Sec. 39.03. OFFICIAL OPPRESSION. (a) A public servant acting under color of his office or employment commits an offense if he:
(1) intentionally subjects another to mistreatment or to arrest, detention, search, seizure, dispossession, assessment, or lien that he knows is unlawful;
(2) intentionally denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, knowing his conduct is unlawful; or
(3) intentionally subjects another to sexual harassment.
(b) For purposes of this section, a public servant acts under color of his office or employment if he acts or purports to act in an official capacity or takes advantage of such actual or purported capacity.
(c) In this section, "sexual harassment" means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, submission to which is made a term or condition of a person's exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, either explicitly or implicitly.
(d) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor, except that an offense is a felony of the third degree if the public servant acted with the intent to impair the accuracy of data reported to the Texas Education Agency through the Public Education Information Management System (PEIMS) described by Sections 48.008 and 48.009, Education Code, under a law requiring that reporting.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 1217, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1989; Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 16, Sec. 19.01(34), eff. Aug. 26, 1991. Renumbered from Penal Code Sec. 39.02 by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.
Amended by:
Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 510 (S.B. 124), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2013.
Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 943 (H.B. 3), Sec. 3.088, eff. September 1, 2019.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
108
cases (
20 in the last 5 years), 1985–2026 · leading case:
Sanchez v. State, 995 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
Sanchez v. State, 995 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
· cites it 8× “majority but write further for two reasons: (1) To provide a more detailed description as to the events that gave rise to this cause; and (2) To try to clarify the difference between "sexual harassment" that is in bad taste, poor manners or otherwise might be that basis of civil…”
Sanchez v. State, 209 S.W.3d 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
· cites it 3× “The court of appeals did not err to conclude that the error in the jury charge was sufficiently egregious as to deprive the appellant of a fair and impartial trial.”
Pineda v. City of Houston, 175 S.W.3d 276 (Tex. App. 2004).
· cites it 6× “Officer Barrera was terminated for violating General Order 200-08 (conduct and authority); the United States Constitution (Fourth Amendment); Texas Penal Code section 39.03 (official oppression); General Order 600-17 (use of force); and General Order 100-01 (internal directives).”
Ambrose, Cynthia, 487 S.W.3d 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
· cites it 2× “Ambrose was charged with the offense ,of official oppression under Texas Penal Code Section 39.03 for “intentionally subjecting] [A.”
Mizell v. State, 119 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
· cites it 2× “Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 39.03 (d) (Vernon 1994).”
Drew Ryser v. State, 453 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. App. 2014).
· cites it 4× “” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 39.03 (a)(1) (West Supp.”
Ross v. State, 543 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
· cites it 4× “ANALYSIS Texas Penal Code § 39.03 defines the offense of official oppression as follows, in pertinent part: (a) A public servant acting under color of [her] office or employment commits an offense if [she] (1) intentionally subjects another to .”
State v. Edmond, 933 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
· cites it 2× “" Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 39.03 (c). Paragraph four alleges appellee made "unwelcome sexual advances" and/or requests "for sexual favors.”
Mizell v. State, 70 S.W.3d 156 (Tex. App. 2001).
· cites it 3× “Compare Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 39.03 (a)(2) (Vernon 1994) and § 39.”
Mathonican v. State, 194 S.W.3d 59 (Tex. App. 2006).
· cites it 2× “2004) (TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 39.03 ( Vernon 2003 ), official oppression); Francis, 36 S.”
Jane Doe v. Edgewood Indep Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2020).
“See TEX. PENAL CODE § 39.03 (“(a) A public servant acting under color of his office or employment commits an offense if he: (1) intentionally subjects another to mistreatment or to arrest, detention, search, seizure, 3 Case: 19-50737 Document: 00515477382 Page: 4 Date Filed:…”
— Tex. Penal Code § 39.03(a) — 16 cases
— Tex. Penal Code § 39.03(a)(1) — 17 cases
Sanchez v. State, 995 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
“majority but write further for two reasons: (1) To provide a more detailed description as to the events that gave rise to this cause; and (2) To try to clarify the difference between "sexual harassment" that is in bad taste, poor manners or otherwise might be that basis of civil…”
Ross v. State, 543 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
“ANALYSIS Texas Penal Code § 39.03 defines the offense of official oppression as follows, in pertinent part: (a) A public servant acting under color of [her] office or employment commits an offense if [she] (1) intentionally subjects another to .”
— Tex. Penal Code § 39.03(a)(2) — 4 cases
— Tex. Penal Code § 39.03(a)(3) — 4 cases
Sanchez v. State, 209 S.W.3d 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
“The court of appeals did not err to conclude that the error in the jury charge was sufficiently egregious as to deprive the appellant of a fair and impartial trial.”
Sanchez v. State, 995 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
“majority but write further for two reasons: (1) To provide a more detailed description as to the events that gave rise to this cause; and (2) To try to clarify the difference between "sexual harassment" that is in bad taste, poor manners or otherwise might be that basis of civil…”
— Tex. Penal Code § 39.03(c) — 1 case
Sanchez v. State, 209 S.W.3d 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
“The court of appeals did not err to conclude that the error in the jury charge was sufficiently egregious as to deprive the appellant of a fair and impartial trial.”
— Tex. Penal Code § 39.03(d) — 4 cases
Mizell v. State, 70 S.W.3d 156 (Tex. App. 2001).
“Compare Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 39.03 (a)(2) (Vernon 1994) and § 39.”
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