Tennessee Code Annotated
Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-118 (2026)
Statute of limitations
✓ current as of May 2026
- (a) Except as provided in subsection (e), an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay a note payable at a definite time must be commenced within six (6) years after the due date or dates stated in the note or, if a due date is accelerated, within six (6) years after the accelerated due date.
- (b) Except as provided in subsection (d) or (e), if demand for payment is made to the maker of a note payable on demand, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay the note must be commenced within six (6) years after the demand. If no demand for payment is made to the maker, an action to enforce the note is barred if neither principal nor interest on the note has been paid for a continuous period of ten (10) years.
- (c) Except as provided in subsection (d), an action to enforce the obligation of a party to an unaccepted draft to pay the draft must be commenced within three (3) years after dishonor of the draft or ten (10) years after the date of the draft, whichever period expires first.
- (d) An action to enforce the obligation of the acceptor of a certified check or the issuer of a teller's check, cashier's check, or traveler's check must be commenced within three (3) years after demand for payment is made to the acceptor or issuer, as the case may be.
- (e)
- (1) An action to enforce the obligation of a party to a certificate of deposit to pay the instrument must be commenced within six (6) years after demand for payment is made to the maker, but if the instrument states a due date and the maker is not required to pay before that date, the six-year period begins when a demand for payment is in effect and the due date has passed.
- (2) This subsection (e) is subject to the requirements of § 45-2-710.
- (f) An action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay an accepted draft, other than a certified check, must be commenced (i) within six (6) years after the due date or dates stated in the draft or acceptance if the obligation of the acceptor is payable at a definite time, or (ii) within six (6) years after the date of the acceptance if the obligation of the acceptor is payable on demand.
- (g) Unless governed by other law regarding claims for indemnity or contribution, an action (i) for conversion of an instrument, for money had and received, or like action based on conversion, (ii) for breach of warranty, or (iii) to enforce an obligation, duty, or right arising under this chapter and not governed by this section must be commenced within three (3) years after the cause of action accrues.
Acts 1995, ch. 397, § 2; 2005, ch. 30, § 2.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 15
cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1979–2021 · leading case: Pero's Steak & Spaghetti House v. Lee, 90 S.W.3d 614 (Tenn. 2002).
Pero's Steak & Spaghetti House v. Lee, 90 S.W.3d 614 (Tenn. 2002). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-3-118 (emphasis added).”
C-Wood Lumber Co. v. Wayne Cnty. Bank, 233 S.W.3d 263 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). “None of the statutes of limitations cited by the trial court apply to C-Wood’s conversion claims in this case. 53 The appropriate statute of limitations is the three-year statute in Tenn.”
Union Planters Nat. Bank of Memphis v. Markowitz, 468 F. Supp. 529 (W.D. Tenn. 1979). “Markowitz relies on T.C.A. § 47-3-118, which states in part: The following rules apply to every instrument: (f) Unless otherwise specified consent to extension authorizes a single extension for not longer than the original period.”
Richard O'Leary, et ux. v. Ann Johnson, 84 S.W.3d 584 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). “Subsection (d) of T.C.A. 47-3-118 provides: An action to enforce the obligation of the acceptor of a certified check or the issuer of a teller’s check, cashier’s check, or traveler’s check must be commenced within three (3) years after demand for payment is made to the acceptor…”
Rebecca M. Pomeroy v. Michael L. McGinnis (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021). “McGinnis correctly notes that “[a] specific statute of limitations for the conversion of a negotiable instrument is established by Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-118 (g).” Insofar as Ms.”
In re Est. of Dennie Lamar Trent (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016). “The statute of limitations for a note payable on demand is contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-118 , which provides: Except as provided in subsection (d) or (e), if demand for payment is made to the maker of a note payable on demand, an action to enforce the obligation of a…”
James A. Long v. Charles D. Ledford (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016). “Thus, Appellants argue that the six-year statute of limitations contained in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-109 applies to this case, 3 rather than the ten-year statute of limitations under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 47-3-118(b),4 applicable to notes payable on…”
Brown v. Brown (M.D. Tenn. 2020). “2020) (“an attempt to commence an action, when doing so is barred by a statute, does not toll a statute of limitations”).”
Carolyn L. Denton-Preletz v. Susan L. Denton (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011). “The note was executed on October 24, 1986, and Lender did not demand payment until 2007.”
Pero's Steak & Spaghetti House v. Elizabeth Hinkle (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). “The crux of my disagreement with the majority is this: assuming the trier of fact determines, under the discovery rule, that the subject causes of action accrued in 1995 or later, but prior to June 1, 1996, I do not believe – as the majority does – that T.C.A. § 47-3-118(g)…”
Laxmi Hosp. Grp., LLC v. Rajesh Narayan (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-118 (a). The evidence showed that Mr.”
John R. Fuller v. Cmty. Nat'l Bank (2020). “” The trial court further held that plaintiff’s UCC claims were barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations, Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-118 (g); that plaintiff “set forth no facts that demonstrate a genuine issue that [the bank] had knowledge of any breach of Brown’s…”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-118(b) — 2 cases
James A. Long v. Charles D. Ledford (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016). “Thus, Appellants argue that the six-year statute of limitations contained in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-109 applies to this case, 3 rather than the ten-year statute of limitations under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 47-3-118(b),4 applicable to notes payable on…”
Carolyn L. Denton-Preletz v. Susan L. Denton (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011). “The note was executed on October 24, 1986, and Lender did not demand payment until 2007.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-118(f) — 1 case
Union Planters Nat. Bank of Memphis v. Markowitz, 468 F. Supp. 529 (W.D. Tenn. 1979). “Markowitz relies on T.C.A. § 47-3-118, which states in part: The following rules apply to every instrument: (f) Unless otherwise specified consent to extension authorizes a single extension for not longer than the original period.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-118(g) — 4 cases
Pero's Steak & Spaghetti House v. Lee, 90 S.W.3d 614 (Tenn. 2002). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-3-118 (emphasis added).”
C-Wood Lumber Co. v. Wayne Cnty. Bank, 233 S.W.3d 263 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). “None of the statutes of limitations cited by the trial court apply to C-Wood’s conversion claims in this case. 53 The appropriate statute of limitations is the three-year statute in Tenn.”
Rebecca M. Pomeroy v. Michael L. McGinnis (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021). “McGinnis correctly notes that “[a] specific statute of limitations for the conversion of a negotiable instrument is established by Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-118 (g).” Insofar as Ms.”
Pero's Steak & Spaghetti House v. Elizabeth Hinkle (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). “The crux of my disagreement with the majority is this: assuming the trier of fact determines, under the discovery rule, that the subject causes of action accrued in 1995 or later, but prior to June 1, 1996, I do not believe – as the majority does – that T.C.A. § 47-3-118(g)…”
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