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Wash. Rev. CodeTitle 9Chapter 9.94

Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94.030 (2025)

Holding person hostage—Interference with officer's duties

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laws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included cited 1956–2020 15citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 15 opinions since 1956. The most litigated part is subsection (27)(a)(ii) (2 cases).

The 15 cases that cite Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94.030 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Bower, 626 P.2d 39 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981).
cites § 9.94.030 6×cited by 28 cases
Where it cites § 9.94.030
“Bower, appeals a judgment and sentence entered upon his conviction at a jury trial of a violation of RCW 9.94.030, preventing a prison guard from performing his duties.”
The case’s holding
A prison-inmate statute implies a knowledge element, and obstructing a public servant is a lesser included offense of preventing a guard's duties.
2
GREENIn re Pers. Restraint of Arnold, 410 P.3d 1133 (Wash. 2018).
cites § 9.94.030 1×subsections: (46)(b)cited by 45 cases
Where it cites § 9.94.030
“080 (1979) does not change the analysis required by former RCW 9.94.030(46)(b) (2012) ¶21 The Court of Appeals in Taylor read the comparability requirement differently.”
The case’s holding
One division of the court of appeals is not bound by the decisions of another division.
Later courts cite it for
“ur current system of rigorous debate at the intermediate appellate level creates the best structure for the development of washington common law.” · 1 citing court
3
GREENState v. Jennings, 44 P.3d 1 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
cites § 9.94.030 1×subsections: (27)(a)(ii)cited by 88 cases
Where it cites § 9.94.030
“The Act provides that when an offender is convicted of a felony that is a "most serious offense," and the offender has two prior most serious offense convictions, he is a persistent offender and is subject to confinement for life without possibility of parole. Former RCW 9.”
The case’s holding
A court may correct a mistake in a prior decision if the error is clear and the correction does not undermine the legitimacy of the judicial process (adopting Neder v. United States).
Later courts cite it for
“applied to an element omitted from, or misstated in, a jury instruction, the error was harmless if that element is supported by uncontroverted evidence.” · 3 citing courts
4
GREENIn re the Pers. Restraint of Carrier, 272 P.3d 209 (Wash. 2012).
cites § 9.94.030 1×subsections: (13)(b)cited by 67 cases
Where it cites § 9.94.030
“Former RCW 9.94.030(13)(b) (2004). Carrier's suspended sentence remains a conviction because it has never been vacated.”
The case’s holding
A statute may not be applied retroactively to infringe a vested right in the vacated status of a conviction.
Later courts cite it for
“if the precipitating event under the statute occurred after the date of enactment.” · 3 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Neuman, 683 S.E.2d 268 (S.C. 2009).
cites § 9.94.030 2×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 9.94.030
“"); Wash. Rev.Code Ann. § 9.94.030 (2003 & Supp.”
6
GREENState v. Robinson, 263 P.3d 1233 (Wash. 2011).
cites § 9.94.030 1×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 9.94.030
“3d 294 (2001) (holding that the definition of "criminal history" in former RCW 9.94.030 did not include defendants' washed out juvenile convictions), abrogated by State v.”
The case’s holding
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea entered after judgment must satisfy both the requirements for relief from a judgment and the standards for correcting a plea (CrR 7.8(b) and CrR 4.2(f)).
Later courts cite it for
“a defendant does not knowingly plead guilty when he bases that plea on misinformation regarding sentencing consequences.” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENState v. Robinson, 172 Wash. 2d 783 (2011).
cites § 9.94.030 1×cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 9.94.030
“3d 294 (2001) (holding that the definition of “criminal history” in former RCW 9.94.030 did not include defendants’ washed-out juvenile convictions), abrogated by State v.”
8
GREENState v. Jennings, 111 Wash. App. 54 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
cites § 9.94.030 1×subsections: (27)(a)(ii)cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 9.94.030
“The Act provides that when an offender is convicted of a felony that is a “most serious offense,” and the offender has two prior most serious offense convictions, he is a persistent offender and is subject to confinement for life without possibility of parole. Former RCW 9.”
9
GREENState Of Washington v. Alan D. Jenks, 459 P.3d 389 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).
cites § 9.94.030 1×subsections: (3)cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 9.94.030
“Remedial Nature of Amendment Jenks argues that the 2019 amendment to RCW 9.94.030(3) must be applied retroactively because it is a remedial amendment.”
Later courts cite it for
“a defendant's sentence is determined based on the law in effect at the time the defendant committed the crime for which they are being sentenced.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENState v. Davis, 294 P.2d 934 (Wash. 1956).
cites § 9.94.030 2×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 9.94.030
“RCW 9.94.030. (The significance of “purportedly” is explained later.”
Later courts cite it for
“ujnless the intended victims of a defendant who is an inmate of a state penal institution, and of his co-conspirators, are officers of a state penal institution, the statute would have no application” · 1 citing court
11
GREENState v. Dalseg, 132 Wash. App. 854 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
cites § 9.94.030 1×subsections: (31)cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 9.94.030
“030(32) (formerly codified as RCW 9.94.030(31)). 3 ¶25 Here, Dalseg’s and Cestnik’s judgment and sentences specifically authorize work release in accordance with RCW 9.”
12
NEUTRALState v. Halsen, 746 P.2d 1235 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 9.94.030 1×subsections: (18)cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 9.94.030
“" Further, in 1985 the definition of a "victim" was added to RCW 9.94A's definition section as follows: "Victim" means any person who has sustained physical or financial injury to person or property as a direct result of the crime charged.”
13
NO FLAGState v. Pinkowsky, 623 P.2d 735 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981).
cites § 9.94.030 3×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 9.94.030
“Defendant, Robert Pinkowsky, appeals from a judgment and sentence finding him guilty of a felony under RCW 9.94.030. We affirm. The statute provides as follows: Whenever any inmate of a state penal institution shall hold, or participate in holding, any person as a hostage, by…”
14
NO FLAGState Of Washington v. D'angelo A. Saloy, No. 72467-3 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2017).
cites § 9.94.030 1×cited by 0 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 9.94.030
“First degree murder is defined as a serious crime by RCW 9.94.030. Thus, even if the State had filed charges before Saloy turned 18, his case would have automatically transferred into the jurisdiction of the adult criminal court.”
15
NO FLAGDonnie Durrett v. Stephen Sinclair, No. 78246-1 (Wash. Ct. App. July 29, 2019).
cites § 9.94.030 1×subsections: (36)cited by 0 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 9.94.030
“RCW 9.94.030(36). “Total confinement” means confinement inside the physical boundaries of a facility or institution operated or utilized under contract by the state or any other unit of government for twenty-four hours a day, or pursuant to RCW 72.”

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
195619882020

One bar per 2 years. Tallest: 2 cases in 1980–1981. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Wash. Ct. App.9Wash.5S.C.1
By subsection
(3)1 case
State Of Washington v. Alan D. Jenks, 459 P.3d 389 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).“Remedial Nature of Amendment Jenks argues that the 2019 amendment to RCW 9.94.030(3) must be applied retroactively because it is a remedial amendment.”
(13)(b)1 case
In re the Pers. Restraint of Carrier, 272 P.3d 209 (Wash. 2012).“Former RCW 9.94.030(13)(b) (2004). Carrier's suspended sentence remains a conviction because it has never been vacated.”
(18)1 case
State v. Halsen, 746 P.2d 1235 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).“" Further, in 1985 the definition of a "victim" was added to RCW 9.94A's definition section as follows: "Victim" means any person who has sustained physical or financial injury to person or property as a direct result of the crime charged.”
(27)(a)(ii)2 cases
State v. Jennings, 44 P.3d 1 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).“The Act provides that when an offender is convicted of a felony that is a "most serious offense," and the offender has two prior most serious offense convictions, he is a persistent offender and is subject to confinement for life without possibility of parole. Former RCW 9.”
State v. Jennings, 111 Wash. App. 54 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).“The Act provides that when an offender is convicted of a felony that is a “most serious offense,” and the offender has two prior most serious offense convictions, he is a persistent offender and is subject to confinement for life without possibility of parole. Former RCW 9.”
(31)1 case
State v. Dalseg, 132 Wash. App. 854 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).“030(32) (formerly codified as RCW 9.94.030(31)). 3 ¶25 Here, Dalseg’s and Cestnik’s judgment and sentences specifically authorize work release in accordance with RCW 9.”
(36)1 case
Donnie Durrett v. Stephen Sinclair, No. 78246-1 (Wash. Ct. App. July 29, 2019).“RCW 9.94.030(36). “Total confinement” means confinement inside the physical boundaries of a facility or institution operated or utilized under contract by the state or any other unit of government for twenty-four hours a day, or pursuant to RCW 72.”
(46)(b)1 case
In re Pers. Restraint of Arnold, 410 P.3d 1133 (Wash. 2018).“080 (1979) does not change the analysis required by former RCW 9.94.030(46)(b) (2012) ¶21 The Court of Appeals in Taylor read the comparability requirement differently.”
Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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