The governor has power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons in all criminal cases after conviction, except impeachment, subject to the regulations provided in this chapter.
Code 1858, §5252; Shan., § 7227; Code 1932, § 11814; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 40-3501.
Notes of Decisions
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
· cites it 2× “III, § 6, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-27-101 to XX-XX-XXX (1990); Tex.”
State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661 (Tenn. 1999).
· cites it 2× “Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-27-101 et seq. (1997 Repl.”
Newsome v. State, 995 S.W.2d 129 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).
· cites it 2× “Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 40-27-101 through 109 (1997); Hicks, No.”
Payne v. Bell, 89 F. Supp. 2d 967 (W.D. Tenn. 2000).
· cites it 2× “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-27-101 et seq. See also Herrera, 506 U.”
Workman v. State, 22 S.W.3d 807 (Tenn. 2000).
· cites it 4× “Tennessee Code Annotated Section 40-27-101 confers upon the Governor the general "power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons in all criminal cases after conviction, except impeachment.”
Rowell v. Dutton, 688 S.W.2d 474 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985).
· cites it 2× “His power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, in all criminal cases, is *477 also specifically set forth in TCA § 40-27-101. But the power is derived from the Constitution, not the statutes.”
Ricks v. State, 882 S.W.2d 387 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).
· cites it 2× “1969) defines the phrase "commutation of sentence” as "[t]he changing of a sentence imposed for crime to less severe punishment; the substitution of a lesser punishment for a greater by authority of law.”
Carroll v. Raney, 953 S.W.2d 657 (Tenn. 1997).
· cites it 2× “Thus, while the power is also recognized by statute, see, Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-27-101 (1990), this Court has observed: The vestiture of the power to grant reprieves and pardons in the chief executive is exclusive of all other departments of the state, and the Legislature cannot,…”
State v. Blanchard, 100 S.W.3d 226 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002).
“§ 40-27-101 et. seq. 6 Similarly, our court of appeals has recognized that [a] valid reason exists for distinguishing between expunged pretrial diversion records and expunged judicial diversion records.”
In Re: Philip R. Workman, Movant. Philip R. Workman v. Ricky Bell, Warden, 245 F.3d 849 (6th Cir. 2001).
· cites it 2× “In support of his claim of fraud, Workman makes the following allegations: (1) the Tennessee Attorney General and others from his office, persons associated with the TBPP, representatives of the Shelby County District Attorney’s Office and the governor’s staff held meetings…”
Workman v. Summers, 136 F. Supp. 2d 896 (M.D. Tenn. 2001).
· cites it 2× “III, § 6; Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-27-101. The Tennessee Board of Pardons and Paroles makes,, “upon the request of the governor, .”
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