Sentencing Guidelines » Chapter 2 c

U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1

Threatening or Harassing Communications; Hoaxes; False Liens

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(a)       Base Offense Level:

(1)       12; or

(2)       6, if the defendant is convicted of an offense under 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C), (D), or (E) that did not involve a threat to injure a person or property.

(b)      Specific Offense Characteristics

(1)       If the offense involved any conduct evidencing an intent to carry out such threat, increase by 6 levels.

(2)       If (A) the offense involved more than two threats; or (B) the defendant is convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1521 and the offense involved more than two false liens or encumbrances, increase by 2 levels.

(3)       If the offense involved the violation of a court protection order, increase by 2 levels.

(4)       If the offense resulted in (A) substantial disruption of public, governmental, or business functions or services; or (B) a substantial expenditure of funds to clean up, decontaminate, or otherwise respond to the offense, increase by 4 levels.

(5)       If the defendant (A) is convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 115, (B) made a public threatening communication, and (C) knew or should have known that the public threatening communication created a substantial risk of inciting others to violate 18 U.S.C. § 115, increase by 2 levels.

(6)       If (A) subsection (a)(2) and subdivisions (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) do not apply, and (B) the offense involved a single instance evidencing little or no deliberation, decrease by 4 levels.

(c)       Cross Reference

(1)       If the offense involved any conduct evidencing an intent to carry out a threat to use a weapon of mass destruction, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(c)(2)(B), (C), and (D), apply §2M6.1 (Weapons of Mass Destruction), if the resulting offense level is greater than that determined under this guideline.

 

Commentary

Statutory Provisions:  18 U.S.C. §§ 32(c), 35(b), 871, 876(c), 877, 878(a), 879, 1038, 1521, 1992(a)(9), (a)(10), 2291(a)(8), 2291(e), 2292, 2332b(a)(2); 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C)–(E); 49 U.S.C. § 46507.  For additional statutory provision(s), see Appendix A (Statutory Index).

Application Notes:

1.      Scope of Conduct to Be Considered.— In determining whether subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) apply, the court shall consider both conduct that occurred prior to the offense and conduct that occurred during the offense; however, conduct that occurred prior to the offense must be substantially and directly connected to the offense, under the facts of the case taken as a whole.  For example, if the defendant engaged in several acts of mailing threatening letters to the same victim over a period of years (including acts that occurred prior to the offense), then for purposes of determining whether subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) apply, the court shall consider only those prior acts of threatening the victim that have a substantial and direct connection to the offense. 

2.      Applicability of Chapter Three Adjustments.—If the defendant is convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1521, apply §3A1.2 (Official Victim).

3.      Grouping.—For purposes of Chapter Three, Part D (Multiple Counts), multiple counts involving making a threatening or harassing communication to the same victim are grouped together under §3D1.2 (Groups of Closely Related Counts).  Multiple counts involving different victims are not to be grouped under §3D1.2.

Background:  These statutes cover a wide range of conduct, the seriousness of which depends upon the defendant's intent and the likelihood that the defendant would carry out the threat.  The specific offense characteristics are intended to distinguish such cases.  

Subsection (b)(5) implements, in a broader form, the directive to the Commission in section 209 of the Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, Public Law 110–177.

Historical Note:  Effective November 1, 1987.  Amended effective November 1, 1993 (amendment 480); November 1, 1997 (amendment 549); November 1, 2002 (amendment 637); November 1, 2006 (amendment 686); November 1, 2007 (amendment 699); November 1, 2008 (amendment 718); November 1, 2009 (amendment 729); November 1, 2023 (amendment 824); November 1, 2025 (amendment 836).


 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 232 cases (26 in the last 5 years), 1990–2026 · leading case: United States v. Jessie Scott, 441 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2006).
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United States v. Jessie Scott, 441 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2006). · cites it 9× “” U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1, cmt. n. 3(B). Scott contends that the district court erred in applying this § 2A6.”
United States v. Roger Leroy Hines, 26 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994). · cites it 14× “The commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1 states: “These statutes cover a wide range of conduct, the seriousness of which depends upon the defendant’s intent and the likelihood that the defendant would carry out the threat.”
United States v. Maurice Horton, 98 F.3d 313 (7th Cir. 1996). · cites it 12× “At sentencing, the judge rejected the recommendations of both the government and the Probation Department concerning the appropriate base offense level to assign to Horton under the Sentencing Guidelines.”
United States v. Denard Neal, 776 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 2015). · cites it 6× “USSG § 2A6.1 cmt. n.l(emphasis added). In determining whether to apply the enhancement, Note (1) requires a sentencing court to consider conduct occurring during the offense.”
United States v. Dixon, 449 F.3d 194 (1st Cir. 2006). · cites it 5× “” USSG § 2A6.1, comment, (backg’d.). It is this statement, Dixon suggests, that renders the specific offense characteristic at issue here — the intent enhancement-inapplicable where, due to factual impossibility, the threat cannot materialize.”
United States v. James Everette Worrell, 313 F.3d 867 (4th Cir. 2002). · cites it 9× “” U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1; U.S.S.G.App. C, amend. 480 (1993).”
United States v. Mandel Tarij Brock, A/K/A Shaheed Shabazz, 211 F.3d 88 (4th Cir. 2000). · cites it 8× “First, the parties agreed that U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1 was the applicable guideline provision and that “[pjursuant to § 2A6.”
United States v. Carolyn Jackson, 862 F.3d 365 (3rd Cir. 2017). · cites it 6× “Specifically, we observed that U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1 (Threatening or Harassing Communications) constituted the “most analogous” offense guideline because “there is a scienter element present in the base offense level for § 2A6.”
United States v. Tracey Dudley, 463 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2006). · cites it 3× “The district court sentenced him to 60 months imprisonment, and he now contends that the district court erred at sentencing by: (1) enhancing his sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(4) for substantially disrupting public or governmental functions and (2) denying his request…”
United States v. Jordan, 678 F. App'x 759 (10th Cir. 2017). · cites it 7× “See USSG § 2A6.1. To that, it added two levels because the offense involved more than two threats (the other Facebook posts).”
United States v. James Douglas Alexander, 287 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2002). · cites it 4× “” U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1 cmt. n. 2. The district court correctly followed the Sentencing Guidelines in grouping the two counts involving Werner, and by not grouping the three remaining counts involving threats to different victims.”
United States v. John Palladino, Vincent Guerrieri, 347 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2003). · cites it 4× “The text of U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(1) states as follows: "If the offense involved any conduct evidencing an intent to carry out such threat, increase by 6 levels.”
Show all 232 citing cases →
— U.S.S.G. §2A6.1(a) — 11 cases
United States v. Zameer Nooralla Mohamed, AKA Al, AKA Samier Hussain, AKA Zameer Mohamed, 459 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2006).
United States v. Christopher Martin Cole, 357 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 2004).
United States v. Manuel Jimenez-Otero, 898 F.2d 813 (1st Cir. 1990).
United States v. Freeman, 176 F.3d 575 (1st Cir. 1999).
United States v. Hornick, 942 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1991).
— U.S.S.G. §2A6.1(a)(1) — 9 cases
United States v. Carolyn Jackson, 862 F.3d 365 (3rd Cir. 2017). “Specifically, we observed that U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1 (Threatening or Harassing Communications) constituted the “most analogous” offense guideline because “there is a scienter element present in the base offense level for § 2A6.”
United States v. Dixon, 449 F.3d 194 (1st Cir. 2006). “” USSG § 2A6.1, comment, (backg’d.). It is this statement, Dixon suggests, that renders the specific offense characteristic at issue here — the intent enhancement-inapplicable where, due to factual impossibility, the threat cannot materialize.”
United States v. Davila-Bonilla, 968 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2020).
United States v. Martin Osborn, 12 F.4th 634 (6th Cir. 2021).
United States v. Seaton (10th Cir. 2019).
— U.S.S.G. §2A6.1(a)(2) — 2 cases
United States v. Mandel Tarij Brock, A/K/A Shaheed Shabazz, 211 F.3d 88 (4th Cir. 2000). “First, the parties agreed that U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1 was the applicable guideline provision and that “[pjursuant to § 2A6.”
United States v. Mandel Tarij Brock (4th Cir. 2000).
— U.S.S.G. §2A6.1(a)(l) — 7 cases
United States v. Jessie Scott, 441 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2006). “” U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1, cmt. n. 3(B). Scott contends that the district court erred in applying this § 2A6.”
United States v. Patrick J. Stewart, 411 F.3d 825 (7th Cir. 2005).
United States v. James Everette Worrell, 313 F.3d 867 (4th Cir. 2002). “” U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1; U.S.S.G.App. C, amend. 480 (1993).”
United States v. Christopher Martin Cole, 357 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 2004).
United States v. Robinson, 654 F.3d 558 (5th Cir. 2011).
— U.S.S.G. §2A6.1(b) — 2 cases
United States v. Eric Jason Fann, 41 F.3d 1218 (8th Cir. 1994).
United States v. Shawn Allen Hungate (8th Cir. 1997).
— U.S.S.G. §2A6.1(b)(1) — 67 cases
United States v. Dixon, 449 F.3d 194 (1st Cir. 2006). “” USSG § 2A6.1, comment, (backg’d.). It is this statement, Dixon suggests, that renders the specific offense characteristic at issue here — the intent enhancement-inapplicable where, due to factual impossibility, the threat cannot materialize.”
United States v. John Palladino, Vincent Guerrieri, 347 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2003). “The text of U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(1) states as follows: "If the offense involved any conduct evidencing an intent to carry out such threat, increase by 6 levels.”
United States v. Tyrone Jordan, 851 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2017).
United States v. Austad, 519 F.3d 431 (8th Cir. 2008).
United States v. James Everette Worrell, 313 F.3d 867 (4th Cir. 2002). “” U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1; U.S.S.G.App. C, amend. 480 (1993).”
— U.S.S.G. §2A6.1(b)(2) — 56 cases
United States v. Maurice Horton, 98 F.3d 313 (7th Cir. 1996). “At sentencing, the judge rejected the recommendations of both the government and the Probation Department concerning the appropriate base offense level to assign to Horton under the Sentencing Guidelines.”
United States v. Kenneth Robert Spring, 305 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2002).
United States v. Joshua William Sanders, 41 F.3d 480 (9th Cir. 1994).
United States v. James Douglas Alexander, 287 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2002). “” U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1 cmt. n. 2. The district court correctly followed the Sentencing Guidelines in grouping the two counts involving Werner, and by not grouping the three remaining counts involving threats to different victims.”
United States v. Jessie Scott, 441 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2006). “” U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1, cmt. n. 3(B). Scott contends that the district court erred in applying this § 2A6.”
— U.S.S.G. §2A6.1(b)(2)(A) — 9 cases
United States v. Jordan, 678 F. App'x 759 (10th Cir. 2017). “See USSG § 2A6.1. To that, it added two levels because the offense involved more than two threats (the other Facebook posts).”
United States v. Gant, 663 F.3d 1023 (8th Cir. 2011).
United States v. Wyrick, 416 F. App'x 786 (10th Cir. 2011).
United States v. E. Stanley Hoff (6th Cir. 2019).
United States v. Thornton (10th Cir. 2024).
— U.S.S.G. §2A6.1(b)(2)(B) — 2 cases
United States v. Denard Neal, 776 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 2015). “USSG § 2A6.1 cmt. n.l(emphasis added). In determining whether to apply the enhancement, Note (1) requires a sentencing court to consider conduct occurring during the offense.”
United States v. Kenneth Leaming, 596 F. App'x 535 (9th Cir. 2015).
— U.S.S.G. §2A6.1(b)(3) — 5 cases
United States v. Mandel Tarij Brock, A/K/A Shaheed Shabazz, 211 F.3d 88 (4th Cir. 2000). “First, the parties agreed that U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1 was the applicable guideline provision and that “[pjursuant to § 2A6.”
United States v. Gant, 663 F.3d 1023 (8th Cir. 2011).
United States v. Michael Hagar (6th Cir. 2020).
United States v. James Richard, 549 F. App'x 221 (4th Cir. 2014).
United States v. Mandel Tarij Brock (4th Cir. 2000).
— U.S.S.G. §2A6.1(b)(4) — 16 cases
United States v. Tracey Dudley, 463 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2006). “The district court sentenced him to 60 months imprisonment, and he now contends that the district court erred at sentencing by: (1) enhancing his sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(4) for substantially disrupting public or governmental functions and (2) denying his request…”
United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190 (3rd Cir. 2008).
United States v. Mark William Cothran, 286 F.3d 173 (3rd Cir. 2002).
United States v. Marc Keyser, 704 F.3d 631 (9th Cir. 2012).
United States v. Andrews, 48 F. App'x 151 (6th Cir. 2002).
— U.S.S.G. §2A6.1(b)(4)(A) — 10 cases
United States v. Todd Spencer, 848 F.3d 324 (4th Cir. 2017).
United States v. Christopher Martin Cole, 357 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 2004).
United States v. Craig Sanders, 511 F. App'x 463 (6th Cir. 2013).
United States v. Anwar, 741 F.3d 1134 (10th Cir. 2013).
United States v. Carter, 651 F. App'x 474 (6th Cir. 2016).
— U.S.S.G. §2A6.1(b)(4)(B) — 2 cases
United States v. Jeremy Daniel Snipes, 466 F. App'x 800 (11th Cir. 2012).
United States v. Seaton (10th Cir. 2019).
— U.S.S.G. §2A6.1(b)(5) — 7 cases
United States v. Turner David Stokes, 347 F.3d 103 (4th Cir. 2003).
United States v. Richard Allen Humphreys, Also Known as Israel Humphreys, Also Known as Prophet Israel Humphreys, 352 F.3d 1175 (8th Cir. 2003).
United States v. Rufus J. Sheppard, 243 F. App'x 580 (11th Cir. 2007).
United States v. Stokes (4th Cir. 2003).
African Amer v. Pittsburgh (3rd Cir. 2003).
— U.S.S.G. §2A6.1(b)(5)(B) — 1 case
United States v. Garcia, 60 F. App'x 364 (3rd Cir. 2003).
— U.S.S.G. §2A6.1(b)(6) — 5 cases
United States v. Lawrence F. Curtin, 78 F.4th 1299 (11th Cir. 2023).
United States v. Christine Wright-Darrisaw, 781 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2015).
United States v. Martin Osborn, 12 F.4th 634 (6th Cir. 2021).
United States v. Colin Hawkins, 695 F. App'x 720 (4th Cir. 2017).
United States v. Wright-Darrisaw, 617 F. App'x 107 (2d Cir. 2015).
— U.S.S.G. §2A6.1(b)(l) — 46 cases
United States v. Roger Leroy Hines, 26 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994). “The commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1 states: “These statutes cover a wide range of conduct, the seriousness of which depends upon the defendant’s intent and the likelihood that the defendant would carry out the threat.”
United States v. James Everette Worrell, 313 F.3d 867 (4th Cir. 2002). “” U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1; U.S.S.G.App. C, amend. 480 (1993).”
United States v. Jessie Scott, 441 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2006). “” U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1, cmt. n. 3(B). Scott contends that the district court erred in applying this § 2A6.”
United States v. Thomas C. Leahy, 169 F.3d 433 (7th Cir. 1999).
United States v. Michael R. Siegler, 272 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 2001).
— U.S.S.G. §2A6.1(c) — 1 case
United States v. Todd Spencer, 628 F. App'x 867 (4th Cir. 2015).
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