Rhode Island General Laws

R.I. Gen. Laws § 6A-3-104 (2026)

Negotiable instrument

✓ current as of July 2026
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(a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), “negotiable instrument” means an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order, if it:

(1) Is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder;

(2) Is payable on demand or at a definite time; and

(3) Does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment of money, but the promise or order may contain (i) an undertaking or power to give, maintain, or protect collateral to secure payment, (ii) an authorization or power to the holder to confess judgment or realize on or dispose of collateral, (iii) a waiver of the benefit of any law intended for the advantage or protection of an obligor; (iv) a term that specifies the law that governs the promise or order; or (v) an undertaking to resolve, in a specified forum, a dispute concerning the promise or order.

(b) “Instrument” means a negotiable instrument.

(c) An order that meets all of the requirements of subsection (a), except paragraph (1), and otherwise falls within the definition of “check” in subsection (f) is a negotiable instrument and a check.

(d) A promise or order other than a check is not an instrument if, at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder, it contains a conspicuous statement, however expressed, to the effect that the promise or order is not negotiable or is not an instrument governed by this chapter.

(e) An instrument is a “note” if it is a promise and is a “draft” if it is an order. If an instrument falls within the definition of both “note” and “draft,” a person entitled to enforce the instrument may treat it as either.

(f) “Check” means (i) a draft, other than a documentary draft, payable on demand and drawn on a bank or (ii) a cashier’s check or teller’s check. An instrument may be a check even though it is described on its face by another term, such as “money order.”

(g) “Cashier’s check” means a draft with respect to which the drawer and drawee are the same bank or branches of the same bank.

(h) “Teller’s check” means a draft drawn by a bank (i) on another bank, or (ii) payable at or through a bank.

(i) “Traveler’s check” means an instrument that (i) is payable on demand, (ii) is drawn on or payable at or through a bank, (iii) is designated by the term “traveler’s check” or by a substantially similar term, and (iv) requires, as a condition to payment, a countersignature by a person whose specimen signature appears on the instrument.

(j) “Certificate of deposit” means an instrument containing an acknowledgment by a bank that a sum of money has been received by the bank and a promise by the bank to repay the sum of money. A certificate of deposit is a note of the bank.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 8 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1980–2022 · leading case: Labor Ready Ne., Inc. v. McConaghy, 849 A.2d 340 (R.I. 2004).
Labor Ready Ne., Inc. v. McConaghy, 849 A.2d 340 (R.I. 2004). · cites it 4× “” But if the General Assembly had intended the check-cashing statute to apply only to “negotiable instruments,” it easily could have and would have said as much by defining that term narrowly within the text of § 19-14-1, just as it did when it narrowly defined “instrument” in §…”
Rotelli v. Catanzaro, 686 A.2d 91 (R.I. 1996). “See §§ 6A-3-104(l)(b) and 6A-3-105(2)(a).”
McFarland v. Brier, 850 A.2d 965 (R.I. 2004). · cites it 2× “” G.L.1956 § 6A-3-104(j). 3 .This is the third time one or more of these same parties have come before this Court on matters arising out of the underlying factual situation.”
Note Capital Grp., Inc. v. Michele Perretta, 207 A.3d 998 (R.I. 2019). “10 General Laws 1956 § 6A-3-104 defines a "negotiable instrument," in pertinent part, as: "an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order, if it: "(1) Is payable to bearer or to order…”
SMS Fin. XXV, LLC v. David Corsetti, 186 A.3d 1060 (R.I. 2018). “" General Laws 1956 § 6A-3-104 defines a "negotiable instrument," in pertinent part, as: "an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order, if it: "(1) Is payable to bearer or to order…”
Rhode Island Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp. v. Ryan, 697 A.2d 1087 (R.I. 1997). · cites it 2× “Negotiable instruments are defined in G.L.1956 § 6A-3-104. The defendant has not argued on appeal that the promissory note was not negotiable.”
Maderios v. Savino, 418 A.2d 839 (R.I. 1980). “1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 6A-3-104(l)(d). 2 . Although defendant signed the first note as guarantor, he nevertheless became principally liable for payment of that note, at least insofar as Beaupre was concerned, when he signed the second note.”
Valdera v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. (D.R.I. 2022). “Laws § 6A-3-104, a negotiable instrument means an “unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order.”
R.I. Gen. Laws § 6A-3-104(a): 1 case
Labor Ready Ne., Inc. v. McConaghy, 849 A.2d 340 (R.I. 2004). “” But if the General Assembly had intended the check-cashing statute to apply only to “negotiable instruments,” it easily could have and would have said as much by defining that term narrowly within the text of § 19-14-1, just as it did when it narrowly defined “instrument” in §…”
R.I. Gen. Laws § 6A-3-104(b): 1 case
Labor Ready Ne., Inc. v. McConaghy, 849 A.2d 340 (R.I. 2004). “” But if the General Assembly had intended the check-cashing statute to apply only to “negotiable instruments,” it easily could have and would have said as much by defining that term narrowly within the text of § 19-14-1, just as it did when it narrowly defined “instrument” in §…”
R.I. Gen. Laws § 6A-3-104(j): 1 case
McFarland v. Brier, 850 A.2d 965 (R.I. 2004). “” G.L.1956 § 6A-3-104(j). 3 .This is the third time one or more of these same parties have come before this Court on matters arising out of the underlying factual situation.”
R.I. Gen. Laws § 6A-3-104(l)(b): 1 case
Rotelli v. Catanzaro, 686 A.2d 91 (R.I. 1996). “See §§ 6A-3-104(l)(b) and 6A-3-105(2)(a).”
R.I. Gen. Laws § 6A-3-104(l)(d): 1 case
Maderios v. Savino, 418 A.2d 839 (R.I. 1980). “1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 6A-3-104(l)(d). 2 . Although defendant signed the first note as guarantor, he nevertheless became principally liable for payment of that note, at least insofar as Beaupre was concerned, when he signed the second note.”
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