42 U.S.C. § 1803

PROTECTION OF CERTAIN EXISTING RATES.

Read at: OLRCuscode.house.gov CornellLII GovInfogovinfo.gov JustiaTitle 42 CasesGoogle Scholar

“(a)Rates Deemed Just and Reasonable.—Except as provided in subsection (b)—“(1) any rate in effect for the 365-day period ending on the date of the enactment of this Act [Oct. 24, 1992] shall be deemed to be just and reasonable (within the meaning of section 1(5) of the Interstate Commerce Act [former 49 U.S.C. 1(5)]); and“(2) any rate in effect on the 365th day preceding the date of such enactment shall be deemed to be just and reasonable (within the meaning of such section 1(5)) regardless of whether or not, with respect to such rate, a new rate has been filed with the Commission during such 365-day period;if the rate in effect, as described in paragraph (1) or (2), has not been subject to protest, investigation, or complaint during such 365-day period.“(b)Changed Circumstances.—No person may file a complaint under section 13 of the Interstate Commerce Act [former 49 U.S.C. 13] against a rate deemed to be just and reasonable under subsection (a) unless—“(1) evidence is presented to the Commission which establishes that a substantial change has occurred after the date of the enactment of this Act [Oct. 24, 1992]—“(A) in the economic circumstances of the oil pipeline which were a basis for the rate; or“(B) in the nature of the services provided which were a basis for the rate; or“(2) the person filing the complaint was under a contractual prohibition against the filing of a complaint which was in effect on the date of enactment of this Act and had been in effect prior to January 1, 1991, provided that a complaint by a party bound by such prohibition is brought within 30 days after the expiration of such prohibition.If the Commission determines pursuant to a proceeding instituted as a result of a complaint under section 13 of the Interstate Commerce Act that the rate is not just and reasonable, the rate shall not be deemed to be just and reasonable. Any tariff reduction or refunds that may result as an outcome of such a complaint shall be prospective from the date of the filing of the complaint.“(c)Limitation Regarding Unduly Discriminatory or Preferential Tariffs.—Nothing in this section shall prohibit any aggrieved person from filing a complaint under section 13 or section 15(l) of the Interstate Commerce Act [former 49 U.S.C. 13, 15(1)] challenging any tariff provision as unduly discriminatory or unduly preferential.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 3 cases, 2014–2014 · leading case: Am. Council of Life Insurers v. Dist. of Columbia Health Benefit Exch. Auth., 73 F. Supp. 3d 65 (D.D.C. 2014).

Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment

Am. Council of Life Insurers v. Dist. of Columbia Health Benefit Exch. Auth., 73 F. Supp. 3d 65 (D.D.C. 2014). “The plaintiff relies on Section 1311(d)(5)(A) of the ACA, 42 U.S.C. § 1803 (d)(5)(A), together with the interpretation of the ACA by the U.”

King v. Sebelius, 997 F. Supp. 2d 415 (E.D. Va. 2014). “§ 18031 (d)(4)(G) (regarding the creation of an electronic calculator to determine compare the cost of different coverage options); 42 U.S.C. § 1803 l(d)(4)(I) (regarding information transmission to the IRS); 42 U.”

St. Louis Effort for Aids v. Huff, 996 F. Supp. 2d 798 (W.D. Mo. 2014). “Defendant counters that the general standards for Federal Navigators set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1803 (i)(2) do not preclude insurance agents or companies from being Federal Navigators — but Defendant never addresses the statutory provision Plaintiffs cite.”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.