U.S. Code » Title 49 » Subtitle SUBTITLE VI— MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRIVER PROGRAMS › Part PART C— INFORMATION, STANDARDS, AND REQUIREMENTS › Chapter CHAPTER 329— AUTOMOBILE FUEL ECONOMY

49 U.S.C. § 32919

Preemption

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(a)General.—When an average fuel economy standard prescribed under this chapter is in effect, a State or a political subdivision of a State may not adopt or enforce a law or regulation related to fuel economy standards or average fuel economy standards for automobiles covered by an average fuel economy standard under this chapter.(b)Requirements Must Be Identical.—When a requirement under section 32908 of this title is in effect, a State or a political subdivision of a State may adopt or enforce a law or regulation on disclosure of fuel economy or fuel operating costs for an automobile covered by section 32908 only if the law or regulation is identical to that requirement.(c)State and Political Subdivision Automobiles.—A State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe requirements for fuel economy for automobiles obtained for its own use.(Pub. L. 103–272, § 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 1075, § 32918; renumbered § 32919, Pub. L. 103–429, § 6(43)(A), Oct. 31, 1994, 108 Stat. 4382.)

Historical and Revision Notes

Revised

Section

Source (U.S. Code)

Source (Statutes at Large)

32918

15:2009.

Oct. 20, 1972, Pub. L. 92–513, 86 Stat. 947, § 509; added Dec. 22, 1975, Pub. L. 94–163, § 301, 89 Stat. 914.

In subsection (a), the word “prescribed” is substituted for “established” for consistency.

Editorial NotesAmendments

1994—Pub. L. 103–429 renumbered section 32918 of this title as this section.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 16 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 2006–2023 · leading case: Paduano v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 169 Cal. App. 4th 1453 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
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Paduano v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 169 Cal. App. 4th 1453 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 9× “As we stated earlier, the “average fuel economy standard” is defined as “a performance standard [prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation] specifying a minimum level of average fuel economy applicable to a manufacturer in a model year.”
Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 615 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2010). · cites it 5× “The district court held that the new rules likely related to fuel economy standards and new vehicle emissions and were thus preempted under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (“EPCA”), 49 U.S.C. § 32919 (a), and the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), 42 U.”
Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007). · cites it 5× “49 U.S.C. § 32919 (a). Because there is a relationship between decreasing carbon dioxide emission from the tailpipe of a motor vehicle and increasing its fuel economy, Plaintiffs challenged Vermont’s regulations as preempted by EPCA, among other contentions.”
Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 633 F. Supp. 2d 83 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). · cites it 5× “49 U.S.C. § 32919 (a) (emphasis added). This language is quite clear: “Congress’s undoubted intent was to make the setting of fuel economy standards exclusively a federal concern.”
Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (E.D. Cal. 2006). · cites it 4× “49 U.S.C. § 32919 . D. This Lawsuit On December 7, 2004, Plaintiffs 4 filed suit against Catherine E.”
Galper v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 802 F.3d 437 (2d Cir. 2015). “at 156 (quoting the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 32919 (a)). We concluded there that the breadth of "relating to” preemption under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act was akin to the broad scope applied in cases arising under the Employee Retirement Income…”
Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (E.D. Cal. 2007). · cites it 5× “49 U.S.C. § 32919 . Unlike the Clean Air Act, EPCA provides no waiver mechanism for its preemptive effect that would allow California or any other state to adopt a regulation relating to fuel economy standards.”
Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of S. Portland, 288 F. Supp. 3d 321 (D. Me. 2017). “49 U.S.C. § 32919 ("When an average fuel economy standard prescribed under this chapter [ *430 49 U.”
Lincoln-Dodge, Inc. v. Sullivan, 588 F. Supp. 2d 224 (D.R.I. 2008). “49 U.S.C. § 32919 (a). Unlike the CAA, EPCA does not contain a waiver provision.”
Yung Kim v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2015). · cites it 7× “) GM argues that such requirements are “expressly preempted by 49 U.S.C. § 32919 and, separately, conflict with the ‘no warranty’ provisions of 49 U.”
Hurst v. BMW of North Am. LLC, No. 2:22-cv-03928 (D.N.J. July 26, 2023). · cites it 3× “) To the extent Plaintiff argues that Defendant was required to list a lower, “real-world” driving range on the window sticker, that claim is also expressly preempted by 49 U.S.C. § 32919 , which provides that “a State .”
Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, No. 09-2901 (2d Cir. July 27, 2010). · cites it 5× “The district court held that the new rules 22 likely related to fuel economy standards and new vehicle 23 emissions and were thus preempted under the Energy Policy and 24 Conservation Act (“EPCA”), 49 U.S.C. § 32919 (a), and the Clean 25 Air Act (“CAA”), 42 U.”
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