29 U.S.C. § 633

Federal-State relationship

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(a) Federal action superseding State action

Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of any agency of any State performing like functions with regard to discriminatory employment practices on account of age except that upon commencement of action under this chapter such action shall supersede any State action.

(b) Limitation of Federal action upon commencement of State proceedings

In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a State which has a law prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing or authorizing a State authority to grant or seek relief from such discriminatory practice, no suit may be brought under section 626 of this title before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated: Provided, That such sixty-day period shall be extended to one hundred and twenty days during the first year after the effective date of such State law. If any requirement for the commencement of such proceedings is imposed by a State authority other than a requirement of the filing of a written and signed statement of the facts upon which the proceeding is based, the proceeding shall be deemed to have been commenced for the purposes of this subsection at the time such statement is sent by registered mail to the appropriate State authority.

(Pub. L. 90–202, § 14, Dec. 15, 1967, 81 Stat. 607.)Executive DocumentsTransfer of Functions

Functions vested by this section in Secretary of Labor or Civil Service Commission transferred to Equal Employment Opportunity Commission by Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, § 2, 43 F.R. 19807, 92 Stat. 3781, set out in the Appendix to Title 5, Government Organization and Employees, effective Jan. 1, 1979, as provided by section 1–101 of Ex. Ord. No. 12106, Dec. 28, 1978, 44 F.R. 1053.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 449 cases (22 in the last 5 years), 1974–2026 · leading case: Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750 (1979).

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Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750 (1979). · cites it 10× “607 , as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 633 (b), provides in pertinent part: "In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a State which has a law prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing or authorizing a State authority to grant or seek…”

Douglas Thomas v. Shawn Woolum, Richard Kepler Charlotte Starcher Billie Waddell, Sr., 337 F.3d 720 (6th Cir. 2003). · cites it 4× “In Oscar Mayer , for example, the distinction between the ADEA’s requirement and an exhaustion requirement focused not on any purported difference in the two requirements’ power to defeat federal claims, but on the simple fact that 29 U.S.C. § 633 (b) “requires only that the…”

Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cnty., 493 U.S. 20 (1990). · cites it 4× “Indeed, the EPA, the federal agency charged with enforcement of RCRA, interprets the notice provision as requiring dismissal for noncompliance.”

Murnane v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 135 (D.D.C. 1979). · cites it 12× “Where, as here, the alleged unlawful practice occurs "in a State which has a law prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing or authorizing a State authority to grant or seek relief from such discriminatory practice", 29 U.S.C. § 633 , the…”

Schuler v. Pricewaterhousecoopers, LLP, 514 F.3d 1365 (D.C. Cir. 2008). · cites it 4× “” 29 U.S.C. § 633 (b). Challenging this decision, Schu-ler argues that he fulfilled this administrative prerequisite in two ways: (1) through the operation of a “worksharing agreement” between the EEOC and the DCOHR under which his charge was “deemed filed” with the District of…”

Alvin PROMISEL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FIRST Am. ARTIFICIAL FLOWERS, INC., Defendant-Appellant, 943 F.2d 251 (1st Cir. 1991). · cites it 4× “First American first argues that 29 U.S.C. § 633 (a) prevents a plaintiff from invoking state law in either state or federal court once plaintiff has elected to proceed under the ADEA, as Promisel has done.”

Kathy Kroske, an Individual v. Us Bank Corp., a Foreign Corp. Dba U.S. Bank, 432 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2005). · cites it 2× “Not only does the ADEA disclaim any preemptive effect on state laws, see 29 U.S.C. § 633 (a), it also incorporates consistent state anti discrimination laws to serve as the primary enforcement mechanism of the enumerated rights, see id.”

Robert Spruill v. Frank Gillis Goolier, C.O. McGlaughlin M.D. Brown, P.A, 372 F.3d 218 (3rd Cir. 2004). “Section 14(b) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 633 (b), provides that, in states that have a "State authority'' authorized to enforce state laws against age discrimination (known as "deferral states”), an ADEA private plaintiff may not bring a federal lawsuit "before the expiration of…”

Williams v. Vought, 68 S.W.3d 102 (Tex. App. 2001). · cites it 4× “§ 2000e-5(c) (West 1994); 29 U.S.C.A. § 633 (West 1999); Tex. Lab.Code Ann.”

Clement GABRIELE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRYSLER Corp., Defendant-Appellee, 573 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1978). · cites it 6× “4 The district court held that this largely uncontested procedural history deprived it-of jurisdiction since it read 29 U.S.C. § 633 (b) 5 as mandating prior resort to an appropriate state agency before one could bring suit in federal court.”

Arthur N. ARONSEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CROWN ZELLERBACH, a Corp., Defendant-Appellee, 662 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1981). · cites it 3× “Section 14(b) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 633 (b) (1976), provides that in cases occurring in deferral states no suit may be brought under section 626 until 60 days after proceedings have been commenced before the state agency, unless the state proceedings had terminated earlier.”

Harter v. GAF Corp., 150 F.R.D. 502 (D.N.J. 1993). · cites it 6× “Finally, Harter argues filing of the Complaint in this action automatically stayed proceedings before the DCR, pursuant to Section 14(a) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 633 (a). 21 Moving Brief at 23-24.”

Show all 449 citing cases →

— 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) — 1 case

Alvin PROMISEL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FIRST Am. ARTIFICIAL FLOWERS, INC., Defendant-Appellant, 943 F.2d 251 (1st Cir. 1991). “First American first argues that 29 U.S.C. § 633 (a) prevents a plaintiff from invoking state law in either state or federal court once plaintiff has elected to proceed under the ADEA, as Promisel has done.”

— 29 U.S.C. § 633(a)(c) — 1 case

Quiron v. LN Violette Co. Inc., 897 F. Supp. 18 (D. Me. 1995).

— 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) — 5 cases

Mizuguchi v. Molokai Elec. Co., 411 F. Supp. 590 (D. Haw. 1976).

Solimino v. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 715 F. Supp. 42 (E.D.N.Y 1989).

Pistillo v. Comm'r, 57 T.C.M. 874 (Tax Ct. 1989).

Lewandowski v. Teamsters Local 700 (N.D. Ill. 2020).

Goodale v. Elavon, Inc. (E.D. Tenn. 2022).

— 29 U.S.C. § 633(b)(1975) — 1 case

Perazzo v. Top Value Enter., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 428 (S.D. Ohio 1984).

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