Tennessee Code Annotated
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-102 (2026)
Legal separation
✓ current as of May 2026
- (a) A party who alleges grounds for divorce from the bonds of matrimony may, as an alternative to filing a complaint for divorce, file a complaint for legal separation. Such complaint shall set forth the grounds for legal separation in substantially the language of § 36-4-101 and pray only for legal separation or for such other and further relief to which complainant may think to be entitled. The other party may deny the existence of grounds for divorce but, unless the other party specifically objects to the granting of an order of legal separation, the court shall declare the parties to be legally separated.
- (b) If the other party specifically objects to legal separation, the court may, after a hearing, grant an order of legal separation, notwithstanding such objections if grounds are established pursuant to § 36-4-101. The court also has the power to grant an absolute divorce to either party where there has been an order of legal separation for more than two (2) years upon a petition being filed by either party that sets forth the original order for legal separation and that the parties have not become reconciled. The court granting the divorce shall make a final and complete adjudication of the support and property rights of the parties. However, nothing in this subsection (b) shall preclude the court from granting an absolute divorce before the two-year period has expired.
- (c) Legal separation shall not affect the bonds of matrimony but shall permit the parties to cease matrimonial cohabitation. The court may provide for matters such as child custody, visitation, support and property issues during legal separation upon motion by either party or by agreement of the parties.
- (d) Notwithstanding this section, a party who can establish grounds for divorce from the bonds of matrimony pursuant to § 36-4-101 shall be entitled to an absolute divorce pursuant to this chapter.
Code 1858, § 2449 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 26, § 19; 1841-1842, ch. 133, § 1); Shan., § 4202; Acts 1919, ch. 70, § 1; mod. Code 1932, § 8427; Acts 1963, ch. 283, § 1; 1967, ch. 284, §1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-802; Acts 1989, ch. 489, § 1; 1998, ch. 1059, § 2.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 36
cases, 1985–2019 · leading case: Earls v. Earls, 42 S.W.3d 877 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
Earls v. Earls, 42 S.W.3d 877 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). “[1] Chapter 1059 of the Public Acts of 1998 which, among other things, amended T.C.A. § 36-4-102 to provide for legal separation rather than divorce from bed and board did not become effective until January 1, 1999.”
Thompson v. Thompson, 797 S.W.2d 599 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). “Thompson's defenses based upon Mr. Thompson's adulterous or bigamous relationship with Ms.”
Campanali v. Campanali, 695 S.W.2d 193 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985). “Campanali filed a complaint pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-4-102(b) requesting that his wife be granted an absolute divorce.”
Rice v. Rice, 983 S.W.2d 680 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). “In addition, she relied upon the grounds of abandonment and non-support under T.C.A. § 36-4-102(a)(3). On December 18, 1996, Husband filed an answer and counterclaim for divorce.”
King v. King, 986 S.W.2d 216 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). “The husband’s answer stated: “in an effort to achieve an equitable and expeditious resolution of this matter, defendant alleges in the affirmative, without admitting to any specific act or conduct, that plaintiff is entitled to a divorce pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-4-102(a)(l).” It…”
Lyon v. Lyon, 765 S.W.2d 759 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). “The trial court has discretion to grant an absolute divorce or a divorce from bed and board pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-4-102 (1984). This Court will not interfere with the exercise of this discretion unless it is abused.”
Nehme v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 252 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2001). “2 (Michie 2000); Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-4-102 (2000); Vt. Stat.”
Knight v. Knight, 11 S.W.3d 898 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). “See T.C.A. § 36-4-102(a)(l) (1996) (now codified at T.”
Thomasson v. Thomasson, 755 S.W.2d 779 (Tenn. 1988). “§ 36-818] providing defenses to divorce actions brought on the grounds listed in T.C.A. § 36-4-102 [formerly T.C.A. § 36-802], of which cruel and inhuman treatment is one, is only available when it is alleged and proved that plaintiff was guilty of misconduct that was a…”
Stanfill v. Stanfill, 742 S.W.2d 267 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). “T.C.A. § 36-4-102 lists the statutory grounds for absolute or limited divorce in the discretion of the court, including cruel and inhuman treatment.”
Harwell v. Harwell, 762 S.W.2d 140 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). “On May 7, 1985, the husband filed a complaint for an absolute divorce, averring more than two years had elapsed since the entry of the final decree for separate maintenance and a divorce should be granted pursuant to T.C.A., § 36-4-102. On November 17, 1987, he filed an amended…”
Franklin v. Franklin, 746 S.W.2d 715 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). “Following an evidentiary hearing the trial court found that “reconciliation is not possible and therefore, the plaintiff is awarded an absolute divorce from the bonds of matrimony pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-4-102(a)(l) rather than a divorce from bed and board.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-102(a) — 2 cases
Carol Ann Vick Watson v. Frank Lee Watson, Jr. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
Kimberly Haas v. Albert Haas (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-102(a)(1) — 3 cases
Earls v. Earls, 42 S.W.3d 877 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). “[1] Chapter 1059 of the Public Acts of 1998 which, among other things, amended T.C.A. § 36-4-102 to provide for legal separation rather than divorce from bed and board did not become effective until January 1, 1999.”
Flanagan v. Flanagan (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
Clark Earls v. Shirley Earls (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-102(a)(2) — 1 case
James Morton Burris v. Lisa Estes Burris (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-102(a)(3) — 1 case
Rice v. Rice, 983 S.W.2d 680 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). “In addition, she relied upon the grounds of abandonment and non-support under T.C.A. § 36-4-102(a)(3). On December 18, 1996, Husband filed an answer and counterclaim for divorce.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-102(a)(l) — 5 cases
Thompson v. Thompson, 797 S.W.2d 599 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). “Thompson's defenses based upon Mr. Thompson's adulterous or bigamous relationship with Ms.”
King v. King, 986 S.W.2d 216 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). “The husband’s answer stated: “in an effort to achieve an equitable and expeditious resolution of this matter, defendant alleges in the affirmative, without admitting to any specific act or conduct, that plaintiff is entitled to a divorce pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-4-102(a)(l).” It…”
Knight v. Knight, 11 S.W.3d 898 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). “See T.C.A. § 36-4-102(a)(l) (1996) (now codified at T.”
Rice v. Rice, 983 S.W.2d 680 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). “In addition, she relied upon the grounds of abandonment and non-support under T.C.A. § 36-4-102(a)(3). On December 18, 1996, Husband filed an answer and counterclaim for divorce.”
Franklin v. Franklin, 746 S.W.2d 715 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). “Following an evidentiary hearing the trial court found that “reconciliation is not possible and therefore, the plaintiff is awarded an absolute divorce from the bonds of matrimony pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-4-102(a)(l) rather than a divorce from bed and board.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-102(b) — 4 cases
Campanali v. Campanali, 695 S.W.2d 193 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985). “Campanali filed a complaint pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-4-102(b) requesting that his wife be granted an absolute divorce.”
Sheila Long Pless v. Robert Eugene Pless, Jr. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019).
Janet Charlene Hooberry v. Ronald Scott Hooberry (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012).
Torrie Schneider Longanacre v. Matthew Robert Longanacre (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-102(c) — 2 cases
Earls v. Earls, 42 S.W.3d 877 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). “[1] Chapter 1059 of the Public Acts of 1998 which, among other things, amended T.C.A. § 36-4-102 to provide for legal separation rather than divorce from bed and board did not become effective until January 1, 1999.”
Sheila Long Pless v. Robert Eugene Pless, Jr. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-102(e) — 1 case
Earls v. Earls, 42 S.W.3d 877 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). “[1] Chapter 1059 of the Public Acts of 1998 which, among other things, amended T.C.A. § 36-4-102 to provide for legal separation rather than divorce from bed and board did not become effective until January 1, 1999.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.