Virginia Code

Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-159 (2026)

Mandatory release on parole

✓ current as of May 2026
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Every person who is sentenced and committed under the laws of the Commonwealth to the Department of Corrections or as provided for in §§ 19.2-308.1, 53.1-152 or § 53.1-153 shall be released on parole by the Virginia Parole Board six months prior to his date of final release. Each person so sentenced or committed, however, shall serve a minimum of three months of his sentence prior to such a release. Persons who are so released on parole shall be subject to a minimum of six months' supervision and an additional period of parole ending on the date upon which the parolee would have served the maximum term of confinement, or any period the Board otherwise deems appropriate in accordance with § 53.1-156. Such persons shall also be subject, for the entire period of parole fixed by the Board, to such terms and conditions prescribed by the Board in accordance with § 53.1-157.

Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, if within thirty days of a release scheduled pursuant to this section, new information is presented to the Board which gives the Board reasonable cause to believe that the release poses a clear and present danger to the life or physical safety of any person, the Board may delay the release for up to six months to investigate the matter and to refer it to law-enforcement, mental health or other appropriate authorities for investigation and any other appropriate action by such authorities.

No person released on parole pursuant to § 53.1-136, and whose parole is subsequently revoked, shall be released on parole pursuant to this section until at least six months have elapsed from the date of the decision revoking his parole. No person released on parole pursuant to this section, whose parole is subsequently revoked, shall thereafter be released on parole pursuant to this section. Final discharge may be extended to require the prisoner to serve the full portion of the term imposed by the sentencing court which was unexpired when the prisoner was released on parole.

For purposes of this section, (i) "maximum term of confinement" means the maximum term of incarceration established by law as punishment for the offense, (ii) "mandatory release date" means that date which is six months prior to the scheduled date of release and takes into consideration good conduct credits, and (iii) "final discharge" and "discharge from parole" mean that a prisoner is released from confinement having satisfied the full term imposed by the sentencing court without regard to good conduct credit. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to create a right or entitlement to parole.

Code 1950, § 53-251.3; 1979, c. 415; 1981, cc. 20, 392; 1982, c. 636; 1985, c. 175; 1987, c. 668; 1991, c. 410; 1994, c. 894.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 24 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1991–2026 · leading case: Townes v. Jarvis, 577 F.3d 543 (4th Cir. 2009).
Townes v. Jarvis, 577 F.3d 543 (4th Cir. 2009). · cites it 3× “While this appeal was pending, Virginia released Townes from prison on mandatory parole pursuant to Va.Code Ann. § 53.1-159 (2005). In addition to the conditions imposed by his parole, Townes must also serve a period of probation administered by the state courts.”
Jack Randall Young v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 830 S.E.2d 68 (Va. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 2× “See generally Code § 53.1-159 (providing that “[e]very person who is sentenced and committed under the laws of the Commonwealth to the Department of Corrections or as provided for in - 13 - §§ 19.”
Zeb Gaston v. John B. Taylor, Warden, Samuel Pruett, Assistant Warden, Toni v. Bair, Reg'l Adm'r, 946 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1991). · cites it 2× “Finally, the Virginia parole statutes provide that the decision to release a prisoner on parole is (with the exception of mandatory parole under Va.Code Ann. § 53.1-159) a discretionary one which is dependent on subjective evaluations and predictions of future behavior.”
Ewell v. Murray, 813 F. Supp. 1180 (W.D. Va. 1993). · cites it 4× “The mandatory parole period referred to in Jones is that guaranteed by Va.Code Ann. § 53.1-159, as follows: Every person who is sentenced and committed under the laws of the Commonwealth to the Department of Corrections .”
Woodley v. Departmentt of Corr., 74 F. Supp. 2d 623 (E.D. Va. 1999). · cites it 6× “” Va Code § 53.1-159 (Michie 1998). Nor is it disputed that Petitioner agreed as a condition of parole that he would reside at Onesimus House for the duration of his parole period.”
Douglas Warren v. Alton Baskerville, 233 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2000). · cites it 3× “On February 27, 1995, the Virginia Parole Board released Warren on mandatory parole pursuant to Va.Code Ann. § 53.1-159 (Michie 1998). By that time, Warren had earned four years and seven months of good conduct time allowances.”
Dial v. Vaughn, 733 A.2d 1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999). · cites it 2× “1-159, [the mandatory release on parole requirement], any person convicted of a felony who is in custody after July 1, 1990, shall provide a blood sample prior to his release. [7] At the time Virginia enacted its DNA blood testing program, Va.”
Thomas v. Commonwealth, 819 S.E.2d 437 (Va. 2018). · cites it 2× “At the time the court imposes sentence upon a conviction for any felony offense committed .”
Brown-El v. Virginia Parole Bd., 948 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Va. 1996). · cites it 3× “” 6 The effect of the new policy on parole violators was that the VPB would now incarcerate all violators and require them to serve the remainder of their sentence. Under the former policy, the VPB exercised its statutory discretion with the result that some violators were…”
Jones v. Murray, 763 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Va. 1991). · cites it 2× “Prisoners obviously could not claim that the testing procedure violates their fourth amendment rights, or their privacy interests. However, the above-detailed procedure would allow prisoners to otherwise challenge the constitutionality of the DNA testing procedures as applied to…”
Brown v. Brown (E.D. Va. 2020). · cites it 14× “1311, 1313 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., circuit justice; motion for stay) (ex post facto prohibition does not apply to a “change in guidelines assisting [a government agency] in the exercise of its discretion.”
Perry (E.D. Va. 2026). · cites it 11× “7-1, at 4 (citing Va. Code §§ 53.1-159 and 53.1-165(A).) Cc.”
— Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-159(B2) — 1 case
Minter v. Bennett (W.D. Va. 2021).
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