In the case of every felony, every principal in the second degree and every accessory before the fact may be indicted, tried, convicted and punished in all respects as if a principal in the first degree; provided, however, that except in the case of a killing for hire under the provisions of subdivision A 2 of § 18.2-31 or a killing pursuant to the direction or order of one who is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise under the provisions of subdivision A 10 of § 18.2-31 or a killing pursuant to the direction or order of one who is engaged in the commission of or attempted commission of an act of terrorism under the provisions of subdivision A 13 of § 18.2-31, an accessory before the fact or principal in the second degree to an aggravated murder shall be indicted, tried, convicted and punished as though the offense were murder in the first degree.
Code 1950, § 18.1-11; 1960, c. 358; 1975, cc. 14, 15; 1977, c. 478; 1997, c. 313; 2002, cc. 588, 623; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344, 345.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
150
cases (
26 in the last 5 years), 1975–2026 · leading case:
Muhammad v. Com., 619 S.E.2d 16 (Va. 2005).
Muhammad v. Com., 619 S.E.2d 16 (Va. 2005).
· cites it 30× “" Code § 18.2-18. Accordingly, pursuant to the charge of capital murder based upon killing of two or more persons within a three-year period, the Commonwealth *34 must prove that Muhammad was a principal in the first degree.”
Hancock v. Commonwealth, 407 S.E.2d 301 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
· cites it 48× “He also assigns several errors to his attempted capital murder convictions: (1) that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a principal in the first degree to the arson and, therefore, because Code § 18.2-18 mandates that only a principal in the…”
Schwartz v. Commonwealth, 611 S.E.2d 631 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 22× “This conclusion is also compelled by the plain language of Code § 18.2-18, which provides, in pertinent part, that “every accessory before the fact may be indicted, tried, convicted and punished in all respects as if a principal in the first degree.”
Sutton v. Commonwealth, 324 S.E.2d 665 (Va. 1985).
· cites it 12× “We hold that the evidence is sufficient to affirm Raymond's conviction of rape.”
Andrews v. Com., 699 S.E.2d 237 (Va. 2010).
· cites it 6× “" Returning to the issue a final time on the next day of trial shortly before the jury was instructed, Andrews' counsel contended that the "judicial notice" that the Commonwealth had requested during the trial was in conflict with Code § 18.2-18, which requires that a principal…”
Cheng v. Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d 599 (Va. 1990).
· cites it 4× “Code § 18.2-18 (emphasis added). The Commonwealth has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that one accused of capital murder was the actual perpetrator of the crime.”
Dalton v. Commonwealth, 512 S.E.2d 142 (Va. Ct. App. 1999).
· cites it 16× “Code § 18.2-18 provides: "[I]n the case of every felony, every principal in the second degree and every accessory before the fact may be indicted, tried, convicted and punished in all respects as if a principal in the first degree.”
Taylor v. Commonwealth, 537 S.E.2d 592 (Va. 2000).
· cites it 8× “2-47 as a principal in the second degree, Code § 18.2-18. She was sentenced to eight years' confinement, suspended except for time served prior to sentencing.”
Coppola v. Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d 797 (Va. 1979).
· cites it 4× “2-31, as qualified by Code § 18.2-18. 4 Johnson v. Commonwealth, 220 Va.”
McMorris v. Com., 666 S.E.2d 348 (Va. 2008).
· cites it 4× “See Code § 18.2-18. The trial court stated, "While [McMorris and others] were attacking Mr.”
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