cites § 8.01-222 9×cited by 41 cases
- Where it cites § 8.01-222
- “Because of the disposition we make of the demurrer issue, we must also consider the application of Code § 8.01-222, which deals with notice to be given cities and towns of claims for damages for negligence.”
- The case’s holding
- A timely notice provision serves as a condition precedent to the right of action in a nuisance claim (Breeding Ex Rel. Breeding v. Hensley).
- Later courts cite it for
- “is filed and a comparison of the original and amended pleading shows that the amended complaint, was intended as a substitute for the original, the case stands as though the original had never been filed, so far as it relates to the statement of facts.” · 4 citing courts
cites § 8.01-222 8×cited by 14 cases
- Where it cites § 8.01-222
- “The City's responsive pleadings denied that Bethel had suffered any damage, but asserted that if it had, Bethel's claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations and by Bethel's failure to give the City notice of its claim, as required by Code § 8.01-222, within six…”
cites § 8.01-222 4×cited by 81 cases
- Where it cites § 8.01-222
- “Illustrations of nonclaim statutes in this state are those providing for liens of laborers and materialmen, claims against estates of deceased persons, and claims for damages against municipal corporations.”
- The case’s holding
- A statute of repose is a substantive provision that extinguishes causes of action and cannot be retroactively revived without violating the due process clause.
- Later courts cite it for
- “statutes of repose reflect legislative decisions that as a matter of policy there should be a specific time beyond which a defendant should no longer be subjected to protracted liability” · 7 citing courts
cites § 8.01-222 4×cited by 57 cases
- Where it cites § 8.01-222
- “The dispositive question in this personal injury action against a municipality is whether the claimant’s notice of accident complied substantially with the mandatory requirements of Code § 8.01-222. In pertinent part, the statute provides: “No action shall be maintained against…”
- The case’s holding
- Actual notice of an accident does not relieve a claimant of the statutory duty to provide written notice of a claim against a political subdivision.
- Later courts cite it for
- “for this court to place any limitation on the clear and comprehensive language of the statute, or to create an exception where none exists under the guise of statutory construction, would be to defeat the purpose of the enactment and to engage in judicial legislation.” · 13 citing courts
cites § 8.01-222 2×cited by 215 cases
- Where it cites § 8.01-222
- “1996); Va.Code Ann. § 8.01-222 (1992). . Although § 12-309 protects only the District of Columbia government and not its employees, Doe has not argued on appeal that the district court erred in applying the notice requirement to all appellees, and therefore has waived the…”
- The case’s holding
- A federal statutory claim under section 1983 fails if the underlying statute imposes only generalized duties rather than creating specific, enforceable individual rights.
- Later courts cite it for
- “a claim that the court lacks jurisdiction under article iii of the constitution may not be waived, since the jurisdiction at issue goes to the foundation of the court's power to resolve a case, and the court is obliged to address it sua sponte.” · 19 citing courts
cites § 8.01-222 4×cited by 34 cases
- Where it cites § 8.01-222
- “William filed a negligence suit against the uninsured motorist and, pursuant to Code § 8.01-222, notified the City of his intention to make a claim "under the City's Uninsured Motorist provisions of [the City's] self-insurance plan.”
- The case’s holding
- Workers' compensation is not the sole remedy available to an employee injured by an uninsured motorist, even when the employer is a self-insurer.
- Later courts cite it for
- “yellow cab is no longer controlling.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 8.01-222 2×cited by 43 cases
- Where it cites § 8.01-222
- “2 The Town also filed a demurrer asserting that Lostrangio failed to allege compliance with Code § 8.01-222 in her motion for judgment, thus barring recovery for any claim against the Town.”
- The case’s holding
- A temporary event is not a recreational facility under the immunity statute, as a facility must be a tangible place built or established for public diversion.
- Later courts cite it for
- “where no evidence is taken in support of a plea in bar, the trial court, and the appellate court upon review, consider solely the pleadings in resolving the issue presented.” · 3 citing courts
cites § 8.01-222 4×cited by 7 cases
- Where it cites § 8.01-222
- “Contrary to Haley's argument, "actual notice" and substantial compliance are not sufficient to satisfy the requirements for claiming an elective share under Code § 64.1-13. The clear and unambiguous requirements of Code § 64.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “would create an exception that has no basis in the text of the statute.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 8.01-222 9×cited by 4 cases
- Where it cites § 8.01-222
- “On May 22, 1991, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment regarding the Virginia law claim (Count II) on two grounds: (1) a claim of sovereign immunity and (2) Plaintiff’s failure to give the City of Hampton notice of the claim as…”
cites § 8.01-222 2×cited by 43 cases
- Where it cites § 8.01-222
- “2d 748 (1984), we dealt with the notice provisions of Code § 8.01-222, which apply to suits against cities and towns.”
- The case’s holding
- Notice provisions of the Virginia Tort Claims Act must be strictly construed and actual notice is insufficient to satisfy statutory requirements (strict compliance with waiver statutes is required).
- Later courts cite it for
- “(1) the time and place at which the injury allegedly occurred and (2) the agency or agencies allegedly liable.” · 3 citing courts
cites § 8.01-222 2×cited by 8 cases
- Where it cites § 8.01-222
- “2d 748, 750 (1984) (holding Town’s “actual notice” of an accident did not remove the injured party’s duty to provide written notice under Code § 8.01-222). “To permit ‘actual notice’ to suffice” when the governing statute requires written notice “would create an exception that…”
- The case’s holding
- A contractor must provide express, timely, written notice of its intent to file a claim to satisfy statutory requirements, as actual notice is insufficient.
- Later courts cite it for
- “to permit actual notice to suffice when the governing statute requires written notice would create an exemption that has no basis in the text of the statute.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 8.01-222 14×cited by 1 case
- Where it cites § 8.01-222
- “*417 The plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that Va. Code § 8.01-222 must be strictly read to apply only to “negligence actions” resulting in damage to “persons or property.”
cites § 8.01-222 2×cited by 8 cases
- Where it cites § 8.01-222
- “The narrow question in this personal injury action is whether the notice to a city of municipal negligence was furnished by the claimant’s “agent” or “representative,” within the meaning of Code § 8.01-222. As pertinent here, the statute provides: “No action shall be maintained…”
cites § 8.01-222 1×cited by 20 cases
- Where it cites § 8.01-222
- “Code § 6043a (now § 8.01-222), was “not jurisdictional to the institution of an action against a city, and that our former decisions so holding should be disapproved and modiñed to that extent.”
- The case’s holding
- The Commonwealth of Virginia is not a person subject to statutory filing deadlines for suits seeking fee reimbursement (Commonwealth Ex Rel. Pross v. Board of Supervisors).
- Later courts cite it for
- “no matter how comprehensive the language, unless named expressly or included by necessary implication.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 8.01-222 5×cited by 1 case
- Where it cites § 8.01-222
- “*49 Notice Requirement of Va. Code § 8.01-222 Under § 8.01-222, “no action may be maintained against any city or town for injury to any person or property or wrongful death alleged to have been sustained by reason of the negligence of die city or town” unless notice thereof is…”
cites § 8.01-222 1×cited by 5 cases
- Where it cites § 8.01-222
- “*539 Failure to Give Statutory Notice (Counts I, II, and III) The City has demurred to Counts I, II, and III because the plaintiffs have not alleged the required notice under § 8.01-222. The Supreme Court of Virginia held in Daniel v.”
cites § 8.01-222 3×cited by 1 case
- Where it cites § 8.01-222
- “In 2007, the notice provisions relating to counties, cities, and towns were moved and reworked by the General Assembly from Va. Code § 8.01-222 to Va. Code § 15.2-209; additionally, subsection G was added at this time.”
cites § 8.01-222 10×cited by 0 cases
- Where it cites § 8.01-222
- “Argument Virginia Code § 8.01-222 requires that “a written statement by the claimant, his agent, attorney, or representative .”
cites § 8.01-222 3×cited by 1 case
- Where it cites § 8.01-222
- “Virginia Code § 8.01-222 provides as follows: No action shall be maintained against any city or town for injury to any person or property or for wrongful death alleged to have been sustained by reason of the negligence of the city or town, or of any officer, agent or employee…”
cites § 8.01-222 4×cited by 0 casesunknown
- Where it cites § 8.01-222
- “In 2007, “the notice provisions relating to counties, cities, and towns were moved and reworked by the General Assembly from Code § 8.01-222 to Code § 15.2-209.” Dixon v.”
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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.