Tennessee Code Annotated

Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-302 (2026)

Detention of persons with severe impairments - Record

✓ current as of May 2026

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(a) No person shall be detained under this part except in a treatment resource that provides psychiatric services, twenty-four hour crisis services, and supervised observation beds, participates in mandatory prescreening authority under § 33-6-104, and is approved by the department for service under this part. The chief officer may detain a person alleged to:
- (1) Have a mental illness or serious emotional disturbance for which immediate observation, care and treatment in the program is appropriate; and
- (2) Be experiencing severe impairment that is likely to result in serious harm to the person.

(b) The chief officer shall have entered on the record the reasons why and with whom the person came to the treatment resource.

Acts 2000, ch. 947, § 1.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 4 cases, 1996–2002 · leading case: State of Tennessee v. Thomas Dee Huskey (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002).

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State of Tennessee v. Thomas Dee Huskey (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002). · cites it 12× “He also argues that Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-302 -145- required that the trial court commit him to an institution as a mentally ill person rather than sentencing him to incarceration in the Department of Correction.”

Gary S. Mayes v. State (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). · cites it 6× “" The appellant's petition set forth several allegations including, inter alia, that Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-302 (1984)1 is unconstitutional; that the appellant was denied admittance to the sex offender treatment program; that the appellant was denied parole based upon his…”

Frank R. Dalton v. Tennessee Bd. of Paroles - Concurring (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 4× “The inmates challenged the constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-302 (1984) which defined sexual offenders as “mentally ill persons” who “should be given continued care and treatment so long as their release would constitute a threat to them or to the general public.”

Mayes v. State (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). “The petitioner further alleged that the classification of all sex offenders as mentally ill persons pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 33-6-302 (1984) violates the petitioner’s rights to due process and equal protection.”

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