18 U.S.C. § 81
Arson within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction
Whoever, within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns any building, structure or vessel, any machinery or building materials or supplies, military or naval stores, munitions of war, or any structural aids or appliances for navigation or shipping, or attempts or conspires to do such an act, shall be imprisoned for not more than 25 years, fined the greater of the fine under this title or the cost of repairing or replacing any property that is damaged or destroyed, or both.
If the building be a dwelling or if the life of any person be placed in jeopardy, he shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 85
cases (7 in the last 5 years), 1940–2026 · leading case: United States v. Ricco Devon Prentiss, 256 F.3d 971 (10th Cir. 2001).
United States v. Ricco Devon Prentiss, 256 F.3d 971 (10th Cir. 2001). “After a divided panel vacated the defendant’s conviction for committing arson in Indian country, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§81 and 1152, see United States v.”
United States v. Prentiss, 206 F.3d 960 (10th Cir. 2000). “On November 23, 1996, a jury found the defendant, Ricco Prentiss, guilty of one count of arson in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 81 and 1152. In this appeal, Mr.”
United States v. Ricco Devon Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2001). “The defendant Ricco Prentiss was convicted after a jury trial of arson in Indian country, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 81 and 1152. A divided panel vacated the conviction, holding that: (1) the indictment failed to allege two essential elements of the offense (the Indian/non…”
United States v. Vinton Bedonie & Thomas Cly, 913 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1990). “” Appellants assert that, in establishing arson-murder under § 1111(a), “[t]he only arson which is jurisdictionally proper for ‘Indian country’ is 18 U.S.C. § 81 ,” and “[b]y its own terms, [§ 81] does not apply to setting fire to motor vehicles.”
United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 1999). “§ 1111 (a) is limited to the arson described in 18 U.S.C. § 81 . Any extension of section 1111(a), he argues, would be over-expansive and impermissible in light of Bedo-nie.”
United States v. Javier Velasquez-Reyes, A.K.A. Javier Alvarado-Hernandez, 427 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2005). “Velasquez-Reyes argues that 18 U.S.C. § 81 , the federal statute that defines arson committed within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, requires proof that the defendant acted “willfully and maliciously,” while the Washington statute identifies the mens rea as…”
United States v. Jane Doe (r.s.w.), 136 F.3d 631 (9th Cir. 1998). “§ 5032 after a bench trial in the district court for having committed arson in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 81 and 1153. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.”
United States v. Doe, 572 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2009). “§ 1153 and defined by 18 U.S.C. § 81 . The district court sentenced S.”
United States of Am. v. Richard Lawrence Auginash, 266 F.3d 781 (8th Cir. 2001). “Auginash raises two issues on appeal: first, that the definition of arson under 18 U.S.C. § 81 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) does not include the burning of a motor vehicle; second, that the district court erred in not departing downward from the statutory minimum sentence of life…”
United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2013). “, 18 U.S.C. § 81 (providing for sentence up to 25 years for arson); id.”
United States v. Olaf Peter Juda Raymond Edward Missell Anthony Burg Frans Gustaaf Van Der Hoeven & Christopher Dean Paris, 46 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 1995). “§ 1903 (a), and arson, 18 U.S.C. § 81 . All reserved the right to seek appellate review of the district court’s refusal to dismiss the prosecutions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the district court’s rejection of their Fourth Amendment claims.”
United States v. M.W., 890 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1989). “On this appeal we must consider (1) the mens rea required under the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 81 , and (2) whether the district court’s findings on the mens rea requirement are supported by the evidence.”
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