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Tex. CodesLabor CodeTitle 5. Workers' CompensationSubtitle A. Texas Workers' Compensation ActChapter 409. Compensation Procedures

Tex. Lab. Code § 409.021 (2026)

Initiation Of Benefits; Insurance Carrier's Refusal; Administrative Violation

Edition and currency
laws through the 89th Legislature (2025). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 89th Legislature (2025) cited 1994–2025 82citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 82 opinions since 1994, 5 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (c) (34 cases).

Sec. 409.021. INITIATION OF BENEFITS; INSURANCE CARRIER'S REFUSAL; ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLATION. (a) An insurance carrier shall initiate compensation under this subtitle promptly. Not later than the 15th day after the date on which an insurance carrier receives written notice of an injury, the insurance carrier shall:

(1) begin the payment of benefits as required by this subtitle; or

(2) notify the division and the employee in writing of its refusal to pay and advise the employee of:

(A) the right to request a benefit review conference; and

(B) the means to obtain additional information from the division.

(a-1) An insurance carrier that fails to comply with Subsection (a) does not waive the carrier's right to contest the compensability of the injury as provided by Subsection (c) but commits an administrative violation subject to Subsection (e).

(a-2) An insurance carrier is not required to comply with Subsection (a) if the insurance carrier has accepted the claim as a compensable injury and income or death benefits have not yet accrued but will be paid by the insurance carrier when the benefits accrue and are due.

(a-3) An insurance carrier is not required to comply with Subsection (a) if the claim results from an employee's disability or death for which a presumption is claimed to be applicable under Subchapter B, Chapter 607, Government Code, and, not later than the 15th day after the date on which the insurance carrier received written notice of the injury, the insurance carrier has provided the employee and the division with a notice that describes all steps taken by the insurance carrier to investigate the injury before the notice was given and the evidence the carrier reasonably believes is necessary to complete its investigation of the compensability of the injury. The commissioner shall adopt rules as necessary to implement this subsection.

(b) An insurance carrier shall notify the division in writing of the initiation of income or death benefit payments in the manner prescribed by commissioner rules.

(c) If an insurance carrier does not contest the compensability of an injury on or before the 60th day after the date on which the insurance carrier is notified of the injury, the insurance carrier waives its right to contest compensability. The initiation of payments by an insurance carrier does not affect the right of the insurance carrier to continue to investigate or deny the compensability of an injury during the 60-day period.

(d) An insurance carrier may reopen the issue of the compensability of an injury if there is a finding of evidence that could not reasonably have been discovered earlier.

(e) An insurance carrier commits an administrative violation if the insurance carrier does not initiate payments or file a notice of refusal as required by this section.

Text of subsec. (f) as added by Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 939, Sec. 1


(f) For purposes of this section, "written notice" to a certified self-insurer occurs only on written notice to the qualified claims servicing contractor designated by the certified self-insurer under Section 407.061(c).

Text of subsec. (f) as added by Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 1100, Sec. 1


(f) For purposes of this section:

(1) a certified self-insurer receives notice on the date the qualified claims servicing contractor designated by the certified self-insurer under Section 407.061(c) receives notice; and

(2) a political subdivision that self-insures under Section 504.011, either individually or through an interlocal agreement with other political subdivisions, receives notice on the date the intergovernmental risk pool or other entity responsible for administering the claim for the political subdivision receives notice.

(j) Each insurance carrier shall establish a single point of contact in the carrier's office for an injured employee for whom the carrier receives a notice of injury.

Added by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 269, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1993. Amended by Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 939, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2003; Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 1100, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2003.

Amended by:

Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch. 265 (H.B. 7), Sec. 3.145, eff. September 1, 2005.

Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1162 (H.B. 2605), Sec. 13, eff. September 1, 2011.

Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 701 (S.B. 2551), Sec. 3, eff. June 10, 2019.

The 20 cases that cite Tex. Lab. Code § 409.021 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENS. Ins. Co. v. Brewster, 249 S.W.3d 6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007).
cites § 409.021 8×subsections: (a) 6×cited by 51 cases
Where it cites § 409.021
“The initiation of payments by an insurance carrier does not affect the right of the insurance carrier to continue to investigate or deny the compensability of an injury during the 60-day period.”
The case’s holding
An insurer waives the defense of untimely notice if it fails to pay benefits or dispute compensability within seven days of receiving written notice of an injury.
Later courts cite it for
“well-settled law compels that we presume that proceedings in the trial court, as well as its judgment, are regular and correct.” · 6 citing courts
2
GREENSw. Bell Tel. Co., LP v. Mitchell, 276 S.W.3d 443 (Tex. 2008).
cites § 409.021 6×subsections: (c) 2× (e) 2×cited by 54 cases
Where it cites § 409.021
“(2003) (committee substitute); TEX. LAB.CODE § 409.021(a-1).”
The case’s holding
Stare decisis does not require a court to adhere to a statutory construction that the legislature has subsequently amended to reflect the opposite rule.
Later courts cite it for
“in the area of statutory construction, the doctrine of stare decisis has its greatest force' because the legislature can rectify a court's mistake, and if the legislature does not do so, there is little reason for the court to reconsider whether its decision was correct.” · 3 citing courts
3
GREENTexas Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. 2012).
cites § 409.021 3×subsections: (a)cited by 229 cases
Where it cites § 409.021
“Tex. Lab.Code § 409.021 (providing that a carrier shall begin paying benefits or file a notice of dispute within fifteen days after receiving written notice of injury).”
The case’s holding
The comprehensive dispute resolution and penalty provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act preclude claims for unfair settlement practices under the Insurance Code and common-law breach of good faith.
Later courts cite it for
“this court presumes the legislature deliberately and purposefully selects words and phrases it enacts, as well as deliberately and purposefully omits words and phrases it does not enact.” · 18 citing courts
4
GREENZurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Gill, 173 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005).
cites § 409.021 8×subsections: (c) 5× (a) 2×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 409.021
“[35] TEX. LAB.CODE ANN. § 409.021 (c). [36] See Williamson, 971 S.”
5
GREENState Off. of Risk Mgmt. v. Lawton, 295 S.W.3d 646 (Tex. 2009).
cites § 409.021 5×subsections: (c) 2×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 409.021
“The administrative rule states: Texas Labor Code, § 409.021 and subsection (a) of this section do not apply to disputes of extent of injury.”
The case’s holding
The sixty-day deadline for challenging injury compensability does not apply to disputes regarding the extent of an injury.
Later courts cite it for
“whether the sixty-day period for challenging compensa-bility of an injury also applies to a dispute over the extent of injury, if the basis for that dispute could have been discovered by a reasonable investigation within the waiver period.” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENAlexander v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 188 S.W.3d 348 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006).
cites § 409.021 6×subsections: (c) 6×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 409.021
“Thus, it had sixty days to contest the compensability of the injury pursuant to Texas Labor Code section 409.021(c). 1 Appellee did not file a dispute within the sixty-day period but filed one later, claiming that it should be able to reopen the issue because it had “newly…”
7
GREENMedina v. Herrera, 927 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. 1996).
cites § 409.021 3×subsections: (c) 3×cited by 108 cases
Where it cites § 409.021
“See TEX.LAB.CODE § 409.021(c) (carrier must contest compensability of injury within sixty days after receiving notice of injury, or else it waives its right to do so).”
The case’s holding
Accepting workers' compensation benefits bars an employee from pursuing an intentional tort claim against an employer due to the doctrine of election of remedies.
Later courts cite it for
“mere fact that an employer may be liable for conduct under a theory of respondeat superior . . . should not impute the conduct itself to the employer so as to trigger the exception from workers' compensation coverage.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENKrueger v. Atascosa Cnty., 155 S.W.3d 614 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004).
cites § 409.021 2×subsections: (a) (c)cited by 59 cases
Where it cites § 409.021
“Downs, but is based on the same principle that an insurance carrier’s failure to begin paying benefits, or give written notice of refusal to pay, within the seven-day period prescribed by Section 409.”
The case’s holding
Judicial review of a commission decision is limited to the specific issues decided by the commission's appeals panel.
Later courts cite it for
“unless an appellant has specifically challenged every possible ground for summary judgment, the appellate court need not review the merits of the challenged ground and may affirm on an unchallenged ground.” · 8 citing courts
9
GREENIn re Texas Mut. Ins. Co., 157 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004).
cites § 409.021 2×subsections: (a)cited by 53 cases
Where it cites § 409.021
“” Goetz points out that the legislature has placed on the compensation carrier the burden of notifying the Commission of an injury and thereby establishing administrative jurisdiction over the injury.”
The case’s holding
A breach of contract claim seeking workers' compensation benefits falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the commission because it presupposes the existence of a policy.
Later courts cite it for
“presupposes the existence of a workers' compensation policy and quite plainly seeks benefits due under that policy.” · 5 citing courts
10
GREENAm. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Fodge, 63 S.W.3d 801 (Tex. 2002).
cites § 409.021 1×cited by 262 cases
Where it cites § 409.021
“Tex. Lab.Code § 409.021. 8 . Id. §413.031.”
The case’s holding
The workers' compensation commission holds the sole power to determine entitlement to compensation benefits, subject to judicial review.
Later courts cite it for
“just as a court cannot award compensation benefits, except on appeal from a commission ruling, neither can it award damages for a denial in payment of compensation benefits without a determination by the commission that such benefits were due.” · 10 citing courts
11
GREENTexas Prop. & Cas. Guar. Ass'n v. Nat'l Am. Ins. Co., 208 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006).
cites § 409.021 2×subsections: (d)cited by 39 cases
Where it cites § 409.021
“; see Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 409.021. Of relevance here, Houston General argued on appeal that the critical issue was not “compensability” for the injury but “coverage” of the claim, and that it had not waived its right to contest coverage.”
The case’s holding
Whether an employee acted within the course and scope of employment with one of several employers is a compensability issue, so it receives modified de novo judicial review.
Later courts cite it for
“we have recognized that a threshold coverage dispute may be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the division if it arises in a claim for compensation benefits, but ordinarily not if presented by a claim predicated upon the absence of coverage.” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENDowns v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 32 S.W.3d 260 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000).
cites § 409.021 6×subsections: (a) (a)(1) (d)cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 409.021
“Thus, it provided the carrier “shall” either pay the benefits or give notice of its refusal to pay within the seven-day period, Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 409.021 (a); and, perhaps most importantly, it provided that the payment of benefits is without prejudice to a determination of…”
Later courts cite it for
“sought to encourage a carrier uncertain of the compensability of an injury to pay the benefits pending a full investigation of the claim” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENSt. Paul Ins. Co. v. Mefford, 994 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999).
cites § 409.021 3×subsections: (c) 2× (d)cited by 39 cases
Where it cites § 409.021
“See Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 409.021(c) (Vernon 1996).”
14
GREENTIG Premier Ins. Co. v. Pemberton, 127 S.W.3d 270 (Tex. App.—Waco 2003).
cites § 409.021 3×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 409.021
“Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 409.021. Statutory construction issues are legal questions reviewed de novo.”
15
GREENNat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Dominguez, 873 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1994).
cites § 409.021 2×subsections: (c) 2×cited by 86 cases
Where it cites § 409.021
“LAWS 1197, 1198 (to be codified at TEX.LAB. CODE § 409.021(c)). [3] The dissent argues that Dominguez' testimony that he told his immediate supervisor that the injury was work related is evidence of bad faith, and yet does not explain how this information could ever have made…”
The case’s holding
To prove a breach of the duty of good faith, a plaintiff must show the insurer lacked a reasonable basis for denial and knew of that lack.
Later courts cite it for
“determinen what potential basis an insurance company may have had for denying the claim.” · 1 citing court
16
GREENMethodist Hosp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 329 S.W.3d 510 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009).
cites § 409.021 2×subsections: (c) 2×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 409.021
“See Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 409.021(c) (Vernon 2006).”
17
GREENTexas Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sara Care Child Care Ctr., Inc., 324 S.W.3d 305 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010).
cites § 409.021 2×subsections: (a)cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 409.021
“2002), citing former Tex.Lab.Code Ann. § 409.021(a)(current version at Tex.”
18
GREENIn re Metro. Transit Auth., 334 S.W.3d 806 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011).
cites § 409.021 2×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 409.021
“Has [Metro] waived the compensa-bility of an infection of the right foot, including an auto-amputation of the right great toe, by not timely contesting its compensability in accordance with the Texas Labor Code Sections 409.021 and 409.”
The case’s holding
A party who appealed every adverse hearing-officer ruling to the appeals panel and prevailed there need not challenge the unappealed adverse finding in district court to exhaust administrative remedies.
19
GREENSanders v. Am. Prot. Ins. Co., 260 S.W.3d 682 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008).
cites § 409.021 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 409.021
“Laws 987 , 1195-96 (amended 2003) (current version at Tex. Lab.Code § 409.021 (Vernon 2006)). If the carrier complied with subsection (a), the carrier had sixty days from the notice of the claim to investigate and contest the injury.”
Later courts cite it for
“as long as its interpretation is reasonable.” · 1 citing court
20
GREENSimplex Elec. Corp. v. Holcomb, 949 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997).
cites § 409.021 2×subsections: (a)cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 409.021
“Under Texas Labor Code section 409.021, the carrier had sixty days, or until March 10, 1995, in which to contest compensability.”
Later courts cite it for
“the construction of a statute by an agency charged with its execution is entitled to serious consideration so long as the construction is reasonable and does not contradict the plain language of the statute.” · 6 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
199420092025

One bar per year. Tallest: 11 cases in 2009. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Tex. App.69Tex.105th Cir.1Tex. App.—Dallas1S.D. Tex.1
By subsection
(a)14 cases
S. Ins. Co. v. Brewster, 249 S.W.3d 6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007).“The initiation of payments by an insurance carrier does not affect the right of the insurance carrier to continue to investigate or deny the compensability of an injury during the 60-day period.”
Texas Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. 2012).“Tex. Lab.Code § 409.021 (providing that a carrier shall begin paying benefits or file a notice of dispute within fifteen days after receiving written notice of injury).”
Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Gill, 173 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005).“[35] TEX. LAB.CODE ANN. § 409.021 (c). [36] See Williamson, 971 S.”
Krueger v. Atascosa Cnty., 155 S.W.3d 614 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004).“Downs, but is based on the same principle that an insurance carrier’s failure to begin paying benefits, or give written notice of refusal to pay, within the seven-day period prescribed by Section 409.”
In re Texas Mut. Ins. Co., 157 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004).“” Goetz points out that the legislature has placed on the compensation carrier the burden of notifying the Commission of an injury and thereby establishing administrative jurisdiction over the injury.”
Showing the top 5 of 14. More in the list view →
(a)(1)1 case
Downs v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 32 S.W.3d 260 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000).“Thus, it provided the carrier “shall” either pay the benefits or give notice of its refusal to pay within the seven-day period, Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 409.021 (a); and, perhaps most importantly, it provided that the payment of benefits is without prejudice to a determination of…”
(a)(2)1 case
Stinson v. Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, 286 S.W.3d 77 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009).
(a)(2)(A)1 case
Donna Hopper v. Argonaut Ins. Co., No. 03-12-00734-CV, 2013 WL 5853747 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 18, 2013).
(c)34 cases
Alexander v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 188 S.W.3d 348 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006).“Thus, it had sixty days to contest the compensability of the injury pursuant to Texas Labor Code section 409.021(c). 1 Appellee did not file a dispute within the sixty-day period but filed one later, claiming that it should be able to reopen the issue because it had “newly…”
Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Gill, 173 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005).
Medina v. Herrera, 927 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. 1996).“See TEX.LAB.CODE § 409.021(c) (carrier must contest compensability of injury within sixty days after receiving notice of injury, or else it waives its right to do so).”
Sw. Bell Tel. Co., LP v. Mitchell, 276 S.W.3d 443 (Tex. 2008).“(2003) (committee substitute); TEX. LAB.CODE § 409.021(a-1).”
Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Dominguez, 873 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1994).“LAWS 1197, 1198 (to be codified at TEX.LAB. CODE § 409.021(c)). [3] The dissent argues that Dominguez' testimony that he told his immediate supervisor that the injury was work related is evidence of bad faith, and yet does not explain how this information could ever have made…”
Showing the top 5 of 34. More in the list view →
(d)7 cases
Texas Prop. & Cas. Guar. Ass'n v. Nat'l Am. Ins. Co., 208 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006).“; see Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 409.021. Of relevance here, Houston General argued on appeal that the critical issue was not “compensability” for the injury but “coverage” of the claim, and that it had not waived its right to contest coverage.”
St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Mefford, 994 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999).“See Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 409.021(c) (Vernon 1996).”
In re Luby's Cafeterias, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998).
Downs v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 32 S.W.3d 260 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000).
Ditmore v. Fairfield Indus., Inc., 855 F. Supp. 187 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
Showing the top 5 of 7. More in the list view →
(e)4 cases
Sw. Bell Tel. Co., LP v. Mitchell, 276 S.W.3d 443 (Tex. 2008).
Thompson v. Zurich Am. Ins., 664 F.3d 62 (5th Cir. 2011).
McElhaney v. City of Tyler, 926 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996).
Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Downs, 81 S.W.3d 803 (Tex. 2002).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 89th Legislature (2025). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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