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U.S. CodeTitle 18Part II— Criminal ProcedureChapter 205— Searches and Seizures

18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2026)

Mobile tracking devices

Edition and currency
U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTU.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point) cited 1990–2024 92citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 92 opinions since 1990, 8 of them in the last five years.

(a)In General.—If a court is empowered to issue a warrant or other order for the installation of a mobile tracking device, such order may authorize the use of that device within the jurisdiction of the court, and outside that jurisdiction if the device is installed in that jurisdiction.(b)Definition.—As used in this section, the term “tracking device” means an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object.(Added Pub. L. 99–508, title I, § 108(a), Oct. 21, 1986, 100 Stat. 1858.)Editorial NotesCodification

Another section 3117 was renumbered section 3118 of this title.

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date

Section effective 90 days after Oct. 21, 1986, and, in case of conduct pursuant to court order or extension, applicable only with respect to court orders and extensions made after such date, with special rule for State authorizations of interceptions, see section 111 of Pub. L. 99–508, set out as an Effective Date of 1986 Amendment note under section 2510 of this title.

The 20 cases that cite 18 U.S.C. § 3117 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
cites § 3117 6×cited by 77 cases
Flagged on editorial review. Abrogated in part by In Re of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data: 1 citing opinion says abrogated.
Where it cites § 3117
“Pub.L. No. 99-508, Title I, § 108(a), 100 Stat.”
The case’s holding
Prospective cell site location data constitutes information from a tracking device and requires a showing of probable cause for government access.
Later courts cite it for
“... location information is a special class of customer information, which can only be used or disclosed in an emergency situation, absent express prior consent by the customer.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 3117 6×cited by 54 cases
Where it cites § 3117
“As will become evident in the discussion below, any such difference between the two applications may be critical to a determination of whether the disclosure of cell site information implicates the rules applicable to a “tracking device” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (b). That…”
The case’s holding
The government must establish probable cause to obtain prospective cell site location information because the Stored Communications Act does not authorize real-time disclosure of captured data.
Later courts cite it for
“because the government cannot demonstrate that cell site tracking could never under any circumstance implicate fourth amendment privacy rights, there is no reason to treat cell phone tracking differently from other forms of tracking ... which routinely require probable cause.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENUnited States v. Gabriel Werdene, 883 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2018).
cites § 3117 4×cited by 40 cases
Where it cites § 3117
“41(a)(2)(E) (incorporating the definition of “tracking device” from 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (b), 14 which is “an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object.”
The case’s holding
The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to warrants that are void ab initio due to a magistrate judge exceeding territorial jurisdiction.
Later courts cite it for
“even though rule 41(b) did not authorize the magistrate judge to issue the nit warrant, future law enforcement officers may apply for and obtain such a warrant pursuant to rule 41(b)(6), which went into effect in december 2016 to authorize nit-like warrants.” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENState v. Sveum, 2010 WI 92, 787 N.W.2d 317.
cites § 3117 6×cited by 52 cases
Where it cites § 3117
“Said legislative action would be consistent with analogous Wisconsin statutes that currently require court authorization of the interception of wire, electronic, or oral communications, see Wis.”
The case’s holding
The manner in which a search warrant is executed remains subject to judicial review under the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment.
Later courts cite it for
“even if a court determines that a search warrant is constitutionally valid, the manner in which the warrant was executed remains subject to judicial review.” · 3 citing courts
5
GREENUnited States v. Ackies, 918 F.3d 190 (1st Cir. 2019).
cites § 3117 5×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 3117
“We reject the argument that the cell phones were tracking devices under 18 U.S.C. § 3117 , and that the PLI warrants violated Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”
Later courts cite it for
“congress was clear that it intends to allow courts to permit searches under section 2703 beyond the courts' usual geographical jurisdictions.” · 2 citing courts
6
REDUnited States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759 (E.D. Mich. 2013).
cites § 3117 9×cited by 11 cases
Vacated in part by United States v. Eric Powell (2017): the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's own opinion in this case ("We AFFIRM the denial of defendants’ motions to suppress; AFFIRM the judgments entered against Carlos…
Later courts cite it for
“informant testimony, confirmed by independently verified evidence, that carlos powell was a major player in a drug trafficking ring in detroit.” · 1 citing court
cites § 3117 4×cited by 45 cases
Where it cites § 3117
“However, if the government seeks to use a particular cellular telephone as a tracking device to aid in execution of an arrest warrant, the government must obtain a tracking device warrant pursuant to Rule 41(b) and in accord with 18 U.S.C. § 3117 . As set forth more fully below,…”
The case’s holding
Individuals maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in their specific location and their aggregate movements revealed through continuous real-time tracking of cellular telephone location data.
Later courts cite it for
“because cellular telephone users tend to keep their phone on their person or very close by, placing a particular cellular telephone within a home is essentially the corollary of locating the user within the home.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENUnited States v. Steven Vincent Smith, 935 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2019).
cites § 3117 3×cited by 21 cases
The case’s holding
The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies when law enforcement officers act in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant that is later determined to be void ab initio.
Later courts cite it for
“that the goal of deploying the nit was to obtain information from the activating computers of any user or administrator who logs into playpen by entering a username and password.” · 1 citing court
9
GREENIn re the United States for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, 509 F. Supp. 2d 64 (D. Mass. 2007).
cites § 3117 8×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 3117
“Part of the SCA’s purpose, as clearly gleaned from the title of section 2703, is to dictate the means by which access may be granted to stored wire and electronic communications and transactional records.”
10
GREENUnited States v. Steven Horton, 863 F.3d 1041 (8th Cir. 2017).
cites § 3117 2×cited by 44 cases
Where it cites § 3117
“, using “an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object,” 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (b). The government argues that the defendants made a “virtual” trip 2 On December 1, 2016, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(b)(6) was added to…”
The case’s holding
The good-faith exception applies to searches conducted under warrants that are void ab initio due to a magistrate judge's lack of territorial jurisdiction.
Later courts cite it for
“the court has not focused on the type of fourth amendment violation at issue, but rather confined the 'good-faith inquiry . . . to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal' in light of 'all of the circumstances.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENUnited States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
cites § 3117 1×cited by 1,309 cases
Where it cites § 3117
“41(e)(2)(A)(i), and they did not install the GPS device within the District of Columbia, as required by the terms of the warrant and by 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (a) and Rule 41(b)(4). In the courts below the Government did not argue, and has not argued here, that the Fourth Amendment…”
Later courts cite it for
“the government's installation of a gps device on a target's vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a 'search.” · 89 citing courts
12
GREENUnited States v. Caraballo, 963 F. Supp. 2d 341 (D. Vt. 2013).
cites § 3117 4×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 3117
“Federal law governs government “installation of a mobile tracking device,” 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (emphasis supplied), which simply does not occur in the pinging process in which the government accesses a cell phone’s inherent capabilities to obtain location data without installing…”
The case’s holding
Exigent circumstances involving an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury justify the warrantless use of cell phone pinging technology to locate a suspect.
Later courts cite it for
“deemed it reasonable to subordinate any individual privacy interest in cell phone location information to society's more compelling interest in preventing an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury,” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENIn re the United States for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, 509 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D. Mass. 2007).
cites § 3117 3×cited by 39 cases
Where it cites § 3117
“” See 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (b). Id. I disagree with this analogy for two reasons.”
The case’s holding
Historical cell site information is a noncontent record obtainable under the Stored Communications Act upon a showing of specific and articulable facts, without the probable cause required for a warrant.
Later courts cite it for
“specific and articulable facts” · 3 citing courts
14
GREENIn re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
cites § 3117 4×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 3117
“18 U.S.C. § 3117 . Several courts have denied applications for § 2703(d) orders for cell site information based on the tracking device exclusion, holding that efforts to gain access to prospective cell site information effectively converts an individual’s cell phone into a…”
Later courts cite it for
“the fourth amendment cannot accord protection to geolocation data associated with a defendant's cell phone while denying such protection against a physical invasion of his home, as the latter is entitled to the highest order of defense.” · 1 citing court
15
GREENIn re Applic. of US for an Order for Disclosure, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
cites § 3117 4×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 3117
“" 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (b). Because a cellular telephone arguably has the capability of being a "device which permits .”
The case’s holding
Prospective cell site location information may be obtained by combining the Pen Register Statute with 18 U.S.C. § 2703 because the word solely in 47 U.S.C. § 1002 permits such a combination.
Later courts cite it for
“inasmuch as cell site information is transmitted to the government only after it has been in the possession of the cell phone company” · 1 citing court
cites § 3117 3×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 3117
“24 Rule 41, as amended by the Supreme Court in 2006, expressly provides Court authority to issue a warrant for the installation and use of a tracking device (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3117 ) 25 for a renewable period not to exceed 45 days.”
The case’s holding
Historical cell-site location information held by a cellular provider cannot be compelled under the Stored Communications Act's relevance standard; the Government must establish probable cause.
Later courts cite it for
“extraordinarily personal and potentially sensitive.” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENUnited States v. Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d 920 (W.D. Ark. 2016).
cites § 3117 2×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 3117
“First, the NIT is an “electronic device” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (b), because it is an investigative tool consisting of computer code transmitted electronically over the internet.”
The case’s holding
A district judge may issue a warrant to search property outside the judge's district when Fourth Amendment requirements are met, as the search occurs where the tracking code reports the computer's location.
Later courts cite it for
“district judges are not limited by'rule 41(b) as magistrate júdges are. instead, district judges may issue warrants to search property located outside their judicial districts when the requirements of the fourth amendment are met.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 3117 2×cited by 39 cases
Where it cites § 3117
“any communication from a tracking device (as defined in [ 18 U.S.C. § 3117 ]).” 53 Section 3117, in turn, defines “tracking device” as “an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object.”
The case’s holding
The Pen Register Statute and the Stored Communications Act together authorize the disclosure of prospective cell site location information via a pen register and trap and trace device.
Later courts cite it for
“arguments for statutory authorization . . . apply equally whether information is obtained from one antenna tower at a time or from many simultaneously.” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENIn re Application for Order of a Pen Register, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597 (D. Md. 2005).
cites § 3117 3×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 3117
“§ 2510 (12)(C), and as discussed later the acquisition of real time cell site information converts a cell phone into a tracking device under 18 U.S.C. § 3117 . "Wire communication" excludes communication not involving the human voice, and the transmission of cell site…”
The case’s holding
Real time cell site location information is not obtainable under the Stored Communications Act or Pen/Trap Statute; absent statutory authority, probable cause under Rule 41 is required.
20
GREENUnited States v. Taylor, 250 F. Supp. 3d 1215 (N.D. Ala. 2017).
cites § 3117 2×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 3117
“First, the NIT is not a “tracking device,” which is defined in Rule 41(a)(2)(E) by reference to 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (b) as “an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object.”
Later courts cite it for
“exclusion of the evidence seized pursuant to the nit warrant would serve little deterrent purpose where the mistaken conduct of the magistrate judge, not the officers, invalidated the warrant.” · 2 citing courts

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Citing cases by year
199020072024

One bar per year. Tallest: 7 cases in 2005. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
D. Md.6S.D. Tex.63rd Cir.47th Cir.4D. Mass.4E.D.N.Y4S.D.N.Y.41st Cir.3

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 50 courts in all.

By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

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Enactment and amendments
(Added Pub. L. 99–508, title I, § 108(a), Oct. 21, 1986, 100 Stat. 1858.)
Versions

Edition shown: U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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