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Wash. Rev. CodeTitle 13Chapter 13.40

Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.010 (2025)

Short title—Intent—Purpose

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included cited 1979–2026 152citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 152 opinions since 1979, 17 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (2) (73 cases).

The 20 cases that cite Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.010 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Rice, 655 P.2d 1145 (Wash. 1983).
cites § 13.40.010 30×subsections: (2) 13× (2)(d) 8× (2)(j) 4× (2)(f) 2×cited by 113 cases
Where it cites § 13.40.010
“The stated purpose of the Legislature in enacting the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 (Juvenile Justice Act) is set forth in RCW 13.40.010: (2) It is the intent of the legislature that a system capable of having primary responsibility for, being accountable for, and responding to…”
The case’s holding
The state may impose juvenile confinement terms exceeding adult maximums under a manifest injustice finding because the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile system justifies such classification.
Later courts cite it for
“i n resolving any issue which turns on the legislative purpose of the jaa, we must ensure that our decision effectuates to the fullest possible extent both the purpose of rehabilitation and the purpose of punishment.” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENState v. Schaaf, 743 P.2d 240 (Wash. 1987).
cites § 13.40.010 9×subsections: (2) 2× (2)(a) 2× (2)(c) 2× (2)(j) 2×cited by 183 cases
Where it cites § 13.40.010
“See majority opinion, at 10; see also RCW 9.94A.010(5). Nevertheless, the paramount goal of both systems is punishment.”
The case’s holding
Juvenile proceedings remain rehabilitative in nature and are distinguishable from criminal prosecutions, meaning no constitutional right to a jury trial attaches to juvenile proceedings.
Later courts cite it for
“it does no violence to our state's common law history to give credence to a 70-year-old legal system that was nonexistent in our territorial days.” · 3 citing courts
3
GREENState v. Bird, 622 P.2d 1262 (Wash. 1980).
cites § 13.40.010 12×subsections: (2) 6× (2)(d) 4× (2)(g) 2×cited by 42 cases
Where it cites § 13.40.010
“, concur. DOLLIVER, J. (dissenting) The majority fails to distinguish between the commission of a crime and the disposition to be made when one is found guilty of having committed a crime.”
The case’s holding
Trial courts possess the discretionary authority to suspend sentences in juvenile delinquency proceedings unless the legislature explicitly prohibits such authority.
Later courts cite it for
“punishment to be meted out to the juvenile offender after the commission of the offense.” · 1 citing court
4
GREENState v. B.O.J., 449 P.3d 1006 (Wash. 2019).
cites § 13.40.010 5×subsections: (2)(g) 3× (2) (2)(i)cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 13.40.010
“" RCW 13.40.010(2). Some of the statutorily enumerated purposes will be relevant to this determination (e.”
The case’s holding
A juvenile's need for treatment alone does not establish a serious and clear danger to society sufficient to support a manifest injustice disposition.
Later courts cite it for
“we may then look to legislative history as a further indication of legislative intent.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Posey, 272 P.3d 840 (Wash. 2012).
cites § 13.40.010 5×subsections: (2) 2× (2)(c) 2× (2)(d)cited by 39 cases
Where it cites § 13.40.010
“RCW 13.40.010(2). The act ensures that punishment takes into consideration the age, crime, and criminal history of the juvenile offender.”
The case’s holding
The legislature cannot deprive superior courts of their constitutional jurisdiction over felony offenses because the juvenile court is merely a division of the superior court.
Later courts cite it for
“an antiquated understanding of subject matter jurisdiction” · 3 citing courts
6
GREENTommy P. v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 645 P.2d 697 (Wash. 1982).
cites § 13.40.010 4×subsections: (2) 4×cited by 117 cases
Where it cites § 13.40.010
“And certainly nothing in the JJA suggests that the compulsory education law should not apply to children in detention.”
The case’s holding
School-age juveniles in detention centers have a statutory right to education that the responsible county must fund.
Later courts cite it for
“it is the duty of the court to reconcile apparently conflicting statutes and to give effect to each of them, if this can be achieved without distortion of the language used.” · 4 citing courts
7
GREENState v. Lawley, 591 P.2d 772 (Wash. 1979).
cites § 13.40.010 5×subsections: (2) (2)(c) (2)(f)cited by 65 cases
Where it cites § 13.40.010
“The goals are set forth in RCW 13.40.010. There the legislature declares that it is its intent to establish a system capable of having primary responsibility and accountability for, and responding to the needs of youthful offenders, as defined in that chapter, and that youths,…”
The case’s holding
The right to a jury trial does not extend to juvenile adjudicatory proceedings despite revisions to the juvenile justice system.
Later courts cite it for
“the legislature has changed the philosophy and methodology of addressing the personal and societal problems of juvenile offenders, but it has not converted the procedure into a criminal offense atmosphere totally comparable to an adult criminal offense scenario.” · 3 citing courts
8
GREENIn re the Pers. Restraint of Smiley, 640 P.2d 7 (Wash. 1982).
cites § 13.40.010 7×subsections: (2)(c) 2× (2)(f) 2× (2)(j) 2× (2)(d)cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 13.40.010
“010(2)(f), it also seeks to "[m]ake the juvenile offender accountable for his or her criminal behavior", RCW 13.40.010(2)(c), and provide for "punishment commensurate with the age, crime, and criminal history of the juvenile offender".”
The case’s holding
A juvenile court that declines jurisdiction over a subsequent offense retains concurrent jurisdiction to enforce prior juvenile sentences under the Juvenile Justice Act.
9
GREENState v. JH, 978 P.2d 1121 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
cites § 13.40.010 5×subsections: (2) 2× (2)(a) (2)(k)cited by 43 cases
Where it cites § 13.40.010
“060(2)(b) (attorney-client privilege protects parents from being compelled to disclose the juvenile's communication with his or her attorney); RCW 13.”
The case’s holding
The denial of a jury trial in juvenile proceedings is constitutional because the juvenile justice system remains distinct from the adult criminal system through its rehabilitative focus.
Later courts cite it for
“because the juvenile justice provisions as amended still retain significant differences from the adult criminal justice system and still afford juveniles special protections not offered to adults, then, under the rational relationship test, rcw 13.04.021(2) does not violate the equal protection guarantees of the state and federal constitutions.” · 4 citing courts
10
GREENState v. J.H., 96 Wash. App. 167 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
cites § 13.40.010 5×subsections: (2) 2× (2)(a) (2)(k)cited by 42 cases
Where it cites § 13.40.010
“060(2)(b) (attorney-client privilege protects parents from being compelled to disclose the juvenile’s communication with his or her attorney); RCW 13.”
11
GREENState v. Hunotte, 851 P.2d 694 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
cites § 13.40.010 6×subsections: (2)(c) 2× (2)(h) 2×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 13.40.010
“40: The brief recitation of the legislative intent behind the juvenile justice act, found in RCW 13.40.010, shows the strong policy behind the restitution and community service provisions in the act.”
The case’s holding
Joint participants in a theft are jointly and severally liable for restitution for damage foreseeably caused by an attempt to escape apprehension after the theft.
12
GREENState v. J.P., 69 P.3d 318 (Wash. 2003).
cites § 13.40.010 1×subsections: (2)(c)cited by 549 cases
Where it cites § 13.40.010
“” RCW 13.40.010(2)(c), (h). These general expressions of intent, however, do not negate the legislature’s intent, evident in the definition of the term “restitution,” to limit restitution to certain types of crime-related costs.”
The case’s holding
A specific and recent statutory provision prevails over a general provision when determining legislative intent during statutory construction.
13
GREENState v. Weber, 149 P.3d 646 (Wash. 2006).
cites § 13.40.010 1×subsections: (2)cited by 307 cases
Where it cites § 13.40.010
“, RCW 13.40.010(2) (listing goals of the Juvenile Justice Act, including protection of the public, accountability, punishment, and provision of necessary treatment for juvenile offenders); RCW 13.”
The case’s holding
Juvenile adjudications qualify as prior convictions under the Apprendi exception and may be included in an offender score without violating a defendant's constitutional rights.
14
GREENState v. Shawn P., 859 P.2d 1220 (Wash. 1993).
cites § 13.40.010 2×subsections: (2)(d) 2×cited by 118 cases
Where it cites § 13.40.010
“[52] RCW 13.40.010(2)(d). See also Washington State Juvenile Disposition Standards Comm'n, Juvenile Disposition Standards Philosophy and Guide 14 (1984) (a juvenile's age is a key factor in developing and administering sanctions).”
The case’s holding
Mandatory revocation of driving privileges for minors who violate alcohol laws does not violate equal protection (State v. Shawn P.).
Later courts cite it for
“the legislative classification will be upheld unless it rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to achievement of legitimate state objectives.” · 10 citing courts
15
REDState v. Rhodes, 600 P.2d 1264 (Wash. 1979).
cites § 13.40.010 2×subsections: (2)cited by 72 cases
Overruled by State v. Baldwin, which says: “Therefore, our decision in State v. Rhodes, 92 Wash.2d 755, 600 P.2d 1264 (1979), is overruled.” Citing opinions that cite it for other points: 4 citing opinions limit it to other groun…
Where it cites § 13.40.010
“160(4); see also RCW 13.40.010. Evidence such as probation officers' reports and psychological and psychiatric studies is available to the court to assist it in determining whether a clear danger to society exists.”
The case’s holding
The promulgation of standard disposition ranges for juvenile offenders creates a constitutionally protected liberty interest.
Later courts cite it for
“in order to stand on review, the standard range for this offense and this defendant must present, beyond a reasonable doubt, a clear danger to society.” · 7 citing courts
16
GREENState v. Saenz, 283 P.3d 1094 (Wash. 2012).
cites § 13.40.010 2×subsections: (2) 2×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 13.40.010
“” RCW 13.40.010(2) (emphasis added). Thus, although the act made juvenile courts more punitive, it preserved the fundamental difference between juvenile courts and adult courts — unlike wholly punitive adult courts, juvenile courts remained rehabilitative.”
The case’s holding
A juvenile court cannot transfer a case to adult court until it enters written findings that the transfer is in the best interest of the juvenile or the public.
Later courts cite it for
“cannot transfer a case to adult court.” · 3 citing courts
17
GREENState v. Bacon, 415 P.3d 207 (Wash. 2018).
cites § 13.40.010 2×subsections: (2)(d) (2)(h)cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 13.40.010
“13 RCW 13.40.010(2)(d). 14 RCW 13.40.010(2)(h).”
18
GREENState v. J.A., 20 P.3d 487 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 13.40.010 2×subsections: (2)cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 13.40.010
“RCW 13.40.010. State v. T.C., 99 Wn. App.”
19
GREENMonroe v. Soliz, 939 P.2d 205 (Wash. 1997).
cites § 13.40.010 2×subsections: (2) (2)(f)cited by 59 cases
Where it cites § 13.40.010
“” RCW 13.40.010(2). To hold otherwise would interfere with the "necessary treatment, supervision, and custody for juvenile offenders” by exposing the residents of juvenile institutions to the almost daily disruptions of juvenile inmates like Monroe.”
The case’s holding
Administrative transfer of a juvenile to an adult facility does not trigger a right to a jury trial because the right to a jury trial does not extend to juvenile proceedings.
Later courts cite it for
“not been construed to guarantee the right of trial by jury in juvenile proceedings.” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENState v. Smith, 658 P.2d 1250 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).
cites § 13.40.010 4×subsections: (2)(h)cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 13.40.010
“See RCW 13.40.010, .190. This standard ach *798 ieves those objectives.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197920022026

One bar per year. Tallest: 8 cases in 1997. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Wash. Ct. App.109Wash.42W.D. Wash.1
By subsection
(1)1 case
State v. Payne, 795 P.2d 134 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
(2)73 cases
State v. Rice, 655 P.2d 1145 (Wash. 1983).“The stated purpose of the Legislature in enacting the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 (Juvenile Justice Act) is set forth in RCW 13.40.010: (2) It is the intent of the legislature that a system capable of having primary responsibility for, being accountable for, and responding to…”
Tommy P. v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 645 P.2d 697 (Wash. 1982).“And certainly nothing in the JJA suggests that the compulsory education law should not apply to children in detention.”
State v. Bird, 622 P.2d 1262 (Wash. 1980).“, concur. DOLLIVER, J. (dissenting) The majority fails to distinguish between the commission of a crime and the disposition to be made when one is found guilty of having committed a crime.”
State v. Schaaf, 743 P.2d 240 (Wash. 1987).“See majority opinion, at 10; see also RCW 9.94A.010(5). Nevertheless, the paramount goal of both systems is punishment.”
State v. Weber, 149 P.3d 646 (Wash. 2006).“, RCW 13.40.010(2) (listing goals of the Juvenile Justice Act, including protection of the public, accountability, punishment, and provision of necessary treatment for juvenile offenders); RCW 13.”
Showing the top 5 of 73. More in the list view →
(2)(a)29 cases
State v. Schaaf, 743 P.2d 240 (Wash. 1987).
State v. Rice, 655 P.2d 1145 (Wash. 1983).
State v. T.E.C., 92 P.3d 263 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
State v. Ferreira, 850 P.2d 541 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
State v. JH, 978 P.2d 1121 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).“060(2)(b) (attorney-client privilege protects parents from being compelled to disclose the juvenile's communication with his or her attorney); RCW 13.”
Showing the top 5 of 29. More in the list view →
(2)(c)19 cases
State v. J.P., 69 P.3d 318 (Wash. 2003).“” RCW 13.40.010(2)(c), (h). These general expressions of intent, however, do not negate the legislature’s intent, evident in the definition of the term “restitution,” to limit restitution to certain types of crime-related costs.”
State v. Schaaf, 743 P.2d 240 (Wash. 1987).
State v. Posey, 272 P.3d 840 (Wash. 2012).“RCW 13.40.010(2). The act ensures that punishment takes into consideration the age, crime, and criminal history of the juvenile offender.”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Smiley, 640 P.2d 7 (Wash. 1982).“010(2)(f), it also seeks to "[m]ake the juvenile offender accountable for his or her criminal behavior", RCW 13.40.010(2)(c), and provide for "punishment commensurate with the age, crime, and criminal history of the juvenile offender".”
State v. Hunotte, 851 P.2d 694 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).“40: The brief recitation of the legislative intent behind the juvenile justice act, found in RCW 13.40.010, shows the strong policy behind the restitution and community service provisions in the act.”
Showing the top 5 of 19. More in the list view →
(2)(d)7 cases
State v. Rice, 655 P.2d 1145 (Wash. 1983).
State v. Bird, 622 P.2d 1262 (Wash. 1980).
State v. Shawn P., 859 P.2d 1220 (Wash. 1993).“[52] RCW 13.40.010(2)(d). See also Washington State Juvenile Disposition Standards Comm'n, Juvenile Disposition Standards Philosophy and Guide 14 (1984) (a juvenile's age is a key factor in developing and administering sanctions).”
State v. Posey, 272 P.3d 840 (Wash. 2012).
State v. Bacon, 415 P.3d 207 (Wash. 2018).“13 RCW 13.40.010(2)(d). 14 RCW 13.40.010(2)(h).”
Showing the top 5 of 7. More in the list view →
(2)(e)5 cases
State v. M.S., 484 P.3d 1231 (Wash. 2021).
State v. D.L., 484 P.3d 448 (Wash. 2021).
State v. S.S., 840 P.2d 891 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
State v. SS, 840 P.2d 891 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
State Of Washington v. Lola Felipa Luna, No. 57943-0 (Wash. Ct. App. June 11, 2024).
(2)(f)17 cases
State v. Rice, 655 P.2d 1145 (Wash. 1983).
In re the Pers. Restraint of Smiley, 640 P.2d 7 (Wash. 1982).
State v. Lawley, 591 P.2d 772 (Wash. 1979).“The goals are set forth in RCW 13.40.010. There the legislature declares that it is its intent to establish a system capable of having primary responsibility and accountability for, and responding to the needs of youthful offenders, as defined in that chapter, and that youths,…”
Monroe v. Soliz, 939 P.2d 205 (Wash. 1997).“” RCW 13.40.010(2). To hold otherwise would interfere with the "necessary treatment, supervision, and custody for juvenile offenders” by exposing the residents of juvenile institutions to the almost daily disruptions of juvenile inmates like Monroe.”
State v. SH, 877 P.2d 205 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
Showing the top 5 of 17. More in the list view →
(2)(g)4 cases
State v. B.O.J., 449 P.3d 1006 (Wash. 2019).“" RCW 13.40.010(2). Some of the statutorily enumerated purposes will be relevant to this determination (e.”
State v. Bird, 622 P.2d 1262 (Wash. 1980).
State v. WS, 700 P.2d 1192 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
State of Washington v. Jonathan Howard Shurtz, No. 34654-4 (Wash. Ct. App. June 27, 2017).
(2)(h)12 cases
State v. Schaaf, 743 P.2d 240 (Wash. 1987).
State v. Hunotte, 851 P.2d 694 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
State v. Bacon, 415 P.3d 207 (Wash. 2018).
State v. Mollichi, 936 P.2d 408 (Wash. 1997).
State v. Mollichi, 936 P.2d 408 (Wash. 1997).
Showing the top 5 of 12. More in the list view →
(2)(i)2 cases
State v. B.O.J., 449 P.3d 1006 (Wash. 2019).
State v. Todd, 103 Wash. App. 783 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
(2)(j)8 cases
State v. Rice, 655 P.2d 1145 (Wash. 1983).
State v. Schaaf, 743 P.2d 240 (Wash. 1987).
State v. Manro, 104 P.3d 708 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
In re the Pers. Restraint of Smiley, 640 P.2d 7 (Wash. 1982).
State v. Manro, 125 Wash. App. 165 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
Showing the top 5 of 8. More in the list view →
(2)(k)3 cases
State v. JH, 978 P.2d 1121 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
State v. J.H., 96 Wash. App. 167 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).“060(2)(b) (attorney-client privilege protects parents from being compelled to disclose the juvenile’s communication with his or her attorney); RCW 13.”
State of Washington v. D.K.V., 483 P.3d 813 (Wash. Ct. App. 2021).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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