cites § 633 10×cited by 712 cases
- Where it cites § 633
- “607 , as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 633 (b), provides in pertinent part: "In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a State which has a law prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing or authorizing a State authority to grant or seek…”
- The case’s holding
- Provisions of the ADEA that are nearly identical to Title VII should be construed consistently with the judicial construction of Title VII.
- Later courts cite it for
- “the adea and title vii share a common purpose, the elimination of discrimination in the workplace,” · 14 citing courts
cites § 633 4×cited by 159 cases
Overruled by Woodford v. Ngo on other grounds: 15 citing opinions limit it to other grounds, 1 says in part, and 1 says overruled outright.
- Where it cites § 633
- “In Oscar Mayer , for example, the distinction between the ADEA’s requirement and an exhaustion requirement focused not on any purported difference in the two requirements’ power to defeat federal claims, but on the simple fact that 29 U.S.C. § 633 (b) “requires only that the…”
- The case’s holding
- A prisoner must appeal administrative rulings to the highest possible administrative level (exhaustion requirement).
- Later courts cite it for
- “an inmate does not exhaust available administrative remedies . . . when the inmate filed such a grievance but 'did not appeal the denial of that complaint to the highest possible administrative level.” · 9 citing courts
cites § 633 4×cited by 544 cases
- Where it cites § 633
- “Indeed, the EPA, the federal agency charged with enforcement of RCRA, interprets the notice provision as requiring dismissal for noncompliance.”
- The case’s holding
- Compliance with the sixty-day notice requirement in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act is a mandatory condition precedent that a district court cannot waive at its discretion.
- Later courts cite it for
- “under a literal reading of the statute, compliance with the 60-day notice provision is a mandatory, not optional, condition precedent for suit.” · 30 citing courts
cites § 633 12×cited by 22 cases
- Where it cites § 633
- “Where, as here, the alleged unlawful practice occurs "in a State which has a law prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing or authorizing a State authority to grant or seek relief from such discriminatory practice", 29 U.S.C. § 633 , the…”
cites § 633 4×cited by 92 cases
- Where it cites § 633
- “” 29 U.S.C. § 633 (b). Challenging this decision, Schu-ler argues that he fulfilled this administrative prerequisite in two ways: (1) through the operation of a “worksharing agreement” between the EEOC and the DCOHR under which his charge was “deemed filed” with the District of…”
- The case’s holding
- The McDonnell Douglas framework applies to age discrimination claims under the ADEA (applying the Teamsters framework to the ADEA).
- Later courts cite it for
- “for all intents and purposes, the dcohr receives charges filed with the eeoc.” · 2 citing courts
- Where it cites § 633
- “First American first argues that 29 U.S.C. § 633 (a) prevents a plaintiff from invoking state law in either state or federal court once plaintiff has elected to proceed under the ADEA, as Promisel has done.”
- The case’s holding
- The ADEA supersession provision stays only state administrative proceedings and does not preclude federal courts from exercising pendente jurisdiction over state law age discrimination claims.
- Later courts cite it for
- “while not automatic, is a favored and normal course of action.” · 13 citing courts
cites § 633 2×cited by 224 cases
- Where it cites § 633
- “Not only does the ADEA disclaim any preemptive effect on state laws, see 29 U.S.C. § 633 (a), it also incorporates consistent state anti discrimination laws to serve as the primary enforcement mechanism of the enumerated rights, see id.”
- The case’s holding
- The amount in controversy includes attorney's fees if they are authorized by statute or contract.
- Later courts cite it for
- “in determining the amount in controversy, the district court properly considered the plaintiff's interrogatory answers and emotional distress damage awards in similar age discrimination cases in washington.” · 8 citing courts
cites § 633 1×cited by 2,016 cases
- Where it cites § 633
- “Section 14(b) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 633 (b), provides that, in states that have a "State authority'' authorized to enforce state laws against age discrimination (known as "deferral states”), an ADEA private plaintiff may not bring a federal lawsuit "before the expiration of…”
- The case’s holding
- Whether a prisoner has properly exhausted administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act is determined by evaluating compliance with the prison's own administrative grievance regulations.
- Later courts cite it for
- “absent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official . . . will not be chargeable with the eighth amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference.” · 238 citing courts
cites § 633 4×cited by 28 cases
- Where it cites § 633
- “§ 2000e-5(c) (West 1994); 29 U.S.C.A. § 633 (West 1999); Tex. Lab.Code Ann.”
cites § 633 6×cited by 28 cases
- Where it cites § 633
- “4 The district court held that this largely uncontested procedural history deprived it-of jurisdiction since it read 29 U.S.C. § 633 (b) 5 as mandating prior resort to an appropriate state agency before one could bring suit in federal court.”
- The case’s holding
- The Age Discrimination in Employment Act does not require a plaintiff to first resort to a state age discrimination agency before suing in federal court; state deferral is optional.
- Later courts cite it for
- “the adea reflects less deference to state mechanisms than does title vii.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 633 3×cited by 135 cases
- Where it cites § 633
- “Section 14(b) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 633 (b) (1976), provides that in cases occurring in deferral states no suit may be brought under section 626 until 60 days after proceedings have been commenced before the state agency, unless the state proceedings had terminated earlier.”
- The case’s holding
- The statute of limitations period begins when an employee knows or should know that an unlawful employment practice has been committed.
- Later courts cite it for
- “knows or should know that an unlawful employment practice has been committed.” · 4 citing courts
cites § 633 6×cited by 24 cases
- Where it cites § 633
- “Finally, Harter argues filing of the Complaint in this action automatically stayed proceedings before the DCR, pursuant to Section 14(a) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 633 (a). 21 Moving Brief at 23-24.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “might materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” · 3 citing courts
cites § 633 3×cited by 39 cases
- Where it cites § 633
- “The action commenced after the CHRO had terminated its proceedings, in compliance with 29 U.S.C. § 633 (b), and more than 60 days after Plaintiff filed his charge with the EEOC (December 13, 2007), in accordance with 29 U.”
- The case’s holding
- A CFEPA discrimination claim against a party not named in the CHRO complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction absent a release from the CHRO covering that party.
- Later courts cite it for
- “the courts of this district have consistently applied the exhaustion provisions of the cfepa to dismiss discrimination claims, finding a lack of subject matter jurisdiction where the plaintiff failed to obtain the requisite release prior to pursuing a private cause of action in court.” · 7 citing courts
cites § 633 3×cited by 106 cases
- Where it cites § 633
- “29 U.S.C. § 633 (b) states: In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a State which has a law prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing or authorizing a State authority to grant or seek relief from such discriminatory practice, no…”
- The case’s holding
- A limitations period is triggered only when an employer establishes its official position and makes that position apparent to the employee through explicit notice of harm.
- Later courts cite it for
- “when the employer has established its official position and made that position apparent to the employee by explicit notice.” · 3 citing courts
cites § 633 6×cited by 20 cases
- Where it cites § 633
- “05 to satisfy the ADEA’s requirement that a plaintiff commence state proceedings, 29 U.S.C. § 633 (b), may proceed with both his federal and state claims if the Court finds it appropriate to retain the pendent claim.”
cites § 633 3×cited by 90 cases
- Where it cites § 633
- “Thereafter, the parties exchanged one set of written discovery for purposes of both the state and federal litigation.”
- The case’s holding
- A district court must perform a careful balancing of factors rather than using a mechanical checklist when determining whether to abstain from jurisdiction due to parallel state litigation.
- Later courts cite it for
- “the decision whether to surrender jurisdiction because of parallel state court litigation does not rest on a 'mechanical checklist' of abstention factors, but on a 'careful balancing' of them, 'as they apply in a given case, with the balance heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction.” · 3 citing courts
cites § 633 4×cited by 44 cases
- Where it cites § 633
- “(See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, §§ 7(d)(2) & 14(b), 29 U.”
- The case’s holding
- The National Bank Act is impliedly amended by Title VII and the ADEA, preempting state antidiscrimination laws only to the extent of a conflict with those federal statutes.
- Later courts cite it for
- “whether federal law preempts state law is fundamentally a question whether congress has intended such a result” · 4 citing courts
cites § 633 4×cited by 43 cases
- Where it cites § 633
- “For example, after the sixty-day period required by 29 U.S.C. § 633 (b), the petitioner may supersede any further state proceedings by filing suit in federal court.”
- The case’s holding
- An unreviewed state administrative determination is preclusive of an ADEA claim if the agency acted in a judicial capacity and the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate the issues.
cites § 633 2×cited by 194 cases
- Where it cites § 633
- “§ 2000e-5(c), which provides the procedure for filing employment discrimination complaints under section 2000e when there is a state law concerning employment discrimination, and 29 U.S.C. § 633 , which provides the procedure for filing age discrimination complaints when there…”
- The case’s holding
- A disability must be one generally perceived as severely limiting an individual in performing work-related functions in general to qualify as a handicap under the statute.
- Later courts cite it for
- “will give effect to all the words of a statute and not treat any statutory language as surplusage if possible” · 21 citing courts
cites § 633 1×cited by 89 cases
- The case’s holding
- Failure to engage in the interactive process does not constitute an independent claim under the ADA unless the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of failure to accommodate.
- Later courts cite it for
- “if the employer meets its burden, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish that the proffered reason was merely pretext for unlawful discrimination.” · 6 citing courts
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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.