Each district attorney general:
- (1) Shall prosecute in the courts of the district all violations of the state criminal statutes and perform all prosecutorial functions attendant thereto, including prosecuting cases in a municipal court where the municipality provides sufficient personnel to the district attorney general for that purpose;
- (2) Shall prosecute in the federal court all criminal cases removed from a state court in the district to any inferior court;
- (3) May cooperate and assist, upon the request or direction of the attorney general and reporter, in the bringing, prosecution, defense, preparation, and trial of all cases in the circuit and chancery courts in which the attorney general and reporter is required to appear for the protection of the state or the public interest;
- (4) Shall give an opinion, without charge, whenever called upon by any county officer in the district, upon a question of criminal law relating to the duties of the county officer's office;
- (5) Shall submit to the office of executive director for the district attorneys general conference within ninety (90) days after the end of each fiscal year, a written report specifying:
- (A) Each source from which funds were received by the office of the district attorney general during the fiscal year;
- (B) The amount of funds received from each source; and
- (C) The disposition of such funds;
- (6) Shall have discretion in the performance of duties and responsibilities in the allocation of resources available to such district attorney general, any other law notwithstanding; and
- (7) Shall have authority to delegate the foregoing duties and responsibilities to an assistant district attorney general.
Code 1858, § 3961 (deriv. Acts 1823, ch. 13, § 2; 1829, ch. 43, § 1; 1833, ch. 43, § 1; 1835-1836, ch. 15, § 21; 1835-1836, ch. 28, §§ 1, 3; 1839-1840, ch. 160, § 5; 1841-1842, ch. 59, §§ 2, 3; 1841-1842, ch. 129, §§ 1, 4; 1841-1842, ch. 147, § 2; 1843-1844, ch. 103, §§ 2, 4; 1843-1844, ch. 215, § 3; 1847-1848, ch. 129, § 1; 1849-1850, ch. 247, § 3; 1851-1852, ch. 167, §§ 1, 2; 1853-1854, ch. 115, § 2); impl. am. Acts 1875, ch. 91; Acts 1899, ch. 271, §§ 1, 2; Shan., § 5768; mod. Code 1932, § 9966; modified; impl. am. Acts 1937, ch. 33, § 50; impl. am. Acts 1959, ch. 9, § 14; impl. am. Acts 1963, ch. 10, § 1; impl. am. Acts 1978, ch. 934, § 22; Acts 1979, ch. 226, § 23; 1979, ch. 318, § 23; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 8-702; impl. am. Acts 1979, ch. 68, § 3; Acts 1988, ch. 913, § 1; 1990, ch. 974, § 4; 1996, ch. 996, § 2; 1998, ch. 1080, § 3.
Notes of Decisions
City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248 (Tenn. 2001).
· cites it 6× “Code Annotated sections 6-54-306 and 55-10-307 violate Article XI, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution, either on their face or as, applied to this case; and (3) whether the City of Chattanooga has used section 55-10-307 to infringe upon the District Attorney General’s…”
State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679 (Tenn. 1997).
· cites it 4× “T.C.A. § 8-7-103(1). When the death penalty will be sought in a first degree murder case, the prosecutor must afford notice to the defendant of the intent to seek the death penalty, as well as notice regarding the aggravating factors that will be relied upon.”
State v. Harrison, 270 S.W.3d 21 (Tenn. 2008).
· cites it 4× “” Maintaining public order, making arrests, and investigating crimes are not among the district attorney general’s duties explicitly listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-7-103 . Other statutes and rules also differentiate between prosecutors and law enforcement officers.”
State v. Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d 309 (Tenn. 2000).
· cites it 4× “" Tenn.Code Ann. § 8-7-103(1) (1993 and Supp.”
Pera v. Kroger Co., 674 S.W.2d 715 (Tenn. 1984).
· cites it 4× “As previously indicated, The Kroger Company obtained a warrant for the arrest of appellant on December 5, 1978, about seven weeks after the check had been issued.”
State v. Todd, 654 S.W.2d 379 (Tenn. 1983).
· cites it 4× “White, 583 F.2d 819, 826 (6th Cir.1978). Moreover, the trial judge could not have properly accepted defendant's plea prior to compliance with State v.”
Black v. Blount, 938 S.W.2d 394 (Tenn. 1996).
· cites it 2× “In Tennessee, Blount says, district attorney generals have a duty “to attend the circuit courts in the district, and every other court therein having criminal jurisdiction, and prosecute on behalf of the state in every case in which the state is a party, or in any wise…”
State v. Elrod, 721 S.W.2d 820 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986).
· cites it 2× “T.C.A. § 8-7-103. He is furnished assistants to aid him in whatever capacity he finds it necessary to utilize their services in carrying out his duties.”
Ramsey v. Town of Oliver Springs, 998 S.W.2d 207 (Tenn. 1999).
· cites it 2× “[sjhall prosecute in the courts of the district all violations of the state criminal statutes and perform all prosecutorial functions attendant thereto, including prosecuting cases in a municipal court where the municipality provides sufficient personnel to the district attorney…”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-7-103(1) — 15 cases
State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679 (Tenn. 1997).
“T.C.A. § 8-7-103(1). When the death penalty will be sought in a first degree murder case, the prosecutor must afford notice to the defendant of the intent to seek the death penalty, as well as notice regarding the aggravating factors that will be relied upon.”
State v. Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d 309 (Tenn. 2000).
“" Tenn.Code Ann. § 8-7-103(1) (1993 and Supp.”
Pera v. Kroger Co., 674 S.W.2d 715 (Tenn. 1984).
“As previously indicated, The Kroger Company obtained a warrant for the arrest of appellant on December 5, 1978, about seven weeks after the check had been issued.”
City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248 (Tenn. 2001).
“Code Annotated sections 6-54-306 and 55-10-307 violate Article XI, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution, either on their face or as, applied to this case; and (3) whether the City of Chattanooga has used section 55-10-307 to infringe upon the District Attorney General’s…”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-7-103(1993) — 1 case
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-7-103(21) — 1 case
State v. Todd, 654 S.W.2d 379 (Tenn. 1983).
“White, 583 F.2d 819, 826 (6th Cir.1978). Moreover, the trial judge could not have properly accepted defendant's plea prior to compliance with State v.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-7-103(4) — 1 case
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-7-103(6) — 1 case
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-7-103(7) — 1 case
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