Wash. Rev. Code » Title 7 · Chapter 7.28
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 7.28.090 (2026)

✓ current as of May 2026
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RCW 7.28.070 and 7.28.080 shall not extend to lands or tenements owned by the United States or this state, nor to school lands, nor to lands held for any public purpose. Nor shall they extend to lands or tenements when there shall be an adverse title to such lands or tenements, and the holder of such adverse title is a person under eighteen years of age, or has been placed under a guardianship under RCW 11.130.265 or has been placed under a conservatorship under RCW 11.130.360. However, such persons as aforesaid shall commence an action to recover such lands or tenements so possessed as aforesaid, within three years after the several disabilities herein enumerated shall cease to exist, and shall prosecute such action to judgment, or in case of vacant and unoccupied land shall, within the time last aforesaid, pay to the person or persons who have paid the same for his or her betterments, and the taxes, with interest on said taxes at the legal rate per annum that have been paid on said vacant and unimproved land.
[ 2020 c 312 s 703; 1977 ex.s. c 80 s 7; 1971 ex.s. c 292 s 7; 1893 c 11 s 5; RRS s 790.]

Notes:

Effective dates—2020 c 312: See note following RCW 11.130.915.
Purpose—Intent—Severability—1977 ex.s. c 80: See notes following RCW 4.16.190.
Severability—1971 ex.s. c 292: See note following RCW 26.28.010.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 16 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1974–2022 · leading case: Kiely v. Graves, 271 P.3d 226 (Wash. 2012).
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Kiely v. Graves, 271 P.3d 226 (Wash. 2012). · cites it 11× “Because the city of Port Townsend did not vacate the alley until February 2009, its interest in the alley prevented the Kielys from obtaining the property through adverse possession.”
Paul Michel, Et Ano, V. City Of Seattle, 498 P.3d 522 (Wash. Ct. App. 2021). · cites it 36× “The common law rule of nullum tempus occurrit regi (no time runs against the king) shields only those lands used in a governmental capacity and is narrower than this statutory immunity because RCW 7.”
Acord v. Pettit, 302 P.3d 1265 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 2× “However, citing to RCW 7.28.090, 5 the court further concluded that the Pettits cannot claim the contested area by adverse possession because they have not made the now statutorily required “substantial improvements” within the contested area.”
Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. v. State, 695 P.2d 996 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 2× “160 provides in part: [T]here shall be no limitation to actions brought in the name or for the benefit of the state, and no claim of right predicated upon the lapse of time shall ever be asserted against the state: .”
Peters v. Skalman, 617 P.2d 448 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980). “The trial court determined that she was not insane as required by the applicable tolling statute, RCW 7.28.090 (repealed and recodified in 1977 to refer to incompetence).”
Williams Place, LLC v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp., 348 P.3d 797 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015). “3d 626 (2006) (citing RCW 7.28.090). ¶69 Williams Place provided the trial court with photographs and declarations that demonstrated genuine factual issues as to continual use, but it did not present evidence that the use had been adverse.”
Galvis v. State, Dept. of Transp., 167 P.3d 584 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). “Rather, their only claim to lost access is that once the project is implemented, their customers and tenants will no longer be able to park in the public right of way. But the owners never had a compensable right to park in the right of way and have not acquired such a right by…”
Erickson Bushling, Inc. v. Manke Lumber Co., 891 P.2d 750 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 3× “Erickson’s motion was granted, and in its memorandum opinion granting partial summary judgment, the trial court noted that RCW 7.28.090, the general rule that adverse possession cannot run against lands held for a public purpose, applies only where the government has title to…”
Sisson v. Koelle, 520 P.2d 1380 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). “The trial court found that plaintiffs had acquired no interest in the disputed property because defendants’ predecessors in interest had acquired both parcels by adverse possession prior to either execution of the quitclaim deeds or the action quieting title against Clallam…”
Northlake Marine Works, Inc. v. Dep't of Nat. Resources, 138 P.3d 626 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). “DNR’s failure to act does not grant Northlake any continuing right to use the waterway because adverse possession and prescriptive easements do not lie against the state.”
Tracy & Barbara Neighbors v. King Co. (Wash. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 2× “79492-2-I/13 County’s ownership of the corridor contradicts the plain language of the complaint indicating it was the County, not BNSF, who had lost rights to the corridor.”
Long Fam. Trust v. Chelan Cnty. Pub. Works (E.D. Wash. 2021). · cites it 2× “Wash. Rev. Code § 7.28.090 ; see also Mueller v.”
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