to be valid and
thus not subject to the life estate contained herein.
Notes of Decisions
Barrett v. Barrett, 894 A.2d 891 (R.I. 2006).
· cites it 97× “NOTES [1] Because both subsections (a) and (b) of G.L. 1956 § 33-25-2 will be discussed throughout this opinion, we provide them here for reference purposes: "Life estate to spouse.”
Pezza v. Pezza, 690 A.2d 345 (R.I. 1997).
· cites it 13× “The trial justice found that the trust created by Anthony was valid, constituted a completed and absolute inter vivos transfer by the time he died, and would not be declared invalid for the purpose of satisfying Olga’s statutory survival interest, as codified in G.L.1956 §…”
In Re Est. of Gervais, 770 A.2d 877 (R.I. 2001).
· cites it 3× “In their place, the Legislature provided that: “Whenever any person shall die leaving a husband or wife surviving, the real estate owned by the decedent in fee simple at his or her death shall descend and pass to the husband or wife for his or her natural life subject, however,…”
Jerome v. Prob. Court of Town of Barrington, 922 A.2d 119 (R.I. 2007).
· cites it 3× “1956 § 33-1-5, and G.L.1956 §§ 33-25-2(a) and 33-25-3. . Although the parties eventually agreed to sell the property for $85,000, one of the sisters apparently opposed the sale, and then objected to the sale price.”
In Re Wells, 26 B.R. 150 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1983).
“— If any estate, real or personal, be devised or bequeathed to a surviving husband or wife in lieu of the life estate provided in § 33-25-2, whether referred to as a life estate, or as a dower or curtesy right, such devise or bequest shall bar said life estate unless such…”
R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-25-2(a): 2 cases
Barrett v. Barrett, 894 A.2d 891 (R.I. 2006).
“NOTES [1] Because both subsections (a) and (b) of G.L. 1956 § 33-25-2 will be discussed throughout this opinion, we provide them here for reference purposes: "Life estate to spouse.”
Jerome v. Prob. Court of Town of Barrington, 922 A.2d 119 (R.I. 2007).
“1956 § 33-1-5, and G.L.1956 §§ 33-25-2(a) and 33-25-3. . Although the parties eventually agreed to sell the property for $85,000, one of the sisters apparently opposed the sale, and then objected to the sale price.”
R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-25-2(b): 1 case
Barrett v. Barrett, 894 A.2d 891 (R.I. 2006).
“NOTES [1] Because both subsections (a) and (b) of G.L. 1956 § 33-25-2 will be discussed throughout this opinion, we provide them here for reference purposes: "Life estate to spouse.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.