Revised Code of Washington
Wash. Rev. Code § 49.12.200 (2026)
Women may pursue any calling open to men
✓ current as of May 2026
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That hereafter in this state every avenue of employment shall be open to women; and any business, vocation, profession and calling followed and pursued by men may be followed and pursued by women, and no person shall be disqualified from engaging in or pursuing any business, vocation, profession, calling or employment or excluded from any premises or place of work or employment on account of sex.
[ 1963 c 229 s 1; 1890 p 519 s 1; RRS s 7620.]
Notes:
Qualifications of electors: State Constitution Art. 6 s 1 (Amendment 63).
Sex equality—Rights and responsibility: State Constitution Art. 31 ss 1, 2 (Amendment 61).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 13
cases, 1971–2013 · leading case: Roberts v. Dudley, 993 P.2d 901 (Wash. 2000).
Roberts v. Dudley, 993 P.2d 901 (Wash. 2000). “61), nor RCW 49.12.200 creates a source of public policy against discrimination, as neither is directed at private employment.”
Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 193 P.3d 128 (Wash. 2008). “2d 901 ("This clearly articulated public policy is based on RCW 49.12.200 and RCW 49.60.010 and has been previously recognized in Marquis v.”
Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 165 Wash. 2d 200 (Wash. 2008). “at 77 (“This clearly articulated public policy is based on RCW 49.12.200 and RCW 49.60.010 and has been previously recognized in Marquis v.”
Thibodeau v. Design Grp. One Architects, LLC, 802 A.2d 731 (Conn. 2002). “2d 67 , quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 49.12.200 (2000) (upholding cause of action for discriminatory discharge based upon statutory pronouncement that “every avenue of employment shall be open to women; and any business, vocation, profession and calling followed and pursued by men…”
J.S.K. Enter., Inc. v. City of Lacey, 492 P.2d 600 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971). “the police power of the City of Lacey; (2) it regulates sauna and massage parlor businesses but does not prohibit them; (3) the fact that a regulatory ordinance changes the nature of the business by its regulation does not make it discriminating; (4) the ordinance is clear and…”
Sedlacek v. Hillis, 36 P.3d 1014 (Wash. 2001). “2d 901 (citing RCW 49.12.200 and chapter 49.60 RCW) and in Washington case law, id.”
Cudney v. Alsco, Inc., 259 P.3d 244 (Wash. 2011). “2d 901 (2000) (recognizing claim under RCW 49.12.200 and Washington's Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), chapter 49.”
Cudney v. ALSCO, Inc., 172 Wash. 2d 524 (Wash. 2011). “2d 901 (2000) (recognizing claim under RCW 49.12.200 and Washington’s Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), chapter 49.”
Piel v. City of Fed. Way, 306 P.3d 879 (Wash. 2013). “An overbroad reading of Korslund and Cudney would fail to account for this long line of precedent allowing wrongful discharge tort claims to exist alongside sometimes comprehensive admin *615 istrative remedies.”
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). “We see no analogy between the right of women to administer massages to men and the question of whether the prohibition against same-sex marriages is unconstitutional. The right recognized in J.”
City of Seattle v. Hinkley, 517 P.2d 592 (Wash. 1973). “) Therefore, the City of Seattle has been authorized by statute to enact the challenged ordinance.”
Roberts v. Dudley, 993 P.2d 901 (Wash. 2000). “61), nor RCW 49.12.200 creates a source of public policy against discrimination, as neither is directed at private employment.”
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