Tennessee Code Annotated
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103 (2026)
Limitation of actions - Exception
✓ current as of May 2026
- (a) Any action against a manufacturer or seller of a product for injury to person or property caused by its defective or unreasonably dangerous condition must be brought within the period fixed by §§ 28-3-104, 28-3-105, 28-3-202 and 47-2-725, but notwithstanding any exceptions to these provisions, it must be brought within six (6) years of the date of injury, in any event, the action must be brought within ten (10) years from the date on which the product was first purchased for use or consumption, or within one (1) year after the expiration of the anticipated life of the product, whichever is the shorter, except in the case of injury to minors whose action must be brought within a period of one (1) year after attaining the age of majority, whichever occurs sooner.
- (b) The foregoing limitation of actions shall not apply to any action resulting from exposure to asbestos or to the human implantation of silicone gel breast implants.
- (c)
- (1) Any action against a manufacturer or seller for injury to a person caused by a silicone gel breast implant must be brought within a period not to exceed twenty-five (25) years from the date such product was implanted; provided, that such action must be brought within four (4) years from the date the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury.
- (2) For purposes of this subsection (c) only, "seller" does not include a hospital or other medical facility where the procedure took place, nor does "seller" include the physician or other medical personnel involved in the procedure.
- (3) This subsection (c) only applies to causes of action not pending or decided on or before May 26, 1993. For the purposes of this subsection (c), a "pending case" is defined as a case actually filed by a silicone gel-filled breast implant recipient.
Acts 1978, ch. 703, § 3; 1979, ch. 162, § 1; T.C.A., §23-3703; Acts 1993, ch. 457, §§ 1, 2.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 83
cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1981–2026 · leading case: Wyatt v. A-Best Prods. Co., 924 S.W.2d 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).
Wyatt v. A-Best Prods. Co., 924 S.W.2d 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). “He held that the Wyatts' action was time-barred by the ten-year statute of repose found at T.C.A. § 29-28-103(a) [1] , a part of the Tennessee Products Liability Act of 1978 (TPLA) [2] .”
Penley v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 31 S.W.3d 181 (Tenn. 2000). “When read in context, the language “in any event” carries precisely the same connotation as “notwithstanding other exceptions” or “without regard to any other limitations,” and the General Assembly’s use of this language compels the conclusion that it intended for the ten-year…”
Michael Lind v. Beaman Dodge, Inc., d/b/a Beaman Dodge Chrysler Jeep, 356 S.W.3d 889 (Tenn. 2011). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-105 (a) (emphasis added); see also Tenn.”
Spence v. Miles Labs., Inc., 810 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Tenn. 1992). “Section 29-28-103(b) provides that the time limits in the statute of repose, § 29-28-103(a), “shall not apply to any action resulting from exposure to asbestos.”
Elec. Power Bd. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 716 F. Supp. 1069 (E.D. Tenn. 1988). “Defendant Westinghouse Electric Corporation (hereinafter “Westinghouse”) has filed a motion for summary judgment asserting the EPB’s claims based on strict liability, negligence and warranty are barred by the applicable Tennessee product liability statutes of repose and…”
Grant v. Kia Motors Corp., 185 F. Supp. 3d 1033 (E.D. Tenn. 2016). “Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103 (a), the triggering event for the ten-year statute of repose is the “date on which the product was first purchased for use or consumption.”
Cnty. of Johnson v. United States Gypsum Co., 580 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Tenn. 1984). “All of the defendants have moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted on grounds that, (1) all of the claims made by the plaintiff are barred by the applicable 10-year statute of limitations, T.C.A. § 29-28-103; (2) the claims are barred by…”
Montgomery v. Wyeth, 580 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2009). “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-28-103. The straightforward reading of § 29-28-103 requires that an action for the injury for which a plaintiff seeks to recover be brought within the statute of repose.”
Jennifer Kay Brumit Mathis & Her Husband, Barry L. Mathis, Plaintiffs v. Eli Lilly & Co., 719 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1983). “Defendant-appellee Lilly filed a motion for summary judgment in the case, relying upon provisions of Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-28-103, which was originally enacted in 1978, and amended in 1979 by the addition of Section (b).”
Jones v. Methodist Healthcare, 83 S.W.3d 739 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). “§ 29-28-103. We affirm. Michael Jones and wife, Charli Jones sued Methodist Healthcare (MHC), Mid-South Regional Blood Center a/k/a Lifeblood (MRBC) and Florida Blood Services, Inc.”
Stutts v. Ford Motor Co., 574 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Tenn. 1983). “Also, the Supreme Court of Tennessee has considered many similar statutes of limitations and sustained them against “Open Courts” provision challenges.”
Calaway Ex Rel. Calaway v. Schucker, 193 S.W.3d 509 (Tenn. 2006). “In Penley , we applied the statutory-construction canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius ("to mention one thing is to exclude others") to refrain from finding an implied exception for mental incompetents that would toll the products liability statute of repose, Tennessee…”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103(a) — 37 cases
Wyatt v. A-Best Prods. Co., 924 S.W.2d 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). “He held that the Wyatts' action was time-barred by the ten-year statute of repose found at T.C.A. § 29-28-103(a) [1] , a part of the Tennessee Products Liability Act of 1978 (TPLA) [2] .”
Penley v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 31 S.W.3d 181 (Tenn. 2000). “When read in context, the language “in any event” carries precisely the same connotation as “notwithstanding other exceptions” or “without regard to any other limitations,” and the General Assembly’s use of this language compels the conclusion that it intended for the ten-year…”
Michael Lind v. Beaman Dodge, Inc., d/b/a Beaman Dodge Chrysler Jeep, 356 S.W.3d 889 (Tenn. 2011). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-105 (a) (emphasis added); see also Tenn.”
Elec. Power Bd. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 716 F. Supp. 1069 (E.D. Tenn. 1988). “Defendant Westinghouse Electric Corporation (hereinafter “Westinghouse”) has filed a motion for summary judgment asserting the EPB’s claims based on strict liability, negligence and warranty are barred by the applicable Tennessee product liability statutes of repose and…”
Spence v. Miles Labs., Inc., 810 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Tenn. 1992). “Section 29-28-103(b) provides that the time limits in the statute of repose, § 29-28-103(a), “shall not apply to any action resulting from exposure to asbestos.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103(a)(2000) — 1 case
Maino v. S. Co., Inc., 253 S.W.3d 646 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103(b) — 11 cases
Wyatt v. A-Best Prods. Co., 924 S.W.2d 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). “He held that the Wyatts' action was time-barred by the ten-year statute of repose found at T.C.A. § 29-28-103(a) [1] , a part of the Tennessee Products Liability Act of 1978 (TPLA) [2] .”
Cnty. of Johnson v. United States Gypsum Co., 580 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Tenn. 1984). “All of the defendants have moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted on grounds that, (1) all of the claims made by the plaintiff are barred by the applicable 10-year statute of limitations, T.C.A. § 29-28-103; (2) the claims are barred by…”
Spence v. Miles Labs., Inc., 810 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Tenn. 1992). “Section 29-28-103(b) provides that the time limits in the statute of repose, § 29-28-103(a), “shall not apply to any action resulting from exposure to asbestos.”
Jones v. Methodist Healthcare, 83 S.W.3d 739 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). “§ 29-28-103. We affirm. Michael Jones and wife, Charli Jones sued Methodist Healthcare (MHC), Mid-South Regional Blood Center a/k/a Lifeblood (MRBC) and Florida Blood Services, Inc.”
Mark Wayne v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 730 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1984).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103(b)(1993) — 1 case
Spence v. Miles Labs., Inc., 37 F.3d 1185 (6th Cir. 1994).
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