Tennessee Code Annotated
Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-106 (2026)
Accrual of right if person under eighteen years of age, adjudicated incompetent, or lacking capacity
✓ current as of May 2026
- (a) If the person entitled to commence an action is, at the time the cause of action accrued, either under eighteen (18) years of age, or adjudicated incompetent, such person, or such person's representatives and privies, as the case may be, may commence the action, after legal rights are restored, within the time of limitation for the particular cause of action, unless it exceeds three (3) years, and in that case within three (3) years from restoration of legal rights.
- (b) Persons over the age of eighteen (18) years of age are presumed competent.
- (c)
- (1) If the person entitled to commence an action, at the time the cause of action accrued, lacks capacity, such person or such person's representatives and privies, as the case may be, may commence the action, after removal of such incapacity, within the time of limitation for the particular cause of action, unless it exceeds three (3) years, and in that case within three (3) years from removal of such incapacity, except as provided for in subdivision (c)(2).
- (2) Any individual with court-ordered fiduciary responsibility towards a person who lacks capacity, or any individual who possesses the legal right to bring suit on behalf of a person who lacks capacity, shall commence the action on behalf of that person within the applicable statute of limitations and may not rely on any tolling of the statute of limitations, unless that individual can establish by clear and convincing evidence that the individual did not and could not reasonably have known of the accrued cause of action.
- (3) Any person asserting lack of capacity and the lack of a fiduciary or other representative who knew or reasonably should have known of the accrued cause of action shall have the burden of proving the existence of such facts.
- (4) Nothing in this subsection (c) shall affect or toll any statute of repose within this code.
- (d) For purposes of this section, the term "person who lacks capacity" means and shall be interpreted consistently with the term "person of unsound mind" as found in this section prior to its amendment by Chapter 47 of the Public Acts of 2011.
Amended by 2016 Tenn. Acts, ch. 932, s 1, eff. 4/27/2016.
Code 1858, § 2757 (deriv. Acts 1715, ch. 27, § 9; 1819, ch. 28, §§ 1, 2; 1823, ch. 16, § 1; 1827, ch. 75); Acts 1901, ch. 15, § 1; Shan., § 4448; mod. Code 1932, § 8574; Acts 1971, ch. 162, §2; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §28-107; Acts 2011 , ch. 47, § 17.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 113
cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1981–2025 · leading case: Calaway Ex Rel. Calaway v. Schucker, 193 S.W.3d 509 (Tenn. 2006).
Calaway Ex Rel. Calaway v. Schucker, 193 S.W.3d 509 (Tenn. 2006). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-1-106 (2000). This statute represents Tennessee's long-standing policy of protecting potential causes of action of minors during their minority.”
Abels Ex Rel. Hunt v. Genie Indus., Inc., 202 S.W.3d 99 (Tenn. 2006). “We hold that Tennessee’s legal disability statute, Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-1-106 (2000), tolls the statute of limitations for legally disabled individuals for so long as the disability of unsound mind remains, regardless whether such individual has had a legal guardian appointed to…”
Sherrill v. Souder, 325 S.W.3d 584 (Tenn. 2010). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-1-106 (2000) (emphasis added).”
John Jones v. City of Franklin, 677 F. App'x 279 (6th Cir. 2017). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-106 . Plaintiff John Jones commenced this action beyond one year.”
Penley v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 31 S.W.3d 181 (Tenn. 2000). “” The plaintiff then argued that the operation of the TPLA statute of repose was tolled by the legal disability statute, Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-1-106 (1980 & Supp.1999), during the twenty days that she remained mentally incapacitated in the hospital.”
Terry Sullivan Ex Rel. Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Sullivan v. Chattanooga Med. Investors, LP, 221 S.W.3d 506 (Tenn. 2007). “§ 28-3-104 (a)(l) (2000), and that the statute of limitations was not tolled by Charlie Sullivan’s mental incompetency because he had granted a durable power of attorney while competent, see Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-1-106 (2000). The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and…”
John Paul Seals v. State of Tennessee, 23 S.W.3d 272 (Tenn. 2000). “We granted this consolidated appeal to decide whether under either the general savings statute set forth in Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-1-106 (1980) or constitutional due process a petitioner’s mental incompetence will toll the one-year statute of limitations for filing a…”
Terrance N. CARTER v. Rickey BELL, 279 S.W.3d 560 (Tenn. 2009). “-7- By the application of these principles, we previously determined that Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1-106 (1980), which tolled the statute of limitations in “civil causes of action” for mental incompetency, applied to post-conviction cases.”
Collier v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 657 S.W.2d 771 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983). “Plaintiff asserted and the trial court agreed that since the decedent was a minor at the time of his death Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-1-106 (1980), would toll the statute of limitation until one year after the decedent would have reached the age of 18 years.”
Doe a v. Coffee Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 852 S.W.2d 899 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). “Since she was a minor when the sexual conduct occurred, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-106 (1980) postponed the running of the applicable statutes of limitation 2 with regard to her claims until March 11, 1988.”
Dorothy Johnson v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 777 F.3d 838 (6th Cir. 2015). “” Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-1-106. Johnson never was.”
Lynn v. City of Jackson, 63 S.W.3d 332 (Tenn. 2001). “Recognizing that the Tennessee wrongful death statute preserves the action the decedent would have had, rather than creating a new cause of action in the surviving beneficiaries, this Court refused to apply Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-1-106 to toll the wrongful death statute of…”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-106(c): 1 case
Cortrease Tate v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022).
Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-106(c)(2): 2 cases
James McDonald Shea Brown Jr. v. John F. Weaver (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018).
Cortrease Tate v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022).
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