Tex. Codes » Family Code · TITLE 5. THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP AND THE SUIT AFFECTING THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP · SUBTITLE B. SUITS AFFECTING THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP · CHAPTER 153. CONSERVATORSHIP, POSSESSION, AND ACCESS
Texas Codes

Tex. Fam. Code § 153.0071 (2026)

Alternate Dispute Resolution Procedures

✓ current as of May 2026
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Sec. 153.0071. ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES. (a) On written agreement of the parties, the court may refer a suit affecting the parent-child relationship to arbitration. The agreement must state whether the arbitration is binding or non-binding.

(b) If the parties agree to binding arbitration, the court shall render an order reflecting the arbitrator's award unless the court determines at a non-jury hearing that the award is not in the best interest of the child. The burden of proof at a hearing under this subsection is on the party seeking to avoid rendition of an order based on the arbitrator's award.

(c) On the written agreement of the parties or on the court's own motion, the court may refer a suit affecting the parent-child relationship to mediation.

(d) A mediated settlement agreement is binding on the parties if the agreement:

(1) provides, in a prominently displayed statement that is in boldfaced type or capital letters or underlined, that the agreement is not subject to revocation;

(2) is signed by each party to the agreement; and

(3) is signed by the party's attorney, if any, who is present at the time the agreement is signed.

(e) If a mediated settlement agreement meets the requirements of Subsection (d), a party is entitled to judgment on the mediated settlement agreement notwithstanding Rule 11, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, or another rule of law.

(e-1) Notwithstanding Subsections (d) and (e), a court may decline to enter a judgment on a mediated settlement agreement if the court finds:

(1) that:

(A) a party to the agreement was a victim of family violence, and that circumstance impaired the party's ability to make decisions; or

(B) the agreement would permit a person who is subject to registration under Chapter 62, Code of Criminal Procedure, on the basis of an offense committed by the person when the person was 17 years of age or older or who otherwise has a history or pattern of past or present physical or sexual abuse directed against any person to:

(i) reside in the same household as the child; or

(ii) otherwise have unsupervised access to the child; and

(2) that the agreement is not in the child's best interest.

(f) A party may at any time prior to the final mediation order file a written objection to the referral of a suit affecting the parent-child relationship to mediation on the basis of family violence having been committed by another party against the objecting party or a child who is the subject of the suit. After an objection is filed, the suit may not be referred to mediation unless, on the request of a party, a hearing is held and the court finds that a preponderance of the evidence does not support the objection. If the suit is referred to mediation, the court shall order appropriate measures be taken to ensure the physical and emotional safety of the party who filed the objection. The order shall provide that the parties not be required to have face-to-face contact and that the parties be placed in separate rooms during mediation. This subsection does not apply to suits filed under Chapter 262.

(g) The provisions for confidentiality of alternative dispute resolution procedures under Chapter 154, Civil Practice and Remedies Code, apply equally to the work of a parenting coordinator, as defined by Section 153.601, and to the parties and any other person who participates in the parenting coordination. This subsection does not affect the duty of a person to report abuse or neglect under Section 261.101.

Added by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 751, Sec. 27, eff. Sept. 1, 1995. Amended by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 937, Sec. 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1997; Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 178, Sec. 7, eff. Aug. 30, 1999; Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 1351, Sec. 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1999.

Amended by:

Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch. 916 (H.B. 260), Sec. 7, eff. June 18, 2005.

Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1181 (H.B. 555), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2007.

Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 99 (S.B. 495), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2017.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 147 cases (34 in the last 5 years), 1995–2026 · leading case: In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2013).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2013). · cites it 17× “21 Tex. Fam.Code § 153.0071(e-l). *460 The dissent’s insistence that “nothing in the statute expressly limits a trial court’s authority to decline to enter judgment on a properly executed, binding MSA to the family violence context addressed in section 153.”
Beyers v. Roberts, 199 S.W.3d 354 (Tex. App. 2006). · cites it 10× “Laws 4577 , 4578 (amended 2005) (current version at Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.0071 (Vernon Supp.”
in the Interest of A.C., J.Y., J.Y. Jr., L.B., & E.B., Child., 560 S.W.3d 624 (Tex. 2018). · cites it 2× “33 Tex. Fam. Code § 153.0071(c), (d) ; see id.”
in the Interest of C.C.E., a Child, 530 S.W.3d 314 (Tex. App. 2017). · cites it 6× “” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.0071 (e); 2 Scruggs, 443 S.”
In re Minix, 543 S.W.3d 446 (Tex. App. 2018). · cites it 8× “See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.0071 (d) (West 2014).”
Kilroy v. Kilroy, 137 S.W.3d 780 (Tex. App. 2004). · cites it 4× “” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.0071 (a) (emphasis added).”
Garcia-Udall v. Udall, 141 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. App. 2004). · cites it 3× “TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.0071 (Vernon 2002).”
in the Interest of K.D., a Minor Child, 471 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. App. 2015). · cites it 4× “Compare Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.0071 (e) (West 2014), with Tex.”
In the Interest of Circone, 122 S.W.3d 403 (Tex. App. 2003). · cites it 5× “Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.0071 (Vernon 2002).”
Charles Keener Scruggs v. Heather Maude Linn, 443 S.W.3d 373 (Tex. App. 2014). · cites it 5× “See Tex. Fam.Code § 153.0071(e — 1); see also Lee, 411 S.”
Amedisys, Inc. D/B/A Amedisys Texas, Ltd. v. Kingwood Home Health Care, LLC D/B/A Health Solutions Home Health, 437 S.W.3d 507 (Tex. 2014). “, Tex. Fam.Code § 153.0071(d), (e) (listing requirements for a binding mediated settlement agreement in suits affecting the parent-child relationship and providing that, when a mediated settlement agreement meets the requirements, “a party is entitled to judgment on the mediated…”
Tony Woody v. Madelyn Woody, 429 S.W.3d 792 (Tex. App. 2014). · cites it 3× “As set forth above, the record indicates that the parties agreed in mediation to keep the amount of Tony’s child support obligation at the amount established in the final decree, but the parties never set that agreement down in writing, and Tony subsequently withdrew his consent…”
Show all 147 citing cases →
— Tex. Fam. Code § 153.0071(a) — 3 cases
In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2013). “21 Tex. Fam.Code § 153.0071(e-l). *460 The dissent’s insistence that “nothing in the statute expressly limits a trial court’s authority to decline to enter judgment on a properly executed, binding MSA to the family violence context addressed in section 153.”
in the Interest of K.B., a Child (Tex. App. 2022).
in the Interest of T.B., a Child (Tex. App. 2009).
— Tex. Fam. Code § 153.0071(b) — 17 cases
In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2013). “21 Tex. Fam.Code § 153.0071(e-l). *460 The dissent’s insistence that “nothing in the statute expressly limits a trial court’s authority to decline to enter judgment on a properly executed, binding MSA to the family violence context addressed in section 153.”
Garcia-Udall v. Udall, 141 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. App. 2004). “TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.0071 (Vernon 2002).”
Stieren v. McBroom, 103 S.W.3d 602 (Tex. App. 2003).
In the Interest of S.M.H., 523 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. App. 2017).
Kilroy v. Kilroy, 137 S.W.3d 780 (Tex. App. 2004). “” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.0071 (a) (emphasis added).”
— Tex. Fam. Code § 153.0071(c) — 17 cases
in the Interest of A.C., J.Y., J.Y. Jr., L.B., & E.B., Child., 560 S.W.3d 624 (Tex. 2018). “33 Tex. Fam. Code § 153.0071(c), (d) ; see id.”
Garcia-Udall v. Udall, 141 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. App. 2004). “TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.0071 (Vernon 2002).”
Kilroy v. Kilroy, 137 S.W.3d 780 (Tex. App. 2004). “” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.0071 (a) (emphasis added).”
In the Interest of Circone, 122 S.W.3d 403 (Tex. App. 2003). “Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.0071 (Vernon 2002).”
in the Interest Of: J.A.S.C., J.A.L.C., N.D.C, & G.S.C, 430 S.W.3d 544 (Tex. App. 2014).
— Tex. Fam. Code § 153.0071(d) — 64 cases
In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2013). “21 Tex. Fam.Code § 153.0071(e-l). *460 The dissent’s insistence that “nothing in the statute expressly limits a trial court’s authority to decline to enter judgment on a properly executed, binding MSA to the family violence context addressed in section 153.”
Amedisys, Inc. D/B/A Amedisys Texas, Ltd. v. Kingwood Home Health Care, LLC D/B/A Health Solutions Home Health, 437 S.W.3d 507 (Tex. 2014). “, Tex. Fam.Code § 153.0071(d), (e) (listing requirements for a binding mediated settlement agreement in suits affecting the parent-child relationship and providing that, when a mediated settlement agreement meets the requirements, “a party is entitled to judgment on the mediated…”
in the Interest of C.C.E., a Child, 530 S.W.3d 314 (Tex. App. 2017). “” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.0071 (e); 2 Scruggs, 443 S.”
In the Interest of Circone, 122 S.W.3d 403 (Tex. App. 2003). “Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.0071 (Vernon 2002).”
Beyers v. Roberts, 199 S.W.3d 354 (Tex. App. 2006). “Laws 4577 , 4578 (amended 2005) (current version at Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.0071 (Vernon Supp.”
— Tex. Fam. Code § 153.0071(d)(1) — 3 cases
Spinks v. Spinks, 939 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. App. 1997).
In Re Lauren Ortiz v. the State of Texas (Tex. App. 2025).
In the Interest of A.H., 114 S.W.3d 750 (Tex. App. 2003).
— Tex. Fam. Code § 153.0071(d)(2) — 1 case
In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2013). “21 Tex. Fam.Code § 153.0071(e-l). *460 The dissent’s insistence that “nothing in the statute expressly limits a trial court’s authority to decline to enter judgment on a properly executed, binding MSA to the family violence context addressed in section 153.”
— Tex. Fam. Code § 153.0071(e) — 31 cases
In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2013). “21 Tex. Fam.Code § 153.0071(e-l). *460 The dissent’s insistence that “nothing in the statute expressly limits a trial court’s authority to decline to enter judgment on a properly executed, binding MSA to the family violence context addressed in section 153.”
Beyers v. Roberts, 199 S.W.3d 354 (Tex. App. 2006). “Laws 4577 , 4578 (amended 2005) (current version at Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.0071 (Vernon Supp.”
Charles Keener Scruggs v. Heather Maude Linn, 443 S.W.3d 373 (Tex. App. 2014). “See Tex. Fam.Code § 153.0071(e — 1); see also Lee, 411 S.”
in the Interest of C.C.E., a Child, 530 S.W.3d 314 (Tex. App. 2017). “” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.0071 (e); 2 Scruggs, 443 S.”
In re Morris, 498 S.W.3d 624 (Tex. App. 2016).
— Tex. Fam. Code § 153.0071(e)(1) — 1 case
in Re Connie Harrison (Tex. App. 2015).
— Tex. Fam. Code § 153.0071(f) — 1 case
Andrea A. Crowson v. Thomas D. Crowson, Jr. Barrett & Coble, Attorneys at Law John Barrett & Kathleen Debra Coble (Tex. App. 2013).
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