42 U.S.C. § 12161

Definitions

Read at: OLRCuscode.house.gov CornellLII GovInfogovinfo.gov JustiaTitle 42 CasesGoogle Scholar

As used in this subpart:(1) Commuter authority

The term “commuter authority” has the meaning given such term in section 24102(4) 11 See References in Text note below. of title 49.

(2) Commuter rail transportation

The term “commuter rail transportation” has the meaning given the term “commuter rail passenger transportation” in section 24102(5) ¹ of title 49.

(3) Intercity rail transportation

The term “intercity rail transportation” means transportation provided by the National Railroad Passenger Corporation.

(4) Rail passenger car

The term “rail passenger car” means, with respect to intercity rail transportation, single-level and bi-level coach cars, single-level and bi-level dining cars, single-level and bi-level sleeping cars, single-level and bi-level lounge cars, and food service cars.

(5) Responsible personThe term “responsible person” means—(A) in the case of a station more than 50 percent of which is owned by a public entity, such public entity;(B) in the case of a station more than 50 percent of which is owned by a private party, the persons providing intercity or commuter rail transportation to such station, as allocated on an equitable basis by regulation by the Secretary of Transportation; and(C) in a case where no party owns more than 50 percent of a station, the persons providing intercity or commuter rail transportation to such station and the owners of the station, other than private party owners, as allocated on an equitable basis by regulation by the Secretary of Transportation.(6) Station

The term “station” means the portion of a property located appurtenant to a right-of-way on which intercity or commuter rail transportation is operated, where such portion is used by the general public and is related to the provision of such transportation, including passenger platforms, designated waiting areas, ticketing areas, restrooms, and, where a public entity providing rail transportation owns the property, concession areas, to the extent that such public entity exercises control over the selection, design, construction, or alteration of the property, but such term does not include flag stops.

(Pub. L. 101–336, title II, § 241, July 26, 1990, 104 Stat. 346; Pub. L. 104–287, § 6(k), Oct. 11, 1996, 110 Stat. 3400.)Editorial NotesReferences in Text

Section 24102 of title 49, referred to in pars. (1) and (2), was subsequently amended, and pars. (4) and (5) of section 24102 no longer define “commuter authority” and “commuter rail passenger transportation”, respectively. However, such terms are defined elsewhere in that section.

Codification

In pars. (1) and (2), “section 24102(4) of title 49” substituted for “section 103(8) of the Rail Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C. 502(8))” and “section 24102(5) of title 49” substituted for “section 103(9) of the Rail Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C. 502(9))” on authority of Pub. L. 103–272, § 6(b), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 1378, the first section of which enacted subtitles II, III, and V to X of Title 49, Transportation.

Amendments

1996—Par. (2). Pub. L. 104–287 substituted “commuter rail passenger transportation” for “commuter service”.

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date

Pub. L. 101–336, title II, § 246, July 26, 1990, 104 Stat. 353, provided that:“(a)General Rule.—Except as provided in subsection (b), this part [part II (§§ 241–246) of subtitle B of title II of Pub. L. 101–336, enacting this subpart] shall become effective 18 months after the date of enactment of this Act [July 26, 1990].“(b)Exception.—Sections 242 and 244 [sections 12162 and 12164 of this title] shall become effective on the date of enactment of this Act.”

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 6 cases, 1998–2019 · leading case: Derrick F. v. Red Lion Area Sch. Dist., 586 F. Supp. 2d 282 (M.D. Penn. 2008).

Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment

Derrick F. v. Red Lion Area Sch. Dist., 586 F. Supp. 2d 282 (M.D. Penn. 2008). · cites it 2× “§ 792 , and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12161 , respectively, by intentionally and willfully denying Plaintiff the benefits of a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) based solely on Plaintiffs disability.”

Sturm v. Bd. of Educ. of Kanawha Cnty., 672 S.E.2d 606 (W. Va. 2008). “§ 728 ; the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12161 et seq.; and 42 U.S.C.”

Montez v. Romer, 32 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (D. Colo. 1999). “§§ 12141 to 12150 and 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12161 to 12165. 2 . Although the Eleventh Amendment bars certain types of relief against the individual defendants sued in their official capacities, the Disability Act expressly waives the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.”

Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 69 F. Supp. 3d 830 (N.D. Ill. 2014). “”); 42 U.S.C. § 12161 (1)(A) (“The term ‘public entity’ means any State or local government.”

Wray v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (E.D. Wis. 1998). “The Plaintiffs’ ADA Claim This is a relatively unusual type of ADA case because it involves a claim of discrimination against Amtrak in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12161 et. seq. The claim falls under Title II, Part B, subpart II, and Title IV of the ADA, which prohibit…”

Andrews v. Good (M.D.N.C. 2019). “(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12161 (1)(A) in finding that “[t]he term ‘public entity’ means any State or local government”).”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.