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U.S. CodeTitle 30Chapter 15— Surface ResourcesSubchapter II— Mining Locations

30 U.S.C. § 611 (2026)

Common varieties of sand, stone, gravel, pumice, pumicite, or cinders, and petrified wood

Edition and currency
U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTU.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point) cited 1965–2022 66citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 66 opinions since 1965, 1 of them in the last five years.

No deposit of common varieties of sand, stone, gravel, pumice, pumicite, or cinders and no deposit of petrified wood shall be deemed a valuable mineral deposit within the meaning of the mining laws of the United States so as to give effective validity to any mining claim hereafter located under such mining laws: Provided, however, That nothing herein shall affect the validity of any mining location based upon discovery of some other mineral occurring in or in association with such a deposit. “Common varieties” as used in this subchapter and sections 601 and 603 of this title does not include deposits of such materials which are valuable because the deposit has some property giving it distinct and special value and does not include so-called “block pumice” which occurs in nature in pieces having one dimension of two inches or more. “Petrified wood” as used in this subchapter and sections 601 and 603 of this title means agatized, opalized, petrified, or silicified wood, or any material formed by the replacement of wood by silica or other matter.

(July 23, 1955, ch. 375, § 3, 69 Stat. 368; Pub. L. 87–713, § 1, Sept. 28, 1962, 76 Stat. 652.)
The 20 cases that cite 30 U.S.C. § 611 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENUnited States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985).
cites § 611 4×cited by 832 cases
Where it cites § 611
“In this case, however, relocation of appellees' claims, which were initially located by appellees' predecessors in 1952 and 1954, was prohibited by the Common Varieties Act of 1955, 30 U. S. C. § 611 ; that Act prospectively barred location of the sort of minerals yielded by…”
The case’s holding
Automatic forfeiture of unpatented mining claims for failure to meet statutory filing deadlines does not violate the due process clause.
Later courts cite it for
“filing deadlines, like statutes of limitations, necessarily operate harshly and arbitrarily with respect to individuals who fall just on the other side of them, but if the concept of a filing deadline is to have any content, the deadline must be enforced.” · 34 citing courts
2
GREENWatt v. W. Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36 (1983).
cites § 611 6×cited by 127 cases
Where it cites § 611
“It is also highly pertinent that federal administrative and judicial decisions over the past half-century have consistently recognized that gravel deposits could be located under the general mining laws until common varieties of gravel were prospectively removed from the purview…”
The case’s holding
Gravel is included within the scope of a mineral reservation contained in a federal patent issued under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act.
Later courts cite it for
“the determination of whether a particular substance is included in the surface estate or the mineral estate should be made in light of the use of the surface estate that congress contemplated.” · 5 citing courts
3
GREENBedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176 (2004).
cites § 611 2×cited by 536 cases
Where it cites § 611
“368 , 30 U. S. C. § 611 ("No deposit of common varieties of sand [and] gravel .”
The case’s holding
Statutory interpretation begins and ends with the text if the language is unambiguous, precluding the use of legislative history to resolve clear provisions.
Later courts cite it for
“the preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires us to 'presume that the legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” · 124 citing courts
4
GREENAndrus v. Charlestone Stone Prods. Co., 436 U.S. 604 (1978).
cites § 611 4×cited by 165 cases
Where it cites § 611
“368 , 30 U. S. C. § 611 . 3 At the administrative hearing *607 on the Secretary’s complaint, the principal issue was whether the sand and gravel deposits were “valuable” prior to the effective date of the 1955 legislation, in which case the claims would be valid.”
The case’s holding
Federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 applies to pending cases filed before the 1976 amendment to the statute.
Later courts cite it for
“nor does it matter that the complaint does not in so many words assert 1331(a) as a basis of jurisdiction, since the facts alleged in it are sufficient to establish such jurisdiction and the complaint appeared jurisdictionally correct when filed.” · 3 citing courts
5
GREENCopar Pumice Co. v. Tidwell, 603 F.3d 780 (10th Cir. 2010).
cites § 611 5×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 611
“30 U.S.C. § 611 (emphasis added). Disposal of these “common varieties” was now “permissible only under the Materials Act of 1947.”
The case’s holding
The petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that an agency action is arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Later courts cite it for
“the burden is on the petitioner to demonstrate that the action is arbitrary and capricious.” · 6 citing courts
6
GREENUnited States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599 (1968).
cites § 611 6×cited by 178 cases
Where it cites § 611
“As to the alternative “chiefly valuable for building stone” claim, the Secretary held that respondent Coleman’s quartzite deposits were a “common variet[y]” of stone within the meaning of 30 U. S. C. § 611 , 3 and thus they could not serve as the basis for a valid mining claim…”
The case’s holding
A discovery under the Mining Law of 1872 requires a showing that minerals can be extracted, removed, and marketed at a profit (marketability test).
Later courts cite it for
“extracted, removed and marketed at a profit.” · 20 citing courts
7
GREENCopar Pumice Co. v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 515 (Fed. Cl. 2013).
cites § 611 6×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 611
“§§ 22-42 , Common Varieties Act, 30 U.S.C. § 611 et seq., and Jemez National Recreation Area Act, 16 U.”
Later courts cite it for
“the affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel are also properly considered under a rcfc 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENAlyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Anderson, 629 P.2d 512 (Alaska 1981).
cites § 611 8×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 611
“'" [4] In addition to the foregoing, since the only claimed use for the slate found in Anderson's claim is as building stone, it also comes under the Common Varieties Act, 30 U.S.C.A. § 611 (West 1971). [5] This act provides that: No deposit of common varieties of sand, stone,…”
Later courts cite it for
“reckless indifference to the rights of others, and conscious action in deliberate disregard of them.” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENTanner Companies v. Arizona State Land Dep't, 688 P.2d 1075 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
cites § 611 4×cited by 28 cases
Where it cites § 611
“After July 23, 1955, the effective date of the act, these commonly occurring materials could not be the object of location and removal under the general mining laws, but would be disposed of under the Materials Act.”
The case’s holding
The statutory term common clay excludes clay possessing distinct and special value due to unique properties, and the list of common materials is not limited by use.
Later courts cite it for
“had the legislature meant to limit the common mineral materials statute . . ., it could have just said that . . . .” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENHansen Bros. Enter. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 12 Cal. 4th 533 (1996).
cites § 611 2×cited by 65 cases
Where it cites § 611
“`Common varieties' as used in this Act does not include deposits of such materials which are valuable because the deposit has some property giving it distinct and special value.”
The case’s holding
The natural and reasonable expansion of a quarry business to meet increased demand does not constitute an impermissible enlargement or change in the use of the property.
Later courts cite it for
“that the natural and reasonable expansion of a quarry business to meet increased demand is not an impermissible enlargement or change in the use of the property” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENReoforce, Inc. v. United States, 853 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
cites § 611 1×cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 611
“30 U.S.C. § 611 . Whether a mineral is valuable is determined by applying a “prudentman test.”
Later courts cite it for
“demonstrate the existence of a legally cognizable property interest,” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENPoverty Flats Land & Cattle Co. v. United States, 788 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1986).
cites § 611 6×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 611
“The term “mineral materials” does appear in 30 U.S.C. § 611 but only to situations where the Government owns the surface and the minerals.”
13
GREENCtr. for Biological Diversity v. Usfws, 33 F.4th 1202 (9th Cir. 2022).
cites § 611 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 611
“Third, later statutes—particularly environmental laws such as the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and the 12 CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. USFWS Endangered Species Act (“ESA”)—have restricted the manner in which miners with valid claims under the Mining Law can…”
Later courts cite it for
“we review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENR. W. Brubaker v. Rogers C. B. Morton, 500 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1974).
cites § 611 4×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 611
“368 , 30 U.S.C. § 611 , and was not subject to mineral filing.”
Later courts cite it for
“a court faced with a problem of statutory construction should give great deference to the interpretation of a statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration.” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENMcGlinchy v. State, Dep't of Nat. Resources, 354 P.3d 1025 (Alaska 2015).
cites § 611 5×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 611
“The parties agree that federal law controls here and we concur. . See United States v.”
Later courts cite it for
“it is well established that expert witnesses are not permitted to testify on what the law is.” · 1 citing court
16
GREENUnited States v. McPhilomy, 270 F.3d 1302 (10th Cir. 2001).
cites § 611 1×cited by 38 cases
Where it cites § 611
“” 30 U.S.C. § 611 . Moreover, “[t]he' establishment of a community pit .”
Later courts cite it for
“we reverse a decision only if it is 'manifestly erroneous.” · 1 citing court
17
GREENUnited States v. Copar Pumice Co., 714 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2013).
cites § 611 1×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 611
“However, pumice that is “valuable because [it] has some property giving it distinct and special value” is not considered common variety, and, therefore, is locatable under the General Mining Law.”
Later courts cite it for
“generally, before a writ of mandamus may issue, the petitioner must satisfy three conditions: the party seeking the writ must have no other adequate means for relief sought, the party's right to the writ must be clear and undisputable, and the issuing court must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate.” · 2 citing courts
18
REDCharlestone Stone Prods. Co. v. Cecil D. Andrus, 553 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1977).
cites § 611 2×cited by 14 cases
Reversed by Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co. (1978): the U.S. Supreme Court's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 611
“The limitation in 30 U.S.C. § 611 on the location of claims for common varieties of certain named minerals does not apply to water.”
Later courts cite it for
“that congress was not aware of the necessary glove of water for the hand of mining and that congress impliedly intended to reserve water from those minerals allowed to be located and recovered,” · 1 citing court
19
GREENUnited States v. Langley, 587 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Cal. 1984).
cites § 611 2×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 611
“In support thereof, plaintiff contended, 1) the defendant is not occupying the claim in good faith for mining purposes; 2) that defendant’s residence on the land, and other uses which he is making of the land, are not “incident to mining” as required by the Surface Resources Act…”
20
GREENAleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg'l Corp., 421 F. Supp. 862 (D. Alaska 1976).
cites § 611 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 611
“See 30 U.S.C. § 611 . The Village Corporations, therefore, would have received sand and gravel in the cases where the land was divided and these sand and gravel revenues would not have been distributed under the revenue sharing plans of those bills.”
Later courts cite it for
“(i)t is precisely this unequal distribution of resources that section 7(i) is intended to counter.” · 2 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
196519932022

One bar per year. Tallest: 5 cases in 1976. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
9th Cir.2510th Cir.8SCOTUS5Fed. Cl.5Alaska3Ariz. Ct. App.2D. Ariz.2E.D. Cal.2

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 21 courts in all.

By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

Show all 66 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments
(July 23, 1955, ch. 375, § 3, 69 Stat. 368; Pub. L. 87–713, § 1, Sept. 28, 1962, 76 Stat. 652.)
Amendment years (notes): 1962
Versions

Edition shown: U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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