In an action by or against a person who, from any cause, is incapable of testifying, or by or against the committee, trustee, executor, administrator, heir, or other representative of the person so incapable of testifying, no judgment or decree shall be rendered in favor of an adverse or interested party founded on his uncorroborated testimony. In any such action, whether such adverse party testifies or not, all entries, memoranda, and declarations by the party so incapable of testifying made while he was capable, relevant to the matter in issue, may be received as evidence in all proceedings including without limitation those to which a person under a disability is a party. The phrase "from any cause" as used in this section shall not include situations in which the party who is incapable of testifying has rendered himself unable to testify by an intentional self-inflicted injury.
For the purposes of this section, and in addition to corroboration by any other competent evidence, an entry authored by an adverse or interested party contained in a business record may be competent evidence for corroboration of the testimony of an adverse or interested party. If authentication of the business record is not admitted in a request for admission, such business record shall be authenticated by a person other than the author of the entry who is not an adverse or interested party whose conduct is at issue in the allegations of the complaint.
Code 1950, § 8-286; 1977, c. 617; 1988, c. 426; 2013, cc. 61, 637.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
69
cases (
6 in the last 5 years), 1980–2025 · leading case:
Johnson v. Raviotta, 563 S.E.2d 727 (Va. 2002).
Johnson v. Raviotta, 563 S.E.2d 727 (Va. 2002).
· cites it 27× “Bell, claims that certain evidence did not meet the corroboration requirements of Code § 8.01-397 as a matter of law and, therefore, the trial court erred in instructing the jury on corroboration and in allowing the jury to consider such evidence.”
Gelber v. Glock, 800 S.E.2d 800 (Va. 2017).
· cites it 20× “GELBER The Executors assign error to the circuit court's exclusion from evidence of declarations made by Mrs.”
1924 Leonard Road, L.L.C. v. Van Roekel, 636 S.E.2d 378 (Va. 2006).
· cites it 14× “We consider various evidentiary issues decided by the circuit court, including (1) an application of Code § 8.01-397, commonly known as the "dead man's statute," (2) the exclusion of several documents purportedly failing to qualify for admission under the business records…”
Jones v. Williams, 701 S.E.2d 405 (Va. 2010).
· cites it 14× “In this appeal, we consider whether Code § 8.01-397 required corroboration of the testimony of a non-party witness in favor of a prevailing plaintiff when the defendant was incapable of testifying.”
Diehl v. Butts, 499 S.E.2d 833 (Va. 1998).
· cites it 22× “The primary issue that we consider in this appeal of a judgment entered in a medical malpractice action is whether Code § 8.01-397, commonly referred to as the dead man’s statute, barred the admission of the defendant’s testimony.”
Gray v. Graham, 341 S.E.2d 153 (Va. 1986).
· cites it 10× “Graham argues the statements were admissible under Code § 8.01-397, and the parties agree that the admissibility of the statements turns upon our interpretation of the Code section.”
Rice v. Charles, 532 S.E.2d 318 (Va. 2000).
· cites it 10× “In this wrongful death action, we address two separate issues: (1) whether the circuit court erred by striking the defendant’s contributory negligence defense because his testimony in support of that defense was not corroborated as required by Code § 8.01-397, and (2) whether…”
Williams v. Condit, 574 S.E.2d 241 (Va. 2003).
· cites it 49× “In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court erred by granting the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s evidence on the basis that the plaintiff failed to present corroborating testimony as required by Code § 8.01-397, commonly referred to as the dead man’s…”
Morris v. United Virginia Bank, 377 S.E.2d 611 (Va. 1989).
· cites it 6× “” The commissioner also ruled that the requirement of corroboration, imposed by Code § 8.01-397, was fully met by the document dated January 25, 1981, which Mrs.”
Hereford v. Paytes, 311 S.E.2d 790 (Va. 1984).
· cites it 8× “In this appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff in an action for personal injuries against a decedent's estate, we must determine whether the testimony of the surviving plaintiff was corroborated as required by Code § 8.01-397. A collision occurred on Route 20 in Orange County,…”
Vaughn v. Shank, 445 S.E.2d 127 (Va. 1994).
· cites it 14× “Because we find that Vaughn’s evidence provided insufficient corroboration to prove the existence of a contract, we do not reach her second and third assignments of errors.”
Bowman v. Commonwealth, 503 S.E.2d 241 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
· cites it 8× “The Commonwealth contends that Ford’s executor could testify pursuant to Code § 8.01-397 concerning any matter to which Ford could have testified.”
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