Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 9.95.009 (2026)

✓ current as of May 2026

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(1) On July 1, 1986, the board of prison terms and paroles shall be redesignated as the indeterminate sentence review board. The board's membership shall be reduced as follows: On July 1, 1986, and on July 1st of each year until 1998, the number of board members shall be reduced in a manner commensurate with the board's remaining workload as determined by the office of financial management based upon its population forecast for the indeterminate sentencing system and in conjunction with the budget process. To meet the statutory obligations of the indeterminate sentence review board, the number of board members shall not be reduced to fewer than three members, although the office of financial management may designate some or all members as part-time members and specify the extent to which they shall be less than full-time members. Any reduction shall take place by the expiration, on that date, of the term or terms having the least time left to serve.

(2) After July 1, 1984, the board shall continue its functions with respect to persons convicted of crimes committed prior to July 1, 1984, and committed to the department of corrections. When making decisions on duration of confinement, including those relating to persons committed under a mandatory life sentence, and parole release under RCW 9.95.100 and 9.95.110, the board shall consider the purposes, standards, and sentencing ranges under chapter 9.94A RCW of the sentencing reform act and the minimum term recommendations of the sentencing judge and prosecuting attorney, and shall attempt to make decisions reasonably consistent with those ranges, standards, purposes, and recommendations: PROVIDED, That the board and its successors shall give adequate written reasons whenever a minimum term or parole release decision is made which is outside the sentencing ranges under chapter 9.94A RCW of the sentencing reform act. In making such decisions, the board and its successors shall consider the different charging and disposition practices under the indeterminate sentencing system.

(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (2) of this section, the indeterminate sentence review board shall give public safety considerations the highest priority when making all discretionary decisions on the remaining indeterminate population regarding the ability for parole, parole release, and conditions of parole.

[ 2011 1st sp.s. c 40 s 41; 1990 c 3 s 707; 1989 c 259 s 1; 1986 c 224 s 6; 1985 c 279 s 1; 1982 c 192 s 8; 1981 c 137 s 24.]

Notes:

Application—Recalculation of community custody terms—2011 1st sp.s. c 40: See note following RCW 9.94A.501.

Effective date—Severability—1986 c 224: See notes following RCW 9.95.001.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 74 cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1984–2024 · leading case: In the Matter of Pers. Restraint of Powell, 814 P.2d 635 (Wash. 2004).

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In the Matter of Pers. Restraint of Powell, 814 P.2d 635 (Wash. 2004). · cites it 17× “259; RCW 9.95.009, .013, .115, .116. This statute requires that a minimum sentence which roughly conforms to Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA) criteria be set for inmates who, like petitioners, are serving mandatory life sentences for crimes committed before July 1, 1984.”

In Re Pers. Restraint of Dyer, 189 P.3d 759 (Wash. 2008). · cites it 28× “¶ 25 Dyer claims that the ISRB's actions contradict this court's construction of RCW 9.95.009(2) in Addleman . RCW 9.95.009(2) provides the ISRB must "consider the purposes, standards, and sentencing ranges" outlined in the SRA as well as the "minimum term recommendations of the…”

Addleman v. Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 730 P.2d 1327 (Wash. 1986). · cites it 20× “We accepted certified review of consolidated habeas corpus petitions alleging the original RCW 9.95.009 has (1) an ex post facto infirmity due to its abolition of the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles in 1988 and (2) statutory construction problems and equal protection problems…”

In re the Pers. Restraint of Dyer, 164 Wash. 2d 274 (Wash. 2008). · cites it 23× “009(2) provides the ISRB must “consider the purposes, standards, and sentencing ranges” outlined in the SRA as well as the “minimum term recommendations of the sentencing judge and prosecuting attorney.” The ISRB must also “attempt to make decisions reasonably consistent with…”

In re the Pers. Restraint of Addleman, 151 Wash. 2d 769 (Wash. 2004). · cites it 16× “RCW 9.95.009(2). 3 However, that duty must be balanced with the fact that prisoners serving indeterminate sentences are not resentenced under the SRA.”

In Re Addleman, 92 P.3d 221 (Wash. 2004). · cites it 16× “In fact, the ISRB "shall not, however, until his or her maximum term expires, release a prisoner, unless in its opinion his or her rehabilitation has been complete and he or she is a fit subject for release.”

In Re the Pers. Restraint of Myers, 714 P.2d 303 (Wash. 1986). · cites it 14× “040, and shall attempt to make decisions reasonably consistent with those ranges and standards. (Italics ours.”

Matter of Pers. Restraint of Locklear, 823 P.2d 1078 (Wash. 1992). · cites it 17× “The relevant statute here is RCW 9.95.009(2), which requires the ISRB to "give adequate written reasons whenever a minimum term .”

In Re Ecklund, 985 P.2d 342 (Wash. 1999). · cites it 14× “Ecklund then filed a PRP with the Court of Appeals, Division Two, claiming that the Board "violated RCW 9.95.009(2) ... because it failed to give appropriate consideration to the SRA standard range and failed to give adequate written reasons for its decision" and that it…”

In re the Pers. Restraint of Ecklund, 139 Wash. 2d 166 (Wash. 1999). · cites it 14× “Ecklund then filed a PRP with the Court of Appeals, Division Two, claiming that the Board “violated RCW 9.95.009(2) . . . because it failed to give appropriate consideration to the SRA standard range and failed to give adequate written reasons for its decision” and that it…”

In Re the Pers. Restraint of Whitesel, 763 P.2d 199 (Wash. 1988). · cites it 8× “Did the 1986 amendment of the transition statute (RCW 9.95.009(2)) and the 1400 Review procedures implemented thereunder violate equal protection guaranties? Decision Issue One.”

In Re Dyer, 139 P.3d 320 (Wash. 2006). · cites it 7× “" RCW 9.95.009(2). ¶ 3 The SRA directs that "[w]hen making decisions on duration of confinement, .”

Show all 74 citing cases →

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.95.009(1) — 6 cases

Addleman v. Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 730 P.2d 1327 (Wash. 1986). “We accepted certified review of consolidated habeas corpus petitions alleging the original RCW 9.95.009 has (1) an ex post facto infirmity due to its abolition of the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles in 1988 and (2) statutory construction problems and equal protection problems…”

In Re the Pers. Restraint of Irwin, 751 P.2d 289 (Wash. 1988).

In Re the Pers. Restraint of Blair, 688 P.2d 532 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).

Pers. Restraint Petition Of Manuel Parejo, 428 P.3d 130 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).

In Re Quackenbush, 16 P.3d 638 (Wash. 2001).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.95.009(2) — 64 cases

In the Matter of Pers. Restraint of Powell, 814 P.2d 635 (Wash. 2004). “259; RCW 9.95.009, .013, .115, .116. This statute requires that a minimum sentence which roughly conforms to Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA) criteria be set for inmates who, like petitioners, are serving mandatory life sentences for crimes committed before July 1, 1984.”

In Re Pers. Restraint of Dyer, 189 P.3d 759 (Wash. 2008). “¶ 25 Dyer claims that the ISRB's actions contradict this court's construction of RCW 9.95.009(2) in Addleman . RCW 9.95.009(2) provides the ISRB must "consider the purposes, standards, and sentencing ranges" outlined in the SRA as well as the "minimum term recommendations of the…”

In re the Pers. Restraint of Dyer, 164 Wash. 2d 274 (Wash. 2008). “009(2) provides the ISRB must “consider the purposes, standards, and sentencing ranges” outlined in the SRA as well as the “minimum term recommendations of the sentencing judge and prosecuting attorney.” The ISRB must also “attempt to make decisions reasonably consistent with…”

In re the Pers. Restraint of Addleman, 151 Wash. 2d 769 (Wash. 2004). “RCW 9.95.009(2). 3 However, that duty must be balanced with the fact that prisoners serving indeterminate sentences are not resentenced under the SRA.”

In Re Addleman, 92 P.3d 221 (Wash. 2004). “In fact, the ISRB "shall not, however, until his or her maximum term expires, release a prisoner, unless in its opinion his or her rehabilitation has been complete and he or she is a fit subject for release.”

— Wash. Rev. Code § 9.95.009(3) — 16 cases

In re the Pers. Restraint of Haynes, 996 P.2d 637 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).

In Re Dyer, 139 P.3d 320 (Wash. 2006). “" RCW 9.95.009(2). ¶ 3 The SRA directs that "[w]hen making decisions on duration of confinement, .”

In re the Pers. Restraint of Dyer, 157 Wash. 2d 358 (Wash. 2006).

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