42 U.S.C. § 5106g

Definitions

Read at: OLRCuscode.house.gov CornellLII GovInfogovinfo.gov JustiaTitle 42 CasesGoogle Scholar
(a) DefinitionsFor purposes of this subchapter—(1) the term “Alaska Native” has the meaning given the term “Native” in section 1602 of title 43;(2) the term “infant or toddler with a disability” has the meaning given the term in section 1432 of title 20;(3) the term “Native Hawaiian” has the meaning given the term in section 7517 of title 20;(4) the term “sexual abuse” includes—(A) the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of any child to engage in, or assist any other person to engage in, any sexually explicit conduct or simulation of such conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such conduct; or(B) the rape, and in cases of caretaker or inter-familial relationships, statutory rape, molestation, prostitution, or other form of sexual exploitation of children, or incest with children; and(5) the term “withholding of medically indicated treatment” means the failure to respond to the infant’s life-threatening conditions by providing treatment (including appropriate nutrition, hydration, and medication) which, in the treating physician’s or physicians’ reasonable medical judgment, will be most likely to be effective in ameliorating or correcting all such conditions, except that the term does not include the failure to provide treatment (other than appropriate nutrition, hydration, or medication) to an infant when, in the treating physician’s or physicians’ reasonable medical judgment—(A) the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose;(B) the provision of such treatment would—(i) merely prolong dying;(ii) not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the infant’s life-threatening conditions; or(iii) otherwise be futile in terms of the survival of the infant; or(C) the provision of such treatment would be virtually futile in terms of the survival of the infant and the treatment itself under such circumstances would be inhumane.(b) Special rule(1) In general

For purposes of section 3(2) 11 See References in Text note below. and subsection (a)(4), a child shall be considered a victim of “child abuse and neglect” and of “sexual abuse” if the child is identified, by a State or local agency employee of the State or locality involved, as being a victim of human trafficking.

(2) State option

Notwithstanding the definition of “child” in section 3(1),1 a State may elect to define that term for purposes of the application of paragraph (1) to section 3(2) 1 and subsection (a)(4) as a person who has not attained the age of 24.

(Pub. L. 93–247, title I, § 111, formerly § 14, as added Pub. L. 100–294, title I, § 101, Apr. 25, 1988, 102 Stat. 116; renumbered title I, § 113, and amended Pub. L. 101–126, § 3(a)(1), (2), (b)(7), Oct. 25, 1989, 103 Stat. 764, 765; renumbered § 111 and amended Pub. L. 104–235, title I, §§ 110, 113(a)(1)(B), Oct. 3, 1996, 110 Stat. 3078, 3079; Pub. L. 111–320, title I, §§ 119, 142(b), Dec. 20, 2010, 124 Stat. 3477, 3483; Pub. L. 114–22, title VIII, § 802(c)(1), (3), May 29, 2015, 129 Stat. 264; Pub. L. 114–95, title IX, § 9215(o), Dec. 10, 2015, 129 Stat. 2170; Pub. L. 117–348, title I, § 133, Jan. 5, 2023, 136 Stat. 6221.)Editorial NotesReferences in Text

Section 3, referred to in subsec. (b), means section 3 of Pub. L. 93–247, which is set out as a Definitions note under section 5101 of this title.

Prior Provisions

A prior section 111 of Pub. L. 93–247 was renumbered section 109 and is classified to section 5106e of this title.

Amendments

2023—Subsec. (b)(1). Pub. L. 117–348 substituted “a victim of ‘child abuse and neglect’ and of ‘sexual abuse’ if the child is identified, by a State or local agency employee of the State or locality involved, as being a victim of human trafficking.” for “a victim of ‘child abuse and neglect’ and of ‘sexual abuse’ if the child is identified, by a State or local agency employee of the State or locality involved, as being a victim of sex trafficking (as defined in paragraph (10) of section 7102 of title 22) or a victim of severe forms of trafficking in persons described in paragraph (9)(A) of that section.”

2015—Pub. L. 114–22, § 802(c)(1), designated existing provisions as subsec. (a) and inserted heading and added subsec. (b).

Subsec. (a)(5)(C). Pub. L. 114–22, § 802(c)(3), substituted period for semicolon at end.

Par. (3). Pub. L. 114–95 made technical amendment to reference in original act which appears in text as reference to section 7517 of title 20.

2010—Pars. (1), (2). Pub. L. 111–320, § 142(b)(1), (2), redesignated pars. (7) and (8) as (1) and (2), respectively, and struck out former pars. (1) and (2) which read as follows:

“(1) the term ‘child’ means a person who has not attained the lesser of—

“(A) the age of 18; or

“(B) except in the case of sexual abuse, the age specified by the child protection law of the State in which the child resides;

“(2) the term ‘child abuse and neglect’ means, at a minimum, any recent act or failure to act on the part of a parent or caretaker, which results in death, serious physical or emotional harm, sexual abuse or exploitation, or an act or failure to act which presents an imminent risk of serious harm;”.

Par. (3). Pub. L. 111–320, § 142(b)(1)–(3), redesignated par. (10) as (3), struck out “and” at end, and struck out former par. (3) which read as follows: “the term ‘Secretary’ means the Secretary of Health and Human Services;”.

Par. (4)(B). Pub. L. 111–320, § 142(b)(4), inserted “and” after semicolon at end.

Par. (5). Pub. L. 111–320, § 142(b)(1), (5), redesignated par. (6) as (5) and struck out former par. (5) which read as follows: “except as provided in section 5106a(f) of this title, the term ‘State’ means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,;”.

Pub. L. 111–320, § 119(1), inserted “except as provided in section 5106a(f) of this title,” after “(5)”, inserted “and” after “Samoa,”, and struck out “and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands” after “Northern Mariana Islands,”.

Par. (6). Pub. L. 111–320, § 142(b)(5), redesignated par. (6) as (5).

Par. (6)(C). Pub. L. 111–320, § 119(2), substituted a semicolon for period at end.

Pars. (7) to (11). Pub. L. 111–320, § 142(b)(1), (2), redesignated pars. (7), (8), and (10) as (1), (2), and (3), respectively, and struck out pars. (9) and (11) which read as follows:

“(9) the terms ‘Indian’, ‘Indian tribe’, and ‘tribal organization’ have the meanings given the terms in section 450b of title 25;”

“(11) the term ‘unaccompanied homeless youth’ means an individual who is described in paragraphs (2) and (6) of section 11434a of this title.”

Pub. L. 111–320, § 119(3), added pars. (7) to (11).

1996—Par. (1). Pub. L. 104–235, § 110(1), (2)(A), redesignated par. (3) as (1) and struck out former par. (1) which read as follows: “the term ‘board’ means the Advisory Board on Child Abuse and Neglect established under section 5102 of this title;”.

Par. (2). Pub. L. 104–235, § 110(2)(A), (3), redesignated par. (4) as (2) and amended it generally. Prior to amendment, par. (2) read as follows: “the term ‘child abuse and neglect’ means the physical or mental injury, sexual abuse or exploitation, negligent treatment, or maltreatment of a child by a person who is responsible for the child’s welfare, under circumstances which indicate that the child’s health or welfare is harmed or threatened thereby, as determined in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary;”.

Pub. L. 104–235, § 110(1) struck out par. (2) which read as follows: “the term ‘Center’ means the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect established under section 5101 of this title;”.

Par. (3). Pub. L. 104–235, § 110(2)(A), redesignated par. (6) as (3). Former par. (3) redesignated (1).

Par. (4). Pub. L. 104–235, § 110(2)(A), (4), redesignated par. (7) as (4) and in subpar. (B) inserted “, and in cases of caretaker or inter-familial relationships, statutory rape” after “rape”. Former par. (4) redesignated (2).

Par. (5). Pub. L. 104–235, § 110(1), (2)(A), redesignated par. (8) as (5) and struck out former par. (5) which read as follows: “the term ‘person who is responsible for the child’s welfare’ includes—

“(A) any employee of a residential facility; and

“(B) any staff person providing out-of-home care;”.

Par. (6). Pub. L. 104–235, § 110(2)(B), redesignated par. (10) as (6). Former par. (6) redesignated (3).

Pars. (7), (8). Pub. L. 104–235, § 110(2)(A), redesignated pars. (7) and (8) as (4) and (5), respectively.

Par. (9). Pub. L. 104–235, § 110(1), struck out par. (9) which read as follows: “the term ‘task force’ means the Inter-Agency Task Force on Child Abuse and Neglect established under section 5103 of this title; and”.

Par. (10). Pub. L. 104–235, § 110(2)(B), redesignated par. (10) as (6).

1989—Pub. L. 101–126, § 3(b)(7)(A), made technical amendment to reference to this subchapter to reflect the insertion of title designations in the original act.

Pars. (1), (2), (9). Pub. L. 101–126, § 3(b)(7)(B)–(D), made technical amendments to references to sections 5101, 5102, and 5103 of this title to reflect renumbering of corresponding sections of original act.

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date of 2015 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 114–95 effective Dec. 10, 2015, except with respect to certain noncompetitive programs and competitive programs, see section 5 of Pub. L. 114–95, set out as a note under section 6301 of Title 20, Education.

Amendment by Pub. L. 114–22 effective 2 years after May 29, 2015, see section 802(a) of Pub. L. 114–22, set out as a note under section 5106a of this title.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 15 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1989–2026 · leading case: Jane Doe, a Minor Child, by Next Friend, Leslie G. Fein v. Dist. of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Jane Doe, a Minor Child, by Next Friend, Leslie G. Fein v. Dist. of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1996). · cites it 2× “42 U.S.C. § 5106g(8) (1994). . Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, Dissent at 879-80, we do not read § 5016a(b)(2) as a requirement for inclusion in a plan, nor do we read it as an independent directive.”
Ibarra v. Holder, Jr., 736 F.3d 903 (10th Cir. 2013). “§ 3202 (3) (1994) (relating to child abuse in Indian country); 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(4) (1994) (CAPTA) (defining "sexual abuse” for reporting purposes); see list of 38 states’ reporting and child welfare laws cited in Soram, 25 I.”
Josephine B. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Off. of Child.'s Servs., 174 P.3d 217 (Alaska 2008). “See also Minutes of the House Judiciary Committee hearing on HB 375, *221 April 23, 1998, testimony of Lisa Torkelson, Legislative Assistant to Representative Fred Dyson (Tape 98-66, Side B) (" '[Elmotional harm' in the original version was a new term, with a new definition.”
Ariel Marcelo Bastias v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 42 F.4th 1266 (11th Cir. 2022). “at 510–11 (citing, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(4) (1994), and 42 U.S.C.”
Stewart-Graves v. Vaughn, 162 Wash. 2d 115 (Wash. 2007). “” 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(6)(C). The implementing regulations provide that nontreatment may not be based on “subjective opinions about future ‘quality of life’ of a .”
Stewart-Graves v. Vaughn, 170 P.3d 1151 (Wash. 2007). “" 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(6)(c). The implementing regulations provide that nontreatment may not be based on "subjective opinions about future `quality of life' of a .”
HCA, INC. v. Miller Ex Rel. Miller, 36 S.W.3d 187 (Tex. App. 2000). · cites it 2× “e., that: (1) she was chronically and irreversibly comatose, (2) the provision of treatment would not have merely prolonged her dying, or (3) the provision of treatment would not have been effective in ameliorating or correcting all of Sydney's life threatening conditions.”
In re Doe, 564 A.2d 433 (N.H. 1989). “1988) (child protective investigation must include “a determination of harm or threatened harm to each child”); see also 42 U.S.C.A § 5106g(4) (West Supp. 1988) (federal definition of child abuse includes physical injury inflicted “under circumstances which indicate that the…”
Sotero Rivera-Mendoza v. Todd Blanche (9th Cir. 2026). · cites it 3× “BLANCHE the statute’s structure “clearly evinces Congress’s intent that ‘a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment’ should be read as a single category that encompasses the entire phrase.”
Rafael Diaz-rodriguez v. Merrick Garland (9th Cir. 2022). · cites it 2× “” 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(4) (1996). Regulations implementing CAPTA further defined the term “negligent treatment or maltreatment” to “include[] failure to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care,” 45 C.”
Ariel Marcelo Bastias v. U.S. Attorney Gen. (11th Cir. 2022). “at 510–11 (citing, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(4) (1994), and 42 U.S.C.”
Williams v. Messa (E.D. Cal. 2022). “§ 4101 , 42 U.S.C. § 5106g, 18 U.S.C. § 1503 , 18 U.”
— 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(2) — 2 cases
Josephine B. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Off. of Child.'s Servs., 174 P.3d 217 (Alaska 2008). “See also Minutes of the House Judiciary Committee hearing on HB 375, *221 April 23, 1998, testimony of Lisa Torkelson, Legislative Assistant to Representative Fred Dyson (Tape 98-66, Side B) (" '[Elmotional harm' in the original version was a new term, with a new definition.”
Freedom From Religion Fndtn v., 2008 DNH 141 (D.N.H. 2008).
— 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(4) — 7 cases
Ibarra v. Holder, Jr., 736 F.3d 903 (10th Cir. 2013). “§ 3202 (3) (1994) (relating to child abuse in Indian country); 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(4) (1994) (CAPTA) (defining "sexual abuse” for reporting purposes); see list of 38 states’ reporting and child welfare laws cited in Soram, 25 I.”
Ariel Marcelo Bastias v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 42 F.4th 1266 (11th Cir. 2022). “at 510–11 (citing, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(4) (1994), and 42 U.S.C.”
In re Doe, 564 A.2d 433 (N.H. 1989). “1988) (child protective investigation must include “a determination of harm or threatened harm to each child”); see also 42 U.S.C.A § 5106g(4) (West Supp. 1988) (federal definition of child abuse includes physical injury inflicted “under circumstances which indicate that the…”
Sotero Rivera-Mendoza v. Todd Blanche (9th Cir. 2026). “BLANCHE the statute’s structure “clearly evinces Congress’s intent that ‘a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment’ should be read as a single category that encompasses the entire phrase.”
Rafael Diaz-rodriguez v. Merrick Garland (9th Cir. 2022). “” 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(4) (1996). Regulations implementing CAPTA further defined the term “negligent treatment or maltreatment” to “include[] failure to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care,” 45 C.”
— 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(6) — 1 case
HCA, INC. v. Miller Ex Rel. Miller, 36 S.W.3d 187 (Tex. App. 2000). “e., that: (1) she was chronically and irreversibly comatose, (2) the provision of treatment would not have merely prolonged her dying, or (3) the provision of treatment would not have been effective in ameliorating or correcting all of Sydney's life threatening conditions.”
— 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(6)(C) — 1 case
Stewart-Graves v. Vaughn, 162 Wash. 2d 115 (Wash. 2007). “” 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(6)(C). The implementing regulations provide that nontreatment may not be based on “subjective opinions about future ‘quality of life’ of a .”
— 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(6)(c) — 1 case
Stewart-Graves v. Vaughn, 170 P.3d 1151 (Wash. 2007). “" 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(6)(c). The implementing regulations provide that nontreatment may not be based on "subjective opinions about future `quality of life' of a .”
— 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(8) — 1 case
Jane Doe, a Minor Child, by Next Friend, Leslie G. Fein v. Dist. of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1996). “42 U.S.C. § 5106g(8) (1994). . Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, Dissent at 879-80, we do not read § 5016a(b)(2) as a requirement for inclusion in a plan, nor do we read it as an independent directive.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.