Sec. 39.06. MISUSE OF OFFICIAL INFORMATION. (a) A public servant commits an offense if, in reliance on information to which the public servant has access by virtue of the person's office or employment and that has not been made public, the person:
(1) acquires or aids another to acquire a pecuniary interest in any property, transaction, or enterprise that may be affected by the information;
(2) speculates or aids another to speculate on the basis of the information; or
(3) as a public servant, including as a school administrator, coerces another into suppressing or failing to report that information to a law enforcement agency.
(b) A public servant commits an offense if with intent to obtain a benefit or with intent to harm or defraud another, he discloses or uses information for a nongovernmental purpose that:
(1) he has access to by means of his office or employment; and
(2) has not been made public.
(c) A person commits an offense if, with intent to obtain a benefit or with intent to harm or defraud another, he solicits or receives from a public servant information that:
(1) the public servant has access to by means of his office or employment; and
(2) has not been made public.
(d) In this section, "information that has not been made public" means any information to which the public does not generally have access, and that is prohibited from disclosure under Chapter 552, Government Code.
(e) Except as provided by Subsection (g), an offense under this section is a felony of the third degree.
(f) Repealed by Acts 2025, 89th Leg., R.S., Ch. 397 (H.B. 2001), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2025.
(g) If the commission of an offense under this section results in a net pecuniary gain to the person committing the offense, the offense is:
(1) a felony of the third degree if the net pecuniary gain is less than $150,000;
(2) a felony of the second degree if the net pecuniary gain is $150,000 or more but less than $300,000; or
(3) a felony of the first degree if the net pecuniary gain is $300,000 or more.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1983, 68th Leg., p. 3243, ch. 558, Sec. 9, eff. Sept. 1, 1983; Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 30, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1987; Acts 1987, 70th Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 43, Sec. 3, eff. Oct. 20, 1987; Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 927, Sec. 1, eff. Aug. 28, 1989. Renumbered from Penal Code Sec. 39.03 and amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Amended by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 76, Sec. 5.95(90), eff. Sept. 1, 1995; Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 76, Sec. 14.52, eff. Sept. 1, 1995.
Amended by:
Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1043 (H.B. 1783), Sec. 5, eff. September 1, 2015.
Acts 2025, 89th Leg., R.S., Ch. 397 (H.B. 2001), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2025.
Acts 2025, 89th Leg., R.S., Ch. 397 (H.B. 2001), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2025.
Notes of Decisions
Villarreal v. City of Laredo, 44 F.4th 363 (5th Cir. 2022).
· cites it 20× “15 Villareal’s Complaint recounts that after she was arrested, she sought a writ of habeas corpus, and a Texas state trial court ruled orally from the bench that Texas Penal Code § 39.06 was unconstitutionally vague.”
Villarreal v. City of Laredo, 94 F.4th 374 (5th Cir. 2024).
· cites it 4× “20-40359 which no reasonable official would have relied under the circumstances; (b) knowingly prepared and obtained a warrant for Villarreal’s arrest under false pretenses; and (c) knowingly arrested and detained her and/or caused her arrest and detention without probable cause…”
State v. Newton, 179 S.W.3d 104 (Tex. App. 2005).
· cites it 9× “” See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 39.06 (c). Each attorney was separately indicted for allegedly contacting five different grand jurors.”
Villarreal v. City of Laredo, 17 F.4th 532 (5th Cir. 2021).
· cites it 3× “Six months later, two arrest warrants were issued for Villarreal for violating Texas Penal Code § 39.06(c). According to Villarreal, local officials have never brought a prosecution under § 39.”
State v. Ford, 179 S.W.3d 117 (Tex. App. 2005).
· cites it 9× “” See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 39.06 (c). Each attorney was separately indicted for allegedly contacting five different grand jurors.”
Wichita Cnty. v. Hart, 989 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. App. 1999).
“Laws 64 (amended 1993) (current version at Tex Penal Code Ann. § 39.06 (Vernon 1998)).”
Lenhart v. Thomas, 944 F. Supp. 525 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
· cites it 2× “Petitioner argues that the Texas Penal Code, § 39.06, cannot apply to this case because there is no suggestion that the grand jurors who spoke to Lenhart did so for personal gain or with intent to harm another.”
J.B.K. Matter Of, 931 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. App. 1996).
“1 See Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 39.06(c) (Vernon 1994).”
Matter of JBK, 931 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. App. 1996).
“[1] See TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 39.06(c) (Vernon 1994).”
Scott Tidwell v. State (Tex. App. 2013).
· cites it 4× “See TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 39.06 (West 2011).11 The indictment against Galle alleged that she, a public servant, namely Quality Control/Utilization Review for the Winkler County Hospital, and with intent to harm Dr.”
— Tex. Penal Code § 39.06(b) — 3 cases
Lenhart v. Thomas, 944 F. Supp. 525 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
“Petitioner argues that the Texas Penal Code, § 39.06, cannot apply to this case because there is no suggestion that the grand jurors who spoke to Lenhart did so for personal gain or with intent to harm another.”
Scott Tidwell v. State (Tex. App. 2013).
“See TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 39.06 (West 2011).11 The indictment against Galle alleged that she, a public servant, namely Quality Control/Utilization Review for the Winkler County Hospital, and with intent to harm Dr.”
— Tex. Penal Code § 39.06(c) — 10 cases
Villarreal v. City of Laredo, 44 F.4th 363 (5th Cir. 2022).
“15 Villareal’s Complaint recounts that after she was arrested, she sought a writ of habeas corpus, and a Texas state trial court ruled orally from the bench that Texas Penal Code § 39.06 was unconstitutionally vague.”
Villarreal v. City of Laredo, 17 F.4th 532 (5th Cir. 2021).
“Six months later, two arrest warrants were issued for Villarreal for violating Texas Penal Code § 39.06(c). According to Villarreal, local officials have never brought a prosecution under § 39.”
Villarreal v. City of Laredo, 94 F.4th 374 (5th Cir. 2024).
“20-40359 which no reasonable official would have relied under the circumstances; (b) knowingly prepared and obtained a warrant for Villarreal’s arrest under false pretenses; and (c) knowingly arrested and detained her and/or caused her arrest and detention without probable cause…”
State v. Newton, 179 S.W.3d 104 (Tex. App. 2005).
“” See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 39.06 (c). Each attorney was separately indicted for allegedly contacting five different grand jurors.”
State v. Ford, 179 S.W.3d 117 (Tex. App. 2005).
“” See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 39.06 (c). Each attorney was separately indicted for allegedly contacting five different grand jurors.”
— Tex. Penal Code § 39.06(d) — 5 cases
Villarreal v. City of Laredo, 44 F.4th 363 (5th Cir. 2022).
“15 Villareal’s Complaint recounts that after she was arrested, she sought a writ of habeas corpus, and a Texas state trial court ruled orally from the bench that Texas Penal Code § 39.06 was unconstitutionally vague.”
State v. Ford, 179 S.W.3d 117 (Tex. App. 2005).
“” See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 39.06 (c). Each attorney was separately indicted for allegedly contacting five different grand jurors.”
State v. Newton, 179 S.W.3d 104 (Tex. App. 2005).
“” See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 39.06 (c). Each attorney was separately indicted for allegedly contacting five different grand jurors.”
Scott Tidwell v. State (Tex. App. 2013).
“See TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 39.06 (West 2011).11 The indictment against Galle alleged that she, a public servant, namely Quality Control/Utilization Review for the Winkler County Hospital, and with intent to harm Dr.”
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