Tennessee Code Annotated

Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-17-102 (2026)

Chapter definitions - Application to jointly created instrumentalities, utility districts and school districts

✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section JustiaTenn. Code CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

Acts 2006 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 1, §49; 2007 , ch. 405, §§ 1, 2; 2008 , ch. 898, § 1.


Notes of Decisions
Cited in 3 cases, 2008–2020 · leading case: David Ellis v. State of Tennessee, 491 F. App'x 659 (6th Cir. 2012).
David Ellis v. State of Tennessee, 491 F. App'x 659 (6th Cir. 2012). “§ 2-12-210; Tenn.Code Ann. § 8-17-102(a)(2). Under these circumstances, Ellis was for all intents and purposes an employee of the State of Tennessee rather than Bradley County.”
Ellis v. Bradley Cnty., 387 F. App'x 516 (6th Cir. 2008). “§ 2-12-210; Tenn.Code Ann. § 8-17-102(a)(2). Under these circumstances, Ellis was for all intents and purposes an employee of the State of Tennessee rather than Bradley County.”
White v. Chester Cnty., Tennessee (W.D. Tenn. 2020). · cites it 8× “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-17-102 (a)(2). The court decided, however, that the greater weight of authority favored a conclusion that an AOE was controlled not by the county but by the State Election Commission, state law, and, ultimately, the State itself.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-17-102(a)(2) — 2 cases
David Ellis v. State of Tennessee, 491 F. App'x 659 (6th Cir. 2012). “§ 2-12-210; Tenn.Code Ann. § 8-17-102(a)(2). Under these circumstances, Ellis was for all intents and purposes an employee of the State of Tennessee rather than Bradley County.”
Ellis v. Bradley Cnty., 387 F. App'x 516 (6th Cir. 2008). “§ 2-12-210; Tenn.Code Ann. § 8-17-102(a)(2). Under these circumstances, Ellis was for all intents and purposes an employee of the State of Tennessee rather than Bradley County.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.