Rhode Island General Laws

R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-9-29 (2026)

Redemption by party to foreclosure proceedings

✓ current as of July 2026
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Any person claiming an interest, on or before the return day or within that further time as may on motion be allowed by the court, providing the motion is made prior to the fixed return day, shall, if he or she desires to redeem, file an answer setting forth his or her right in the land, and an offer to redeem upon the terms as may be fixed by the court. Where an answer has been timely filed, the court shall hear the parties, and may in its discretion make a finding allowing the party to redeem, within a time fixed by the court, upon payment to the petitioner of an amount sufficient to cover the original sum, costs, penalties, and all subsequent taxes, costs, and interest to which the petitioner may be entitled, together with the costs of the proceeding and counsel fee as the court deems reasonable. The court may impose other terms as justice and the circumstances warrant.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 26 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1974–2023 · leading case: Pleasant Mgmt., LLC v. Carrasco, 960 A.2d 216 (R.I. 2008).
Pleasant Mgmt., LLC v. Carrasco, 960 A.2d 216 (R.I. 2008). · cites it 4× “” Section 44-9-29. However, the matter before us was not a typical redemption case under § 44-9-29.”
Pontes v. Cunha, 310 F. Supp. 2d 447 (D.R.I. 2004). · cites it 6× “The Appellants argue that Pontes did receive notice of the right of redemption when Sunset Realty filed the petition to foreclose the right of redemption under R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-9-29. It is true that a taxpayer receives notice of the right of redemption under § 44-9-29, but by…”
Kildeer Realty v. Brewster Realty Corp., 826 A.2d 961 (R.I. 2003). · cites it 3× “The plaintiff argues that § 44-9-31 operates as an absolute bar to vacating the judgment because defendant failed to comply with the provisions of § 44-9-29 by faffing to file an answer and an offer to redeem the property on or before the return day.”
ABAR Assocs. v. Luna, 870 A.2d 990 (R.I. 2005). · cites it 4× “First Union further argues that because there was no valid final judgment foreclosing the rights of redemption and because it has an interest in the property, it had standing under § 44-9-29 to file an answer and offer to redeem the property.”
John Izzo v. Victor Realty, 132 A.3d 680 (R.I. 2016). · cites it 2× “Neither plaintiff responded to the Petition in accordance with § 44-9-29. On August 9, 2013, a hearing was held on-, defendant’s Petition; it is undisputed that plaintiffs were not given notice of this hearing.”
Pratt v. Woolley, 365 A.2d 424 (R.I. 1976). · cites it 5× “” By the terms of §44-9-29, persons claiming an interest in the subject property have a right to redeem the land: “Any person claiming an interest, on or before the return day or within such further time as may on motion be allowed by the court, shall, if he desires to' redeem,…”
Patrick T. Conley v. Paul Fontaine, 138 A.3d 756 (R.I. 2016). · cites it 4× “” In his bench decision, the trial justice ultimately concluded that, pursuant to § 44-9-29, 4 the court was not barred “from exercising its discretion to permit a party to file an answer out of time.”
Amy Realty v. Gomes, 839 A.2d 1232 (R.I. 2004). · cites it 3× “In ordering that the money be placed in the court registry, the hearing justice apparently believed that doing so would ensure that the Gomeses were ready, willing, and able to redeem the property. Although Rule 81(a)(2) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides…”
Albertson v. Leca, 447 A.2d 383 (R.I. 1982). · cites it 2× “2 II The second issue before us relates to the exercise of a Superior Court justice’s discretion, under § 44-9-29, to allow or to deny redemption of real estate sold for taxes.”
Karayiannis v. Ibobokiwe, 839 A.2d 492 (R.I. 2003). · cites it 2× “Although the Superi- or Court did not enter a default judgment against defendants, Ibobokiwe was in default because she failed to take any steps to redeem the property in accordance with § 44-9-29. Certainly, if defendant had made a timely demand to redeem, the hearing justice…”
Pontes v. Lapatin (In Re Pontes), 280 B.R. 20 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2002). · cites it 4× “While it might be argued technically that a debtor may redeem the property at the foreclosure hearing, see R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-9-29, this is insufficient, given the expense and burden added to the redemption process once the foreclosure proceeding has commenced.”
Driscoll v. Karroo Land Co., Inc., 600 A.2d 722 (R.I. 1991). · cites it 2× “No sale hereafter made shall give to the purchaser any right to either the possession, or the rents, or profits of the land until the expiration of one (1) year after the date of the sale.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.