cites § 437 2×cited by 85 cases
Reversed in part by McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003): the U.S. Supreme Court's own opinion in this case ("Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the District Court's judgment with respect to Titles I an…
- Where it cites § 437
- “, created pursuant to FECA, 2 U.S.C. § 437 (c), and is charged with enforcing the Act as amended by BCRA.”
- The case’s holding
- The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act is constitutional regarding its regulations of electioneering communications, coordinated expenditures, and certain nonfederal fund restrictions.
- Later courts cite it for
- “the president typically controls his party's national committee, and once a favorite has emerged for the presidential nomination of the other party, that candidate and his party's national committee typically work closely together.” · 4 citing courts
cites § 437 1×cited by 55 cases
- The case’s holding
- An agency's decision to prefer case-by-case adjudication over rulemaking is arbitrary and capricious if the agency fails to provide a reasoned explanation for that choice.
- Later courts cite it for
- “in ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the court shall grant summary judgment only if one of the moving parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law upon material facts that are not genuinely disputed.” · 29 citing courts
cites § 437 1×cited by 45 cases
- Where it cites § 437
- “As of September 1, 2014, the relevant provisions of BCRA were transferred from 2 U.S.C. § 437 to 52 U.S.C. § 30104 . We use the updated citations, but note, in the interest of clarity, that the District Court opinion and other disclosure-related opinions employ the old citations.”
- The case’s holding
- Campaign disclosure requirements for electioneering communications satisfy exacting scrutiny if the monetary and media thresholds are substantially related to a sufficiently important state interest.
- Later courts cite it for
- “in reviewing the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction, we employ a tripartite standard of review: findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, and the decision to grant or deny an injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” · 3 citing courts
cites § 437 1×cited by 128 cases
- Where it cites § 437
- “” 2 U.S.C. § 437 . Congress also lodged a degree of flexibility in the definitions of “contribution” and “expenditure” in particular where it defined them to “include” certain uses and phrased the exceptions to their general prohibitions as enumerating activities that the terms…”
- The case’s holding
- Generalized harm to the political process through corruption does not constitute a sufficiently concrete or personalized injury to establish standing for supporters of a political candidate.
- Later courts cite it for
- “while it is true that a plaintiff must have a personal interest at stake throughout the litigation of a case, such interest is to be assessed under the rubric of standing at the commencement of the case, and under the rubric of mootness thereafter.” · 10 citing courts
cites § 437 1×cited by 58 cases
- Where it cites § 437
- “Here, 2 U.S.C. § 437 (h) has given standing in the Sierra Club sense to any eligible voter.”
- The case’s holding
- A challenge to a statutory one-house veto provision is unripe for judicial review if the veto power has not yet been exercised against specific regulations.
- Later courts cite it for
- “to the extent the dissent's language may be read as suggesting a view that congress may 'command' the judiciary to act contrary to the rules relative to ripeness the supreme court has developed 'for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction,' we respectfully disagree.” · 1 citing court
cites § 437 1×cited by 19 cases
- Where it cites § 437
- “For example, the counterclaim sought a declaratory judgment concerning "the proper construction of 26 USC § 9008 (c) and 2 USC § 437 (2), relating to permissible uses of federal funds for presidential nominating conventions, when applied to the facts of this case; and, the…”
cites § 437 2×cited by 6 cases
- Where it cites § 437
- “CREW seeks judicial review, as a party “aggrieved” under 2 U.S.C. § 437 (g)(a)(8)(A), of defendant Federal Election Commission’s (“FEC”) decision to dismiss CREW’s administrative complaint.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “endeavor is tantamount to seeking enforcement of the law.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 437 1×cited by 17 cases
- Where it cites § 437
- “The Amended Complaint also adds a Claim for Promissory Estoppel (Count Seven) and includes claims for violation of the Federal Election Campaign Act (“Campaign Act”), 2 U.S.C. § 437 (Count Five), violation of the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “plaintiff's stake is no greater and his status no more differentiated than that of millions of other voters, . . . his harm is too vague and its effects too attenuated to confer standing on any and all voters.” · 4 citing courts
cites § 437 1×cited by 27 cases
- Where it cites § 437
- “Thus, the pertinent enforcement provisions of 2 U.S.C. § 437 were triggered: (a)(1) Any person who believes a violation of this Act or of chapter 95 or chapter 96 of Title 26 has occurred may file a complaint with the Commission.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “neither requires the parties to engage in time consuming discovery nor requires the district court to construct a lengthy record.” · 1 citing court
cites § 437 1×cited by 12 cases
- Where it cites § 437
- “See, 2 U.S.C. § 437 . However, in this case, the Commission was not in the process of exercising its quasi-judicial authority at the time the remark was made.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “inappropriate conduct by the candidate.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 437 1×cited by 22 cases
- Where it cites § 437
- “2 U.S.C. § 437 g(a)(5)(D). From these provisions it is fair to infer that Congress was concerned that complainants and the FEC itself might launch unfounded, partisan accusations that could injure a candidate merely because they were published.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “suggests, much less clearly and ambiguously states, that action by the department of justice to prosecute a violation of the act is conditioned upon prior consideration of the alleged violation by the fec.” · 5 citing courts
cites § 437 1×cited by 14 cases
- Where it cites § 437
- “§ 201, 2 U.S.C. § 437 (g). The legislative history concerning the new FECA criminal provision, however, focused on the need to simplify the enforcement scheme and makes no mention of repealing the more generally applicable provisions of Title 18.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “must provide something more than mere speculation or personal conclusions based on anecdotal evidence.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 437 1×cited by 4 cases
- Where it cites § 437
- “Therefore, as an aggrieved party, Kean Commission challenged the FEC’s inaction pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 437 (g)(1), by filing a complaint with this Court on September 18, 2001.”
cites § 437 1×cited by 6 cases
Reversed by Athens Lumber Company, Incorporated v. Federal Election Commission (1983): the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's own opinion in this case.
- Where it cites § 437
- “The Court sustained the constitutional validity of the Act’s individual contribution limits, disclosure and reporting provisions and public financing scheme, but found the Act’s limitations on campaign expenditures, on independent expenditures by individuals and groups and on…”
cites § 437 1×cited by 3 cases
- Where it cites § 437
- “” 2 U.S.C. § 437 (a)(1). On May 19, 2003, the FEC sent notice of the administrative complaint to Stephen Moore, who serves as both the Treasurer of PAC and as the President of Club for Growth, Inc.”
cites § 437 1×cited by 3 cases
- Where it cites § 437
- “The enforcement scheme of FECA generally, 2 U.S.C. § 437 (g), provides for the filing of a complaint with the Federal Election Commission, which either dismisses or investigates the complaint.”
cites § 437 1×cited by 2 cases
- Where it cites § 437
- “” The purpose of the alleged force against the plaintiff was to regain possession of the office records, that an employee, soon to be terminated, would not surrender.”
cites § 437 1×cited by 1 case
- Where it cites § 437
- “Plaintiff seeks: (1) the convening of a three-judge court pursuant to § 403 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act and/or certification of questions regarding the constitutionality of the challenged portions of FECA to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of…”
cites § 437 1×cited by 1 case
- Where it cites § 437
- “” (5) Fifth Affirmative Defense: “The Federal Election Campaign Act, at 2 U.S.C. § 437 (g)(2)(A) has not been enforced by the Federal Election Commission against individuals, and it violates both the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution to…”
cites § 437 1×cited by 4 cases
- Where it cites § 437
- “2 U.S.C. § 437 f, note 2 supra. There must be a “complete written request” concerning the application of the Act or the Fund Act or the Matching Payment Act or a rule or regulation prescribed by the Commission, “with respect to a specific transaction or activity by the person.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “particularly inappropriate for judicial resolution at this time” · 2 citing courts
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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.