46 U.S.C. § 10101

Definitions

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In this part—(1) “master” means the individual having command of a vessel.(2) “owner” means the person to whom the vessel belongs.(3) “seaman” means an individual (except scientific personnel, a sailing school instructor, or a sailing school student) engaged or employed in any capacity on board a vessel.(4) “fishing vessel” includes—(A) a fish tender vessel; or(B) a fish processing vessel entered into service before January 1, 1988, and not more than 1,600 gross tons as measured under section 14502 of this title, or an alternate tonnage measured under section 14302 of this title as prescribed by the Secretary under section 14104 of this title or entered into service after December 31, 1987, and having not more than 16 individuals on board primarily employed in the preparation of fish or fish products.(Pub. L. 98–89, Aug. 26, 1983, 97 Stat. 560; Pub. L. 98–364, title IV, § 402(13), July 17, 1984, 98 Stat. 449; Pub. L. 98–557, § 33(d), Oct. 30, 1984, 98 Stat. 2876; Pub. L. 99–640, § 10(b)(3), Nov. 10, 1986, 100 Stat. 3550; Pub. L. 104–324, title VII, § 736, Oct. 19, 1996, 110 Stat. 3941.)

Historical and Revision Notes

Revised section

Source section (U.S. Code)

10101

46:713

Section 10101 defines the terms master, seaman, and owner as they apply to merchant seamen’s protection and relief.

Editorial NotesAmendments

1996—Par. (4)(B). Pub. L. 104–324 inserted “as measured under section 14502 of this title, or an alternate tonnage measured under section 14302 of this title as prescribed by the Secretary under section 14104 of this title” after “1,600 gross tons”.

1986—Pars. (1), (3). Pub. L. 99–640 struck out “owned by a citizen of the United States” after “vessel”.

1984—Par. (4). Pub. L. 98–364, as amended Pub. L. 98–557, added par. (4).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 28 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1989–2025 · leading case: Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438 (2001).
Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438 (2001). “The Act allows a vessel owner to limit liability for damage or injury, occasioned without the owner’s privity or knowledge, to the value of the vessel or the owner’s interest in the vessel.”
Bjornsson v. U.S. Dominator, Inc., 863 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1993). · cites it 4× “The plain language of 46 U.S.C. § 10101 indicates that lay share fishermen are “seamen” as defined in this part of the code.”
Bolanos v. Norwegian Cruise Lines Ltd., 212 F.R.D. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). “statu *151 tory law and the general maritime law,” is a violation of 46 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq. (Am. Compl. 1111103-04.”
Doyle v. Huntress, Inc., 419 F.3d 3 (1st Cir. 2005). “” 46 U.S.C. § 10101 (3). This definition appears to encompass fishermen.”
McAller v. Smith, 57 F.3d 109 (1st Cir. 1995). · cites it 2× “§ 10101 (1) (defining “master” as “the individual having command of a vessel”); 46 U.S.C. § 10101 (2) (defining “owner” as “the person to whom the vessel belongs”).”
Helen Ehret Bach, Eugene G. Bach, Iii, Janet B. Lashley v. Trident S.S. Co., Inc., 920 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1991). “46 U.S.C. § 10101 . 30 The legislative history of the Jones Act is scarce indeed.”
Doyle v. Huntress, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 2d 135 (D.R.I. 2004). “The definition section of Part G, 46 U.S.C. § 10101 (1996), defines the term “seaman” as “an individual (except scientific personnel, a sailing school instructor, or a sailing school student) engaged or employed in any capacity on board a vessel.”
Evans v. United Arab Shipping Co. S.A.G., 4 F.3d 207 (3rd Cir. 1993). · cites it 2× “" 46 U.S.C.A. § 10101 (West Supp.1993, Partial Revision).”
Kaluom v. Stolt Offshore, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 866 (S.D. Tex. 2007). “” 46 U.S.C. § 10101 (1). While this evidence is by no means definitive regarding the true nature of the charter agreement, it presents enough of an issue of material fact to survive summary judgment.”
Smith v. Tidewater Inc., 918 So. 2d 1 (La. Ct. App. 2005). “The most general objection of the union representatives was regarding the replacement of specific legal inspection standards with increased regulatory authority for the Coast Guard.”
Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass'n v. Aubry, 918 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1990). “See 46 U.S.C. § 10101 (3); Norris, The Law of Seamen, §§ 2.”
Smith v. Seaport Marine, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (S.D. Ala. 2013). · cites it 2× “In light of these compelling arguments, considered individually and collectively, the Court rejects Seaport’s legally unfounded contention that § 11109 is confined to the context of a fishing vessel or fish processing vessel, but instead finds it applicable to all seamen, as…”
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