Revised Code of Washington
Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.570 (2026)
Persistent offenders
✓ current as of May 2026
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Notwithstanding the statutory maximum sentence or any other provision of this chapter, a persistent offender shall be sentenced to a term of total confinement for life without the possibility of release or, when authorized by *RCW 10.95.030 for the crime of aggravated murder in the first degree, sentenced to death. In addition, no offender subject to this section may be eligible for community custody, earned release time, furlough, home detention, partial confinement, work crew, work release, or any other form of release as defined under **RCW 9.94A.728 (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (8), or (9), or any other form of authorized leave from a correctional facility while not in the direct custody of a corrections officer or officers, except: (1) In the case of an offender in need of emergency medical treatment; or (2) for the purpose of commitment to an inpatient treatment facility in the case of an offender convicted of the crime of rape in the first degree.
[ 2000 c 28 s 6. Formerly RCW 9.94A.560.]
Notes:
Reviser's note: *(1) RCW 10.95.030 was amended by 2023 c 102 s 20, deleting subsection (2) relating to "death sentence."
**(2) RCW 9.94A.728 was amended by 2009 c 455 s 2, deleting subsections (1) and (2) and changing subsections (3), (4), (6), (8), and (9) to subsections (2), (3), (5), (7), and (8), respectively. RCW 9.94A.728 was subsequently amended by 2015 c 156 s 1, changing subsections (2), (3), (5), (7), and (8) to subsection (1)(b), (c), (e), (g), and (h), respectively. RCW 9.94A.728 was subsequently amended by 2018 c 166 s 2, changing subsection (1)(g) and (h) to subsection (1)(h) and (i), respectively.
Technical correction bill—2000 c 28: See note following RCW 9.94A.015.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 186
cases (41 in the last 5 years), 2003–2026 · leading case: State v. Moretti, 446 P.3d 609 (Wash. 2019).
State v. Moretti, 446 P.3d 609 (Wash. 2019). “Because Moretti had previously been convicted oftwo separate most serious offenses,' he was labeled a "persistent offender" under RCW 9.94A.570 and was given the mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole.”
State v. Jenks, 487 P.3d 482 (Wash. 2021). “98496-4 listed second degree robbery a most serious offense. Therefore former RCW 9.94A.”
State v. Crawford, 159 Wash. 2d 86 (Wash. 2006). “Taking into account Crawford’s prior criminal convictions, the Pierce County Superior Court sentenced him to a life sentence without the possibility of parole under the Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA), RCW 9.94A.570. Before the Court of Appeals, Crawford raised two…”
State Of Washington v. Kevin Lee Estes, 372 P.3d 163 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016). “2 1 RCW 9.94A.570 2 Because of our resolution of this case on this ground, we do not address the other issues Estes raised in his appeal and his SAG.”
State v. Crawford, 147 P.3d 1288 (Wash. 2006). “Taking into account Crawford's prior criminal convictions, the Pierce County Superior Court sentenced him to a life sentence without the possibility of parole under the Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA), RCW 9.94A.570. Before the Court of Appeals, Crawford raised two…”
State v. Sublett, 292 P.3d 715 (Wash. 2012). “He was sentenced to life without the possibility of release under the Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA), RCW 9.94A.570, based on prior out-of-state convictions found comparable to Washington strike offenses.”
State v. Smith, 75 P.3d 934 (Wash. 2003). “Following convictions for burglary in the first degree and criminal trespass in the first degree, the trial court found Russell Smith to be a persistent offender under the Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA), RCW 9.94A.570, and sentenced him to life without the…”
State v. Witherspoon, 329 P.3d 888 (Wash. 2014). “RCW 9.94A.570 (“[n]otwithstanding the statutory maximum sentence or any other provision of this chapter, a persistent offender shall be sentenced to a term of total confinement for life without the possibility of release”).”
State Of Washington v. Jeremiah Teas, 447 P.3d 606 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019). “2d 741, 756 , 278 P.3d 653 (2012). The effect of a prosecutor’s conduct is viewed in “‘the context of the total argument, the issues in the case, the evidence addressed in the argument, and the instructions given 2 RCW 9.”
State v. Ortega, 84 P.3d 935 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). “Arguing that the Texas conviction was a felony sexual offense, the State asserted that the current offense was a second strike authorizing the trial court to impose a life sentence without the possibility of parole pursuant to RCW 9.94A.570. Mr. Ortega objected to admission of…”
State v. McKague, 159 Wash. App. 489 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). “¶8 Based on his prior felony convictions for second degree assault, first degree kidnapping, and first degree robbery, the State had alleged that McKague was a persistent offender under RCW 9.94A.570. The trial court examined certified copies of the judgment and sentence forms…”
State v. Lewis, 141 Wash. App. 367 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). “At sentencing, the State argued that the trial court must sentence Lewis under the Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA), RCW 9.94A.570, because Lewis had a 1994 conviction for assault in the second degree (Pierce County Superior Court cause No.”
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